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APPLICANTS	IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CRESTOR FLED ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED 2401 02680	
	AND IN THE MATTER OF THE PLAN OF C ARRANGEMENT OF RAZOR ENERGY CO HOLDINGS GP CORP., AND BLADE ENER CORP.	RP., RAZOBM
DOCUMENT	BOOK OF AUTHORITIES FOR THE BENCH BRIEF OF RAZOR ENER RAZOR HOLDINGS GP CORP., AND BLAD SERVICES CORP. TO BE HEARD ON MARCH 6, 2024 AT 3:0	DE ENERGY
ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT	McCarthy Tétrault LLP 4000, 421 – 7 th Avenue SW Calgary, AB T2P 4K9 Attention: Sean Collins / Pantelis Kyriakakis Tel: 403-260-3531 / 3536 / 3534 Fax: 403-260-3501 Email: scollins@mccarthy.ca / pkyriakakis@ nstewart@mccarthy.ca	

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Clerk's Stamp

COURT FILE NUMBER	2401-02680	
COURT	COURT OF KING'S BENCH OF ALBERTA	
JUDICIAL CENTRE	CALGARY	
APPLICANTS	IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED	
	AND IN THE MATTER OF THE PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF RAZOR ENERGY CORP., RAZOR HOLDINGS GP CORP., AND BLADE ENERGY SERVICES CORP.	
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LIST OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES

1. *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, at sections 11, 11.51 and 11.52;

CASE LAW

- 2. 9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp., 2020 SCC 10;
- 3. 1057863 B.C. Ltd. (Re), 2020 BCSC 1359;
- 4. *Canadian Airlines Corp. (Re)*, (2000), 19 CBR (4th) I;
- 5. *Canwest Publishing Inc.*, 2010 ONSC 222;
- 6. *Century Services Inc v Canada (Attorney General)*, 2010 SCC 60;
- 7. In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Aleafia Health Inc, et al., Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List), Court File No. CV-23-00703350-00CL, Amended and Restated Initial Order pronounced by the Honourable Justice Penny on August 4, 2023;
- 8. In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Trees Corporation, et al., Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List), Court File No. CV-23-00711935-00CL, Second Amended and Restated Initial Order pronounced by the Honourable Justice Osbourne on January 29, 2024;
- 9. In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Wolverine Energy and Infrastructure Inc., et al, Court of King's Bench of Alberta, Court File No. 2301-15988, CCAA Initial Order pronounced by the Honourable Justice Whitling on November 30, 2023;
- 10. In the Matter of Application by IMV Inc., Immunovaccine Technologies Inc. and IMV USA Inc. for Relief Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Court File No. Hfx No. 523334, Amended and Restated Initial Order pronounced by the Honourable Justice Bodurtha on May 1, 2023;
- 11. *Mantle Materials Group (Re)*, 2024 ABKB 19;
- 12. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (Re), 2008 ONCA 587;
- 13. *Re Jaguar Mining Inc.*, 2014 ONSC 494;
- 14. Re Lehndorff General Partners Ltd (1993), 17 CBR (3d) 24, 9 BLR 275 (Ont Gen Div);
- 15. Sherman Estate v Donovan, 2021 SCC 25;
- 16. Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41;
- 17. Stelco Inc (Re), 2005 CanLII 8671 (ONCA);

- 18. Timminco Limited (Re), 2012 ONSC 506; and,
- 19. Wiebe v Weinrich Contracting Ltd, 2020 ABCA 396.





CANADA

CONSOLIDATION

CODIFICATION

Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36

L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-36

Current to February 6, 2024

Last amended on April 27, 2023

À jour au 6 février 2024

Dernière modification le 27 avril 2023

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OFFICIAL STATUS OF CONSOLIDATIONS

Subsections 31(1) and (2) of the *Legislation Revision and Consolidation Act*, in force on June 1, 2009, provide as follows:

Published consolidation is evidence

31 (1) Every copy of a consolidated statute or consolidated regulation published by the Minister under this Act in either print or electronic form is evidence of that statute or regulation and of its contents and every copy purporting to be published by the Minister is deemed to be so published, unless the contrary is shown.

Inconsistencies in Acts

(2) In the event of an inconsistency between a consolidated statute published by the Minister under this Act and the original statute or a subsequent amendment as certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments under the *Publication of Statutes Act*, the original statute or amendment prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.

CARACTÈRE OFFICIEL DES CODIFICATIONS

Les paragraphes 31(1) et (2) de la *Loi sur la révision et la codification des textes législatifs*, en vigueur le 1^{er} juin 2009, prévoient ce qui suit :

Codifications comme élément de preuve

31 (1) Tout exemplaire d'une loi codifiée ou d'un règlement codifié, publié par le ministre en vertu de la présente loi sur support papier ou sur support électronique, fait foi de cette loi ou de ce règlement et de son contenu. Tout exemplaire donné comme publié par le ministre est réputé avoir été ainsi publié, sauf preuve contraire.

Incompatibilité – lois

(2) Les dispositions de la loi d'origine avec ses modifications subséquentes par le greffier des Parlements en vertu de la *Loi sur la publication des lois* l'emportent sur les dispositions incompatibles de la loi codifiée publiée par le ministre en vertu de la présente loi.

LAYOUT

The notes that appeared in the left or right margins are now in boldface text directly above the provisions to which they relate. They form no part of the enactment, but are inserted for convenience of reference only.

NOTE

This consolidation is current to February 6, 2024. The last amendments came into force on April 27, 2023. Any amendments that were not in force as of February 6, 2024 are set out at the end of this document under the heading "Amendments Not in Force".

MISE EN PAGE

Les notes apparaissant auparavant dans les marges de droite ou de gauche se retrouvent maintenant en caractères gras juste au-dessus de la disposition à laquelle elles se rattachent. Elles ne font pas partie du texte, n'y figurant qu'à titre de repère ou d'information.

NOTE

Cette codification est à jour au 6 février 2024. Les dernières modifications sont entrées en vigueur le 27 avril 2023. Toutes modifications qui n'étaient pas en vigueur au 6 février 2024 sont énoncées à la fin de ce document sous le titre « Modifications non en vigueur ».

Form of applications

10 (1) Applications under this Act shall be made by petition or by way of originating summons or notice of motion in accordance with the practice of the court in which the application is made.

Documents that must accompany initial application

(2) An initial application must be accompanied by

(a) a statement indicating, on a weekly basis, the projected cash flow of the debtor company;

(b) a report containing the prescribed representations of the debtor company regarding the preparation of the cash-flow statement; and

(c) copies of all financial statements, audited or unaudited, prepared during the year before the application or, if no such statements were prepared in that year, a copy of the most recent such statement.

Publication ban

(3) The court may make an order prohibiting the release to the public of any cash-flow statement, or any part of a cash-flow statement, if it is satisfied that the release would unduly prejudice the debtor company and the making of the order would not unduly prejudice the company's creditors, but the court may, in the order, direct that the cash-flow statement or any part of it be made available to any person specified in the order on any terms or conditions that the court considers appropriate. R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 10; 2005, c. 47, s. 127.

General power of court

11 Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

R.S., 1985, c. C-36, s. 11; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1996, c. 6, s. 167; 1997, c. 12, s. 124; 2005, c. 47, s. 128.

Relief reasonably necessary

11.001 An order made under section 11 at the same time as an order made under subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order made under that subsection with respect to an initial application shall be

Forme des demandes

10 (1) Les demandes prévues par la présente loi peuvent être formulées par requête ou par voie d'assignation introductive d'instance ou d'avis de motion conformément à la pratique du tribunal auquel la demande est présentée.

Documents accompagnant la demande initiale

(2) La demande initiale doit être accompagnée :

a) d'un état portant, projections à l'appui, sur l'évolution hebdomadaire de l'encaisse de la compagnie débitrice;

b) d'un rapport contenant les observations réglementaires de la compagnie débitrice relativement à l'établissement de cet état;

c) d'une copie des états financiers, vérifiés ou non, établis au cours de l'année précédant la demande ou, à défaut, d'une copie des états financiers les plus récents.

Interdiction de mettre l'état à la disposition du public

(3) Le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, interdire la communication au public de tout ou partie de l'état de l'évolution de l'encaisse de la compagnie débitrice s'il est convaincu que sa communication causerait un préjudice indu à celle-ci et que sa non-communication ne causerait pas de préjudice indu à ses créanciers. Il peut toutefois préciser dans l'ordonnance que tout ou partie de cet état peut être communiqué, aux conditions qu'il estime indiquées, à la personne qu'il nomme.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 10; 2005, ch. 47, art. 127.

Pouvoir général du tribunal

11 Malgré toute disposition de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* ou de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les re-structurations*, le tribunal peut, dans le cas de toute demande sous le régime de la présente loi à l'égard d'une compagnie débitrice, rendre, sur demande d'un intéressé, mais sous réserve des restrictions prévues par la présente loi et avec ou sans avis, toute ordonnance qu'il estime indiquée.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-36, art. 11; 1992, ch. 27, art. 90; 1996, ch. 6, art. 167; 1997, ch. 12, art. 124; 2005, ch. 47, art. 128.

Redressements normalement nécessaires

11.001 L'ordonnance rendue au titre de l'article 11 en même temps que l'ordonnance rendue au titre du paragraphe 11.02(1) ou pendant la période visée dans l'ordonnance rendue au titre de ce paragraphe relativement à la demande initiale n'est limitée qu'aux redressements normalement nécessaires à la continuation de l'exploitation limited to relief that is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period.

2019, c. 29, s. 136.

Rights of suppliers

11.01 No order made under section 11 or 11.02 has the effect of

(a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or

(b) requiring the further advance of money or credit. 2005, c. 47, s. 128.

Stays, etc. - initial application

11.02 (1) A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 10 days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

Stays, etc. — other than initial application

(2) A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(a);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

de la compagnie débitrice dans le cours ordinaire de ses affaires durant cette période.

2019, ch. 29, art. 136.

Droits des fournisseurs

11.01 L'ordonnance prévue aux articles 11 ou 11.02 ne peut avoir pour effet :

a) d'empêcher une personne d'exiger que soient effectués sans délai les paiements relatifs à la fourniture de marchandises ou de services, à l'utilisation de biens loués ou faisant l'objet d'une licence ou à la fourniture de toute autre contrepartie de valeur qui ont lieu après l'ordonnance;

b) d'exiger le versement de nouvelles avances de fonds ou de nouveaux crédits.

2005, ch. 47, art. 128.

Suspension : demande initiale

11.02 (1) Dans le cas d'une demande initiale visant une compagnie débitrice, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, aux conditions qu'il peut imposer et pour la période maximale de dix jours qu'il estime nécessaire :

a) suspendre, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, toute procédure qui est ou pourrait être intentée contre la compagnie sous le régime de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* ou de la *Loi sur les liquidations et les restructurations*;

b) surseoir, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, à la continuation de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie;

c) interdire, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, l'introduction de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie.

Suspension : demandes autres qu'initiales

(2) Dans le cas d'une demande, autre qu'une demande initiale, visant une compagnie débitrice, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, aux conditions qu'il peut imposer et pour la période qu'il estime nécessaire :

a) suspendre, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, toute procédure qui est ou pourrait être intentée contre la compagnie sous le régime des lois mentionnées à l'alinéa (1)a);

b) surseoir, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, à la continuation de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie;

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

Burden of proof on application

(3) The court shall not make the order unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

Restriction

(4) Orders doing anything referred to in subsection (1) or (2) may only be made under this section.

2005, c. 47, s. 128, 2007, c. 36, s. 62(F); 2019, c. 29, s. 137.

Stays - directors

11.03 (1) An order made under section 11.02 may provide that no person may commence or continue any action against a director of the company on any claim against directors that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relates to obligations of the company if directors are under any law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of those obligations, until a compromise or an arrangement in respect of the company, if one is filed, is sanctioned by the court or is refused by the creditors or the court.

Exception

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of an action against a director on a guarantee given by the director relating to the company's obligations or an action seeking injunctive relief against a director in relation to the company.

Persons deemed to be directors

(3) If all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the company is deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.

2005, c. 47, s. 128.

Persons obligated under letter of credit or guarantee

11.04 No order made under section 11.02 has affect on any action, suit or proceeding against a person, other than the company in respect of whom the order is made,

c) interdire, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, l'introduction de toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la compagnie.

Preuve

(3) Le tribunal ne rend l'ordonnance que si :

a) le demandeur le convainc que la mesure est opportune;

b) dans le cas de l'ordonnance visée au paragraphe (2), le demandeur le convainc en outre qu'il a agi et continue d'agir de bonne foi et avec la diligence voulue.

Restriction

(4) L'ordonnance qui prévoit l'une des mesures visées aux paragraphes (1) ou (2) ne peut être rendue qu'en vertu du présent article.

2005, ch. 47, art. 128, 2007, ch. 36, art. 62(F); 2019, ch. 29, art. 137.

Suspension — administrateurs

11.03 (1) L'ordonnance prévue à l'article 11.02 peut interdire l'introduction ou la continuation de toute action contre les administrateurs de la compagnie relativement aux réclamations qui sont antérieures aux procédures intentées sous le régime de la présente loi et visent des obligations de la compagnie dont ils peuvent être, ès qualités, responsables en droit, tant que la transaction ou l'arrangement, le cas échéant, n'a pas été homologué par le tribunal ou rejeté par celui-ci ou les créanciers.

Exclusion

(2) La suspension ne s'applique toutefois pas aux actions contre les administrateurs pour les garanties qu'ils ont données relativement aux obligations de la compagnie ni aux mesures de la nature d'une injonction les visant au sujet de celle-ci.

Présomption : administrateurs

(3) Si tous les administrateurs démissionnent ou sont destitués par les actionnaires sans être remplacés, quiconque dirige ou supervise les activités commerciales et les affaires internes de la compagnie est réputé un administrateur pour l'application du présent article. 2005, ch. 47, art. 128.

Suspension — lettres de crédit ou garanties

11.04 L'ordonnance prévue à l'article 11.02 est sans effet sur toute action, poursuite ou autre procédure contre la

is satisfied that the director is unreasonably impairing or is likely to unreasonably impair the possibility of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company or is acting or is likely to act inappropriately as a director in the circumstances.

Filling vacancy

(2) The court may, by order, fill any vacancy created under subsection (1).

1997, c. 12, s. 124; 2005, c. 47, s. 128.

Security or charge relating to director's indemnification

11.51 (1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company after the commencement of proceedings under this Act.

Priority

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

Restriction — indemnification insurance

(3) The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

Negligence, misconduct or fault

(4) The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

2005, c. 47, s. 128; 2007, c. 36, s. 66.

Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs

11.52 (1) On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of

convaincu que ce dernier, sans raisons valables, compromet ou compromettra vraisemblablement la possibilité de conclure une transaction ou un arrangement viable ou agit ou agira vraisemblablement de façon inacceptable dans les circonstances.

Vacance

(2) Le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, combler toute vacance découlant de la révocation.

1997, ch. 12, art. 124; 2005, ch. 47, art. 128.

Biens grevés d'une charge ou sûreté en faveur d'administrateurs ou de dirigeants

11.51 (1) Sur demande de la compagnie débitrice, le tribunal peut par ordonnance, sur préavis de la demande aux créanciers garantis qui seront vraisemblablement touchés par la charge ou sûreté, déclarer que tout ou partie des biens de celle-ci sont grevés d'une charge ou sûreté, d'un montant qu'il estime indiqué, en faveur d'un ou de plusieurs administrateurs ou dirigeants pour l'exécution des obligations qu'ils peuvent contracter en cette qualité après l'introduction d'une procédure sous le régime de la présente loi.

Priorité

(2) Il peut préciser, dans l'ordonnance, que la charge ou sûreté a priorité sur toute réclamation des créanciers garantis de la compagnie.

Restriction – assurance

(3) Il ne peut toutefois rendre une telle ordonnance s'il estime que la compagnie peut souscrire, à un coût qu'il estime juste, une assurance permettant d'indemniser adéquatement les administrateurs ou dirigeants.

Négligence, inconduite ou faute

(4) Il déclare, dans l'ordonnance, que la charge ou sûreté ne vise pas les obligations que l'administrateur ou le dirigeant assume, selon lui, par suite de sa négligence grave ou de son inconduite délibérée ou, au Québec, par sa faute lourde ou intentionnelle.

2005, ch. 47, art. 128; 2007, ch. 36, art. 66.

Biens grevés d'une charge ou sûreté pour couvrir certains frais

11.52 (1) Le tribunal peut par ordonnance, sur préavis aux créanciers garantis qui seront vraisemblablement touchés par la charge ou sûreté, déclarer que tout ou partie des biens de la compagnie débitrice sont grevés d'une charge ou sûreté, d'un montant qu'il estime indiqué, pour couvrir :

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

Priority

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

2005, c. 47, s. 128; 2007, c. 36, s. 66.

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act matters

11.6 Notwithstanding the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*,

(a) proceedings commenced under Part III of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* may be taken up and continued under this Act only if a proposal within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* has not been filed under that Part; and

(b) an application under this Act by a bankrupt may only be made with the consent of inspectors referred to in section 116 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* but no application may be made under this Act by a bankrupt whose bankruptcy has resulted from

(i) the operation of subsection 50.4(8) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, or

(ii) the refusal or deemed refusal by the creditors or the court, or the annulment, of a proposal under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*.

1997, c. 12, s. 124.

Court to appoint monitor

11.7 (1) When an order is made on the initial application in respect of a debtor company, the court shall at the same time appoint a person to monitor the business and financial affairs of the company. The person so appointed must be a trustee, within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*.

a) les débours et honoraires du contrôleur, ainsi que ceux des experts — notamment en finance et en droit — dont il retient les services dans le cadre de ses fonctions;

b) ceux des experts dont la compagnie retient les services dans le cadre de procédures intentées sous le régime de la présente loi;

c) ceux des experts dont tout autre intéressé retient les services, si, à son avis, la charge ou sûreté était nécessaire pour assurer sa participation efficace aux procédures intentées sous le régime de la présente loi.

Priorité

(2) Il peut préciser, dans l'ordonnance, que la charge ou sûreté a priorité sur toute réclamation des créanciers garantis de la compagnie.

2005, ch. 47, art. 128; 2007, ch. 36, art. 66.

Lien avec la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité

11.6 Par dérogation à la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* :

a) les procédures intentées sous le régime de la partie III de cette loi ne peuvent être traitées et continuées sous le régime de la présente loi que si une proposition au sens de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* n'a pas été déposée au titre de cette même partie;

b) le failli ne peut faire une demande au titre de la présente loi qu'avec l'aval des inspecteurs visés à l'article 116 de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*, aucune demande ne pouvant toutefois être faite si la faillite découle, selon le cas :

(i) de l'application du paragraphe 50.4(8) de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité*,

(ii) du rejet — effectif ou présumé — de sa proposition par les créanciers ou le tribunal ou de l'annulation de celle-ci au titre de cette loi.

1997, ch. 12, art. 124.

Nomination du contrôleur

11.7 (1) Le tribunal qui rend une ordonnance sur la demande initiale nomme une personne pour agir à titre de contrôleur des affaires financières ou autres de la compagnie débitrice visée par la demande. Seul un syndic au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la *Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité* peut être nommé pour agir à titre de contrôleur.



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9354-9186 Québec inc. and 9354-9178 Québec inc. *Appellants*

v.

Callidus Capital Corporation, International Game Technology, Deloitte LLP, Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, Francis Proulx and François Pelletier *Respondents*

and

Ernst & Young Inc., IMF Bentham Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Limited), Bentham IMF Capital Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Capital (Canada) Limited), Insolvency Institute of Canada and Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals Interveners

- and -

IMF Bentham Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Limited) and Bentham IMF Capital Limited (now known as Omni Bridgeway Capital (Canada) Limited) Appellants

v.

Callidus Capital Corporation, International Game Technology, Deloitte LLP, Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, Francis Proulx and François Pelletier *Respondents* 9354-9186 Québec inc. et 9354-9178 Québec inc. Appelantes

С.

Callidus Capital Corporation, International Game Technology, Deloitte S.E.N.C.R.L., Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, Francis Proulx et François Pelletier Intimés

et

Ernst & Young Inc.,

IMF Bentham Limited (maintenant connue sous le nom d'Omni Bridgeway Limited), Corporation Bentham IMF Capital (maintenant connue sous le nom de Corporation Omni Bridgeway Capital (Canada)), Institut d'insolvabilité du Canada et Association canadienne des professionnels de l'insolvabilité et de la réorganisation Intervenants

- et -

IMF Bentham Limited (maintenant connue sous le nom d'Omni Bridgeway Limited) et Corporation Bentham IMF Capital (maintenant connue sous le nom de Corporation Omni Bridgeway Capital (Canada)) Appelantes

С.

Callidus Capital Corporation, International Game Technology, Deloitte S.E.N.C.R.L., Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, Francis Proulx et François Pelletier Intimés Ernst & Young Inc., 9354-9186 Québec inc., 9354-9178 Québec inc., Insolvency Institute of Canada and Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals Interveners

INDEXED AS: 9354-9186 QUÉBEC INC. V. Callidus Capital Corp.

2020 SCC 10

File No.: 38594.

Hearing and judgment: January 23, 2020.

Reasons delivered: May 8, 2020.

Present: Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe and Kasirer JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR QUEBEC

Bankruptcy and insolvency — Discretionary authority of supervising judge in proceedings under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Appellate review of decisions of supervising judge — Whether supervising judge has discretion to bar creditor from voting on plan of arrangement where creditor is acting for improper purpose — Whether supervising judge can approve third party litigation funding as interim financing — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ss. 11, 11.2.

The debtor companies filed a petition for the issuance of an initial order under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") in November 2015. The petition succeeded, and the initial order was issued by a supervising judge, who became responsible for overseeing the proceedings. Since then, substantially all of the assets of the debtor companies have been liquidated, with the notable exception of retained claims for damages against the companies' only secured creditor. In September 2017, the secured creditor proposed a plan of arrangement, which later failed to receive sufficient creditor support. In February 2018, the secured creditor proposed another, virtually identical, plan of arrangement. It also sought the supervising judge's permission to vote on this new plan in the same class as the debtor companies' unsecured creditors, on the basis that its security was worth nil. Around the Ernst & Young Inc., 9354-9186 Québec inc., 9354-9178 Québec inc., Institut d'insolvabilité du Canada et Association canadienne des professionnels de l'insolvabilité et de la réorganisation Intervenants

Répertorié : 9354-9186 Québec inc. *c*. Callidus Capital Corp.

2020 CSC 10

Nº du greffe : 38594.

Audition et jugement : 23 janvier 2020.

Motifs déposés : 8 mai 2020.

Présents : Le juge en chef Wagner et les juges Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe et Kasirer.

EN APPEL DE LA COUR D'APPEL DU QUÉBEC

Faillite et insolvabilité — Pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge surveillant dans une instance introduite sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Contrôle en appel des décisions du juge surveillant — Le juge surveillant a-t-il le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'empêcher un créancier de voter sur un plan d'arrangement si ce créancier agit dans un but illégitime? — Le juge surveillant peut-il approuver le financement de litige par un tiers à titre de financement temporaire? — Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies, L.R.C. 1985, c. C-36, art. 11, 11.2.

En novembre 2015, les compagnies débitrices déposent une requête en délivrance d'une ordonnance initiale sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (« LACC »). La requête est accueillie, et l'ordonnance initiale est rendue par un juge surveillant, qui est chargé de surveiller le déroulement de l'instance. Depuis, la quasi-totalité des éléments d'actif de la compagnie débitrice ont été liquidés, à l'exception notable des réclamations réservées en dommages-intérêts contre le seul créancier garanti des compagnies. En septembre 2017, le créancier garanti propose un plan d'arrangement, qui n'obtient pas subséquemment l'appui nécessaire des créanciers. En février 2018, le créancier garanti propose un autre plan d'arrangement, presque identique au premier. Il demande aussi au juge surveillant la permission de voter sur ce nouveau plan dans la même catégorie que

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same time, the debtor companies sought interim financing in the form of a proposed third party litigation funding agreement, which would permit them to pursue litigation of the retained claims. They also sought the approval of a related super-priority litigation financing charge.

The supervising judge determined that the secured creditor should not be permitted to vote on the new plan because it was acting with an improper purpose. As a result, the new plan had no reasonable prospect of success and was not put to a creditors' vote. The supervising judge allowed the debtor companies' application, authorizing them to enter into a third party litigation funding agreement. On appeal by the secured creditor and certain of the unsecured creditors, the Court of Appeal set aside the supervising judge's order, holding that he had erred in reaching the foregoing conclusions.

Held: The appeal should be allowed and the supervising judge's order reinstated.

The supervising judge made no error in barring the secured creditor from voting or in authorizing the third party litigating funding agreement. A supervising judge has the discretion to bar a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement where they determine that the creditor is acting for an improper purpose. A supervising judge can also approve third party litigation funding as interim financing, pursuant to s. 11.2 of the *CCAA*. The Court of Appeal was not justified in interfering with the supervising judge's discretionary decisions in this regard, having failed to treat them with the appropriate degree of deference.

The *CCAA* is one of three principal insolvency statutes in Canada. It pursues an array of overarching remedial objectives that reflect the wide ranging and potentially catastrophic impacts insolvency can have. These objectives include: providing for timely, efficient and impartial resolution of a debtor's insolvency; preserving and maximizing the value of a debtor's assets; ensuring fair and equitable treatment of the claims against a debtor; protecting the public interest; and, in the context of a commercial insolvency, balancing the costs and benefits of restructuring or liquidating the company. The architecture of the *CCAA* leaves the case-specific assessment and balancing of these objectives to the supervising judge. les créanciers non garantis des compagnies débitrices, au motif que sa sûreté ne vaut rien. À peu près au même moment, les compagnies débitrices demandent un financement temporaire sous forme d'un accord de financement de litige par un tiers qui leur permettrait de poursuivre l'instruction des réclamations réservées. Elles sollicitent également l'approbation d'une charge super-prioritaire pour financer le litige.

Le juge surveillant décide que le créancier garanti ne peut voter sur le nouveau plan parce qu'il agit dans un but illégitime. En conséquence, le nouveau plan n'a aucune possibilité raisonnable d'être avalisé et il n'est pas soumis au vote des créanciers. Le juge surveillant accueille la demande des compagnies débitrices et les autorise à conclure un accord de financement de litige par un tiers. À l'issue d'un appel formé par le créancier garanti et certains des créanciers non garantis, la Cour d'appel annule l'ordonnance du juge surveillant, estimant qu'il est parvenu à tort aux conclusions qui précèdent.

Arrêt : Le pourvoi est accueilli et l'ordonnance du juge surveillant est rétablie.

Le juge surveillant n'a commis aucune erreur en empêchant le créancier garanti de voter ou en approuvant l'accord de financement de litige par un tiers. Un juge surveillant a le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'empêcher un créancier de voter sur un plan d'arrangement s'il décide que le créancier agit dans un but illégitime. Un juge surveillant peut aussi approuver le financement de litige par un tiers à titre de financement temporaire, en vertu de l'art. 11.2 de la *LACC*. La Cour d'appel n'était pas justifiée de modifier les décisions discrétionnaires du juge surveillant à cet égard et n'a pas fait preuve de la déférence à laquelle elle était tenue par rapport à ces décisions.

La LACC est l'une des trois principales lois canadiennes en matière d'insolvabilité. Elle poursuit un grand nombre d'objectifs réparateurs généraux qui témoignent de la vaste gamme des conséquences potentiellement catastrophiques qui peuvent découler de l'insolvabilité. Ces objectifs incluent les suivants : régler de façon rapide, efficace et impartiale l'insolvabilité d'un débiteur; préserver et maximiser la valeur des actifs d'un débiteur; assurer un traitement juste et équitable des réclamations déposées contre un débiteur; protéger l'intérêt public; et, dans le contexte d'une insolvabilité commerciale, établir un équilibre entre les coûts et les bénéfices découlant de la restructuration ou de la liquidation d'une compagnie. La structure de la LACC laisse au juge surveillant le soin de procéder à un examen et à une mise en balance au cas par cas de ces objectifs.

From beginning to end, each proceeding under the CCAA is overseen by a single supervising judge, who has broad discretion to make a variety of orders that respond to the circumstances of each case. The anchor of this discretionary authority is s. 11 of the CCAA, with empowers a judge to make any order that they consider appropriate in the circumstances. This discretionary authority is broad, but not boundless. It must be exercised in furtherance of the remedial objectives of the CCAA and with three baseline considerations in mind: (1) that the order sought is appropriate in the circumstances, and (2) that the applicant has been acting in good faith and (3) with due diligence. The due diligence consideration discourages parties from sitting on their rights and ensures that creditors do not strategically manoeuvre or position themselves to gain an advantage. A high degree of deference is owed to discretionary decisions made by judges supervising CCAA proceedings and, as such, appellate intervention will only be justified if the supervising judge erred in principle or exercised their discretion unreasonably.

A creditor can generally vote on a plan of arrangement or compromise that affects its rights, subject to any specific provisions of the CCAA that may restrict its voting rights, or a proper exercise of discretion by the supervising judge to constrain or bar the creditor's right to vote. Given that the CCAA regime contemplates creditor participation in decision-making as an integral facet of the workout regime, the discretion to bar a creditor from voting should only be exercised where the circumstances demand such an outcome. Where a creditor is seeking to exercise its voting rights in a manner that frustrates, undermines, or runs counter to the remedial objectives of the CCAA ---that is, acting for an improper purpose - s. 11 of the CCAA supplies the supervising judge with the discretion to bar that creditor from voting. This discretion parallels the similar discretion that exists under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and advances the basic fairness that permeates Canadian insolvency law and practice. Whether this discretion ought to be exercised in a particular case is a circumstance-specific inquiry that the supervising judge is best-positioned to undertake.

In the instant case, the supervising judge's decision to bar the secured creditor from voting on the new plan discloses no error justifying appellate intervention. When he made this decision, the supervising judge was intimately

Chaque procédure fondée sur la LACC est supervisée du début à la fin par un seul juge surveillant, qui a le vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire de rendre toute une gamme d'ordonnances susceptibles de répondre aux circonstances de chaque cas. Le point d'ancrage de ce pouvoir discrétionnaire est l'art. 11 de la LACC, lequel confère au juge le pouvoir de rendre toute ordonnance qu'il estime indiquée. Quoique vaste, ce pouvoir discrétionnaire n'est pas sans limites. Son exercice doit tendre à la réalisation des objectifs réparateurs de la LACC et tenir compte de trois considérations de base : (1) que l'ordonnance demandée est indiquée, et (2) que le demandeur a agi de bonne foi et (3) avec la diligence voulue. La considération de diligence décourage les parties de rester sur leurs positions et fait en sorte que les créanciers n'usent pas stratégiquement de ruse ou ne se placent pas eux-mêmes dans une position pour obtenir un avantage. Les décisions discrétionnaires des juges chargés de la supervision des procédures intentées sous le régime de la LACC commandent un degré élevé de déférence. En conséquence, les cours d'appel ne seront justifiées d'intervenir que si le juge surveillant a commis une erreur de principe ou exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire de manière déraisonnable.

En général, un créancier peut voter sur un plan d'arrangement ou une transaction qui a une incidence sur ses droits, sous réserve des dispositions de la LACC qui peuvent limiter son droit de voter, ou de l'exercice justifié par le juge surveillant de son pouvoir discrétionnaire de limiter ou de supprimer ce droit. Étant donné que le régime de la LACC, dont l'un des aspects essentiels tient à la participation du créancier au processus décisionnel, les créanciers ne devraient être empêchés de voter que si les circonstances l'exigent. Lorsqu'un créancier cherche à exercer ses droits de vote de manière à contrecarrer ou à miner les objectifs réparateurs de la LACC ou à aller à l'encontre de ceux-ci — c'est-à-dire à agir dans un but illégitime - l'art. 11 de la LACC confère au juge surveillant le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'empêcher le créancier de voter. Ce pouvoir discrétionnaire s'apparente au pouvoir discrétionnaire semblable qui existe en vertu de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité et favorise l'équité fondamentale qui imprègne le droit et la pratique en matière d'insolvabilité au Canada. La question de savoir s'il y a lieu d'exercer le pouvoir discrétionnaire dans une situation donnée appelle une analyse fondée sur les circonstances propres à chaque situation que le juge surveillant est le mieux placé pour effectuer.

En l'espèce, la décision du juge surveillant d'empêcher le créancier garanti de voter sur le nouveau plan ne révèle aucune erreur justifiant l'intervention d'une cour d'appel. Lorsqu'il a rendu sa décision, le juge surveillant

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familiar with these proceedings, having presided over them for over 2 years, received 15 reports from the monitor, and issued approximately 25 orders. He considered the whole of the circumstances and concluded that the secured creditor's vote would serve an improper purpose. He was aware that the secured creditor had chosen not to value any of its claim as unsecured prior to the vote on the first plan and did not attempt to vote on that plan, which ultimately failed to receive the other creditors' approval. Between the failure of the first plan and the proposal of the (essentially identical) new plan, none of the factual circumstances relating to the debtor companies' financial or business affairs had materially changed. However, the secured creditor sought to value the entirety of its security at nil and, on that basis, sought leave to vote on the new plan as an unsecured creditor. If the secured creditor were permitted to vote in this way, the new plan would certainly have met the double majority threshold for approval under s. 6(1) of the CCAA. The inescapable inference was that the secured creditor was attempting to strategically value its security to acquire control over the outcome of the vote and thereby circumvent the creditor democracy the CCAA protects. The secured creditor's course of action was also plainly contrary to the expectation that parties act with due diligence in an insolvency proceeding, which includes acting with due diligence in valuing their claims and security. The secured creditor was therefore properly barred from voting on the new plan.

Whether third party litigation funding should be approved as interim financing is a case-specific inquiry that should have regard to the text of s. 11.2 of the CCAA and the remedial objectives of the CCAA more generally. Interim financing is a flexible tool that may take on a range of forms. This is apparent from the wording of s. 11.2(1), which is broad and does not mandate any standard form or terms. At its core, interim financing enables the preservation and realization of the value of a debtor's assets. In some circumstances, like the instant case, litigation funding furthers this basic purpose. Third party litigation funding agreements may therefore be approved as interim financing in CCAA proceedings when the supervising judge determines that doing so would be fair and appropriate, having regard to all the circumstances and the objectives of the Act. This requires consideration of the specific factors set out in s. 11.2(4) of the CCAA. These factors need not be mechanically applied or individually reviewed by the supervising judge, as not all of them will be significant in every case, nor are they exhaustive. connaissait très bien les procédures en cause, car il les avait présidées pendant plus de 2 ans, avait reçu 15 rapports du contrôleur et avait délivré environ 25 ordonnances. Il a tenu compte de l'ensemble des circonstances et a conclu que le vote du créancier garanti viserait un but illégitime. Il savait qu'avant le vote sur le premier plan, le créancier garanti avait choisi de n'évaluer aucune partie de sa réclamation à titre de créancier non garanti et n'avait pas tenté de voter sur ce plan, qui n'a finalement pas reçu l'aval des autres créanciers. Entre l'insuccès du premier plan et la proposition du nouveau plan (identique pour l'essentiel au premier plan), les circonstances factuelles se rapportant aux affaires financières ou commerciales des compagnies débitrices n'avaient pas réellement changé. Pourtant, le créancier garanti a tenté d'évaluer la totalité de sa sûreté à zéro et, sur cette base, a demandé l'autorisation de voter sur le nouveau plan à titre de créancier non garanti. Si le créancier garanti avait été autorisé à voter de cette façon, le nouveau plan aurait certainement satisfait au critère d'approbation à double majorité prévu par le par. 6(1) de la LACC. La seule conclusion possible était que le créancier garanti tentait d'évaluer stratégiquement la valeur de sa sûreté afin de prendre le contrôle du vote et ainsi contourner la démocratie entre les créanciers que défend la LACC. La façon d'agir du créancier garanti était manifestement contraire à l'attente selon laquelle les parties agissent avec diligence dans une procédure d'insolvabilité, ce qui comprend le fait de faire preuve de diligence raisonnable dans l'évaluation de leurs réclamations et sûretés. Le créancier garanti a donc été empêché à bon droit de voter sur le nouveau plan.

La question de savoir s'il y a lieu d'approuver le financement d'un litige par un tiers à titre de financement temporaire commande une analyse fondée sur les faits de l'espèce qui doit tenir compte du libellé de l'art. 11.2 de la LACC et des objectifs réparateurs de la LACC de façon plus générale. Le financement temporaire est un outil souple qui peut revêtir différentes formes. Cela ressort du libellé du par. 11.2(1), qui est large et ne prescrit aucune forme ou condition type. Le financement temporaire permet essentiellement de préserver et de réaliser la valeur des éléments d'actif du débiteur. Dans certaines circonstances. comme en l'espèce, le financement de litige favorise la réalisation de cet objectif fondamental. Les accords de financement de litige par un tiers peuvent être approuvés à titre de financement temporaire dans le cadre des procédures fondées sur la LACC lorsque le juge surveillant estime qu'il serait juste et approprié de le faire, compte tenu de l'ensemble des circonstances et des objectifs de la Loi. Cela implique la prise en considération des facteurs précis énoncés au par. 11.2(4) de la LACC. Ces facteurs

Additionally, in order for a third party litigation funding agreement to be approved as interim financing, the agreement must not contain terms that effectively convert it into a plan of arrangement.

In the instant case, there is no basis upon which to interfere with the supervising judge's exercise of his discretion to approve the litigation funding agreement as interim financing. A review of the supervising judge's reasons as a whole, combined with a recognition of his manifest experience with the debtor companies' CCAA proceedings, leads to the conclusion that the factors listed in s. 11.2(4)concern matters that could not have escaped his attention and due consideration. It is apparent that he was focussed on the fairness at stake to all parties, the specific objectives of the CCAA, and the particular circumstances of this case when he approved the litigation funding agreement as interim financing. Further, the litigation funding agreement is not a plan of arrangement because it does not propose any compromise of the creditors' rights. The fact that the creditors may walk away with more or less money at the end of the day does not change the nature or existence of their rights to access the funds generated from the debtor companies' assets, nor can it be said to compromise those rights. Finally, the litigation financing charge does not convert the litigation funding agreement into a plan of arrangement. Holding otherwise would effectively extinguish the supervising judge's authority to approve these charges without a creditors' vote, which is expressly provided for in s. 11.2 of the CCAA.

Cases Cited

By Wagner C.J. and Moldaver J.

Applied: Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379; considered: Re Crystallex, 2012 ONCA 404, 293 O.A.C. 102; Laserworks Computer Services Inc. (Bankruptcy), Re, 1998 NSCA 42, 165 N.S.R. (2d) 296; referred to: Bayens v. Kinross Gold Corporation, 2013 ONSC 4974, 117 O.R. (3d) 150; Hayes v. The City of Saint John, 2016 NBQB 125; Schenk v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc., 2015 ONSC 3215, 74 C.P.C. (7th) 332; Re Blackburn, 2011 BCSC 1671, 27 B.C.L.R. (5th) 199; Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steelworkers, 2013 SCC 6, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271; Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar Global Fund ne doivent pas être appliqués machinalement ou examinés individuellement par le juge surveillant, car ils ne seront pas tous importants dans tous les cas, et ils ne sont pas non plus exhaustifs. En outre, pour qu'un accord de financement de litige par un tiers soit approuvé à titre de financement temporaire, il ne doit pas comporter des conditions qui le convertissent effectivement en plan d'arrangement.

En l'espèce, il n'y a aucune raison d'intervenir dans l'exercice par le juge surveillant de son pouvoir discrétionnaire d'approuver l'accord de financement de litige à titre de financement temporaire. L'examen des motifs du juge surveillant dans leur ensemble, conjugué à la reconnaissance de son expérience évidente des procédures intentées par les compagnies débitrices sous le régime de la LACC, mène à la conclusion que les facteurs énumérés au par. 11.2(4) concernent des questions qui n'auraient pu échapper à son attention et à son examen adéquat. Il est manifeste que le juge surveillant a mis l'accent sur l'équité envers toutes les parties, les objectifs précis de la LACC et les circonstances particulières de la présente affaire lorsqu'il a approuvé l'accord de financement de litige à titre de financement temporaire. De plus, l'accord de financement de litige ne constitue pas un plan d'arrangement parce qu'il ne propose aucune transaction visant les droits des créanciers. Le fait que les créanciers puissent en fin de compte remporter plus ou moins d'argent ne modifie en rien la nature ou l'existence de leurs droits d'avoir accès aux fonds provenant des actifs des compagnies débitrices, pas plus qu'on ne saurait dire qu'il s'agit d'une transaction à l'égard de leurs droits. Enfin, la charge relative au financement de litige ne convertit pas l'accord de financement de litige en plan d'arrangement. Une conclusion contraire aurait pour effet d'annihiler le pouvoir du juge surveillant d'approuver ces charges sans un vote des créanciers, un résultat qui est expressément prévu par l'art. 11.2 de la LACC.

Jurisprudence

Citée par le juge en chef Wagner et le juge Moldaver

Arrêt appliqué : Century Services Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général), 2010 CSC 60, [2010] 3 R.C.S. 379; arrêts examinés : Re Crystallex, 2012 ONCA 404, 293 O.A.C. 102; Laserworks Computer Services Inc. (Bankruptcy), Re, 1998 NSCA 42, 165 N.S.R. (2d) 296; arrêts mentionnés : Bayens c. Kinross Gold Corporation, 2013 ONSC 4974, 117 O.R. (3d) 150; Hayes c. The City of Saint John, 2016 NBQB 125; Schenk c. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc., 2015 ONSC 3215, 74 C.P.C. (7th) 332; Re Blackburn, 2011 BCSC 1671, 27 B.C.L.R. (5th) 199; Sun Indalex Finance, LLC c. Syndicat des Métallos, 2013 CSC 6, [2013] 1 R.C.S. 271; Ernst

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Game Technology, Deloitte LLP, Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, Francis Proulx and François Pelletier.

Joseph Reynaud and Nathalie Nouvet, for the intervener Ernst & Young Inc.

Sylvain Rigaud, Arad Mojtahedi and Saam Pousht-Mashhad, for the interveners the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals.

The reasons for judgment of the Court were delivered by

THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND MOLDAVER J.-

I. Overview

[1] These appeals arise in the context of an ongoing proceeding instituted under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"), in which substantially all of the assets of the debtor companies have been liquidated. The proceeding was commenced well over four years ago. Since then, a single supervising judge has been responsible for its oversight. In this capacity, he has made numerous discretionary decisions.

[2] Two of the supervising judge's decisions are in issue before us. Each raises a question requiring this Court to clarify the nature and scope of judicial discretion in *CCAA* proceedings. The first is whether a supervising judge has the discretion to bar a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement where they determine that the creditor is acting for an improper purpose. The second is whether a supervising judge can approve third party litigation funding as interim financing, pursuant to s. 11.2 of the *CCAA*.

[3] For the reasons that follow, we would answer both questions in the affirmative, as did the supervising judge. To the extent the Court of Appeal disagreed Game Technology, Deloitte S.E.N.C.R.L., Luc Carignan, François Vigneault, Philippe Millette, François Proulx et François Pelletier.

Joseph Reynaud et *Nathalie Nouvet*, pour l'intervenante Ernst & Young Inc.

Sylvain Rigaud, Arad Mojtahedi et Saam Pousht-Mashhad, pour les intervenants l'Institut d'insolvabilité du Canada et l'Association canadienne des professionnels de l'insolvabilité et de la réorganisation.

Version française des motifs de jugement de la Cour rendus par

Le juge en chef et le juge Moldaver —

I. <u>Aperçu</u>

[1] Ces pourvois s'inscrivent dans le contexte d'une instance toujours en cours introduite sous le régime de la *Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers de compagnies*, L.R.C. 1985, c. C-36 («*LACC*»), dans le cadre de laquelle la quasi-totalité des éléments d'actif des compagnies débitrices ont été liquidés. L'instance a été introduite il y a plus de quatre ans. Depuis, un seul juge surveillant a été chargé de sa supervision. À ce titre, il a rendu de nombreuses décisions discrétionnaires.

[2] Deux de ces décisions du juge surveillant font l'objet du présent pourvoi. Chacune d'elles soulève une question exigeant de notre Cour qu'elle précise la nature et la portée du pouvoir discrétionnaire exercé par les tribunaux dans les instances relevant de la *LACC*. La première est de savoir si le juge surveillant dispose du pouvoir discrétionnaire d'interdire à un créancier de voter sur un plan d'arrangement s'il estime que ce créancier agit dans un but illégitime. La deuxième porte sur le pouvoir du juge surveillant d'approuver le financement du litige par un tiers à titre de financement temporaire, en vertu de l'art. 11.2 de la *LACC*.

[3] Pour les motifs qui suivent, nous sommes d'avis de répondre à ces deux questions par l'affirmative, à l'instar du juge surveillant. Dans la mesure où la

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[43] Liquidating CCAAs take diverse forms and may involve, among other things: the sale of the debtor company as a going concern; an "en bloc" sale of assets that are capable of being operationalized by a buyer; a partial liquidation or downsizing of business operations; or a piecemeal sale of assets (B. Kaplan, "Liquidating CCAAs: Discretion Gone Awry?", in J. P. Sarra, ed., Annual Review of Insolvency Law (2008), 79, at pp. 87-89). The ultimate commercial outcomes facilitated by liquidating CCAAs are similarly diverse. Some may result in the continued operation of the business of the debtor under a different going concern entity (e.g., the liquidations in Indalex and Re Canadian Red Cross Society (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. C.J. (Gen. Div.)), while others may result in a sale of assets and inventory with no such entity emerging (e.g., the proceedings in Re Target Canada Co., 2015 ONSC 303, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323, at paras. 7 and 31). Others still, like the case at bar, may involve a going concern sale of most of the assets of the debtor, leaving residual assets to be dealt with by the debtor and its stakeholders.

[44] CCAA courts first began approving these forms of liquidation pursuant to the broad discretion conferred by the Act. The emergence of this practice was not without criticism, largely on the basis that it appeared to be inconsistent with the CCAA being a "restructuring statute" (see, e.g., Uti Energy Corp. v. Fracmaster Ltd., 1999 ABCA 178, 244 A.R. 93, at paras. 15-16, aff'g 1999 ABQB 379, 11 C.B.R. (4th) 204, at paras. 40-43; A. Nocilla, "The History of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Future of Re-Structuring Law in Canada" (2014), 56 Can. Bus. L.J. 73, at pp. 88-92).

[45] However, since s. 36 of the *CCAA* came into force in 2009, courts have been using it to effect liquidating CCAAs. Section 36 empowers courts to authorize the sale or disposition of a debtor

[43] Les procédures de liquidation sous le régime de la LACC revêtent différentes formes et peuvent, entre autres, inclure la vente de la société débitrice à titre d'entreprise en activité; la vente « en bloc » des éléments d'actif susceptibles d'être exploités par un acquéreur; une liquidation partielle de l'entreprise ou une réduction de ses activités; ou encore une vente de ses actifs élément par élément (B. Kaplan, « Liquidating CCAAs : Discretion Gone Awry? » dans J. P. Sarra, dir., Annual Review of Insolvency Law (2008), 79, p. 87-89). Les résultats commerciaux ultimement obtenus à l'issue des procédures de liquidation introduites sous le régime de la LACC sont eux aussi variés. Certaines procédures peuvent avoir pour résultat la continuité des activités de la débitrice sous la forme d'une autre entité viable (p. ex., les sociétés liquidées dans Indalex et Re Canadian Red Cross Society (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (C.J. Ont., Div. gén.)), alors que d'autres peuvent simplement aboutir à la vente des actifs et de l'inventaire sans donner naissance à une nouvelle entité (p. ex., la procédure en cause dans Re Target Canada Co., 2015 ONSC 303, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323, par. 7 et 31). D'autres encore, comme dans le dossier qui nous occupe, peuvent donner lieu à la vente de la plupart des actifs de la débitrice en vue de la poursuite de son activité, laissant à la débitrice et aux parties intéressées le soin de s'occuper des actifs résiduaires.

[44] Les tribunaux chargés de l'application de la *LACC* ont d'abord commencé à approuver ces formes de liquidation en exerçant le vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire que leur confère la Loi. L'émergence de cette pratique a fait l'objet de critiques, essentiellement parce qu'elle semblait incompatible avec l'objectif de « restructuration » de la *LACC* (voir, p. ex., *Uti Energy Corp. c. Fracmaster Ltd.*, 1999 ABCA 178, 244 A.R. 93, par. 15-16, conf. 1999 ABQB 379, 11 C.B.R. (4th) 204, par. 40-43; A. Nocilla, « The History of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Future of Re-Structuring Law in Canada » (2014), 56 *Rev. can. dr. comm.* 73, p. 88-92).

[45] Toutefois, depuis que l'art. 36 de la *LACC* est entré en vigueur en 2009, les tribunaux l'utilisent pour consentir à une liquidation sous le régime de la *LACC*. L'article 36 confère aux tribunaux le pouvoir company's assets outside the ordinary course of business.³ Significantly, when the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce recommended the adoption of s. 36, it observed that liquidation is not necessarily inconsistent with the remedial objectives of the CCAA, and that it may be a means to "raise capital [to facilitate a restructuring], eliminate further loss for creditors or focus on the solvent operations of the business" (p. 147). Other commentators have observed that liquidation can be a "vehicle to restructure a business" by allowing the business to survive, albeit under a different corporate form or ownership (Sarra, Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, at p. 169; see also K. P. McElcheran, Commercial Insolvency in Canada (4th ed. 2019), at p. 311). Indeed, in Indalex, the company sold its assets under the CCAA in order to preserve the jobs of its employees, despite being unable to survive as their employer (see para. 51).

[46] Ultimately, the relative weight that the different objectives of the CCAA take on in a particular case may vary based on the factual circumstances, the stage of the proceedings, or the proposed solutions that are presented to the court for approval. Here, a parallel may be drawn with the BIA context. In Orphan Well Association v. Grant Thornton Ltd., 2019 SCC 5, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 150, at para. 67, this Court explained that, as a general matter, the BIA serves two purposes: (1) the bankrupt's financial rehabilitation and (2) the equitable distribution of the bankrupt's assets among creditors. However,

d'autoriser la vente ou la disposition des actifs d'une compagnie débitrice hors du cours ordinaire de ses affaires³. Fait important, lorsque le Comité sénatorial permanent des banques et du commerce a recommandé l'adoption de l'art. 36, il a fait observer que la liquidation n'est pas nécessairement incompatible avec les objectifs réparateurs de la LACC et qu'il pourrait s'agir d'un moyen « soit pour obtenir des capitaux [et faciliter la restructuration] ou éviter des pertes plus graves aux créanciers, soit pour se concentrer sur ses activités solvables » (p. 163). D'autres auteurs ont observé que la liquidation peut [TRADUCTION] « être un moyen de restructurer une entreprise » en lui permettant de survivre, quoique sous une forme corporative différente ou sous la gouverne de propriétaires différents (Sarra, Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, p. 169; voir aussi K. P. McElcheran, Commercial Insolvency in Canada (4e éd. 2019), p. 311). D'ailleurs, dans l'arrêt Indalex, la compagnie a vendu ses actifs sous le régime de la LACC afin de protéger les emplois de son personnel, même si elle ne pouvait demeurer leur employeur (voir par. 51).

[46] En définitive, le poids relatif attribué aux différents objectifs de la LACC dans une affaire donnée peut varier en fonction des circonstances factuelles, de l'étape des procédures ou des solutions qui sont présentées à la cour pour approbation. En l'espèce, il est possible d'établir un parallèle avec le contexte de la LFI. Dans l'arrêt Orphan Well Association c. Grant Thornton Ltd., 2019 CSC 5, [2019] 1 R.C.S. 150, par. 67, notre Cour a expliqué que, de façon générale, la LFI vise deux objectifs : (1) la réhabilitation financière du failli, et (2) le partage équitable des actifs du failli entre les créanciers. Or, dans les cas où

We note that while s. 36 now codifies the jurisdiction of a supervising court to grant a sale and vesting order, and enumerates factors to guide the court's discretion to grant such an order, it is silent on when courts ought to approve a liquidation under the CCAA as opposed to requiring the parties to proceed to liquidation under a receivership or the BIA regime (see Sarra, Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, at pp. 167-68; A. Nocilla, "Asset Sales Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Failure of Section 36" (2012) 52 Can. Bus. L.J. 226, at pp. 243-44 and 247). This issue remains an open question and was not put to this Court in either Indalex or these appeals.

Mentionnons que, bien que l'art. 36 codifie désormais le pouvoir du juge surveillant de rendre une ordonnance de vente et de dévolution, et qu'il énonce les facteurs devant orienter l'exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire d'accorder une telle ordonnance, il est muet quant aux circonstances dans lesquelles les tribunaux doivent approuver une liquidation sous le régime de la LACC plutôt que d'exiger des parties qu'elles procèdent à la liquidation par voie de mise sous séquestre ou sous le régime de la LFI (voir Sarra, Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, p. 167-168; A. Nocilla, « Asset Sales Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Failure of Section 36 » (2012) 52 Rev. can. dr. comm. 226, p. 243-244 et 247). Cette question demeure ouverte et n'a pas été soumise à la Cour dans Indalex non plus que dans les présents pourvois.

in circumstances where a debtor corporation will never emerge from bankruptcy, only the latter purpose is relevant (see para. 67). Similarly, under the *CCAA*, when a reorganization of the pre-filing debtor company is not a possibility, a liquidation that preserves going-concern value and the ongoing business operations of the pre-filing company may become the predominant remedial focus. Moreover, where a reorganization or liquidation is complete and the court is dealing with residual assets, the objective of maximizing creditor recovery from those assets may take centre stage. As we will explain, the architecture of the *CCAA* leaves the case-specific assessment and balancing of these remedial objectives to the supervising judge.

(2) <u>The Role of a Supervising Judge in CCAA</u> <u>Proceedings</u>

[47] One of the principal means through which the *CCAA* achieves its objectives is by carving out a unique supervisory role for judges (see Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at pp. 18-19). From beginning to end, each *CCAA* proceeding is overseen by a single supervising judge. The supervising judge acquires extensive knowledge and insight into the stakeholder dynamics and the business realities of the proceedings from their ongoing dealings with the parties.

[48] The CCAA capitalizes on this positional advantage by supplying supervising judges with broad discretion to make a variety of orders that respond to the circumstances of each case and "meet contemporary business and social needs" (*Century Services*, at para. 58) in "real-time" (para. 58, citing R. B. Jones, "The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 484). The anchor of this discretionary authority is s. 11, which empowers a judge "to make any order that [the judge] considers appropriate in the circumstances". This section has been described as "the engine" driving the statutory scheme (*Stelco* la société débitrice ne s'extirpera jamais de la faillite, seul le dernier objectif est pertinent (voir par. 67). Dans la même veine, sous le régime de la LACC, lorsque la restructuration d'une société débitrice qui n'a pas déposé de proposition est impossible, une liquidation visant à protéger sa valeur d'exploitation et à maintenir ses activités courantes peut devenir l'objectif réparateur principal. En outre, lorsque la restructuration ou la liquidation est terminée et que le tribunal doit décider du sort des actifs résiduels, l'objectif de maximiser le recouvrement des créanciers à partir de ces actifs peut passer au premier plan. Comme nous l'expliquerons, la structure de la LACC laisse au juge surveillant le soin de procéder à un examen et à une mise en balance au cas par cas de ces objectifs réparateurs.

(2) <u>Le rôle du juge surveillant dans les procé-</u> dures intentées sous le régime de la *LACC*

[47] Un des principaux moyens par lesquels la *LACC* atteint ses objectifs réside dans le rôle particulier de surveillance qu'elle réserve aux juges (voir Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, p. 18-19). Chaque procédure fondée sur la *LACC* est supervisée du début à la fin par un seul juge surveillant. En raison de ses rapports continus avec les parties, ce dernier acquiert une connaissance approfondie de la dynamique entre les intéressés et des réalités commerciales entourant la procédure.

[48] La *LACC* mise sur la position avantageuse qu'occupe le juge surveillant en lui accordant le vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire de rendre toute une gamme d'ordonnances susceptibles de répondre aux circonstances de chaque cas et de « [s'adapter] aux besoins commerciaux et sociaux contemporains » (*Century Services*, par. 58) en « temps réel » (par. 58, citant R. B. Jones, « The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring : Challenges for the Rule of Law », dans J. P. Sarra, dir., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, p. 484). Le point d'ancrage de ce pouvoir discrétionnaire est l'art. 11, qui confère au juge le pouvoir de « rendre toute ordonnance qu'il estime indiquée ». Cette disposition a été décrite

[2020] 1 S.C.R.

Inc. (*Re*) (2005), 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 36).

[49] The discretionary authority conferred by the *CCAA*, while broad in nature, is not boundless. This authority must be exercised in furtherance of the remedial objectives of the *CCAA*, which we have explained above (see *Century Services*, at para. 59). Additionally, the court must keep in mind three "baseline considerations" (at para. 70), which the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating: (1) that the order sought is appropriate in the circumstances, and (2) that the applicant has been acting in good faith and (3) with due diligence (para. 69).

[50] The first two considerations of appropriateness and good faith are widely understood in the *CCAA* context. Appropriateness "is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*" (para. 70). Further, the well-established requirement that parties must act in good faith in insolvency proceedings has recently been made express in s. 18.6 of the *CCAA*, which provides:

Good faith

18.6 (1) Any interested person in any proceedings under this Act shall act in good faith with respect to those proceedings.

Good faith — powers of court

(2) If the court is satisfied that an interested person fails to act in good faith, on application by an interested person, the court may make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

(See also *BIA*, s. 4.2; *Budget Implementation Act*, 2019, *No.* 1, S.C. 2019, c. 29, ss. 133 and 140.)

[51] The third consideration of due diligence requires some elaboration. Consistent with the *CCAA* regime generally, the due diligence consideration discourages parties from sitting on their rights and ensures that creditors do not strategically manoeuver or comme étant le « moteur » du régime législatif (*Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109 (C.A. Ont.), par. 36).

[49] Quoique vaste, le pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré par la *LACC* n'est pas sans limites. Son exercice doit tendre à la réalisation des objectifs réparateurs de la *LACC*, que nous avons expliqués ci-dessus (voir *Century Services*, par. 59). En outre, la cour doit garder à l'esprit les trois « considérations de base » (par. 70) qu'il incombe au demandeur de démontrer : (1) que l'ordonnance demandée est indiquée, et (2) qu'il a agi de bonne foi et (3) avec la diligence voulue (par. 69).

[50] Les deux premières considérations, l'opportunité et la bonne foi, sont largement connues dans le contexte de la *LACC*. Le tribunal « évalue l'opportunité de l'ordonnance demandée en déterminant si elle favorisera la réalisation des objectifs de politique générale qui sous-tendent la Loi » (par. 70). Par ailleurs, l'exigence bien établie selon laquelle les parties doivent agir de bonne foi dans les procédures d'insolvabilité est depuis peu mentionnée de façon expresse à l'art. 18.6 de la *LACC*, qui dispose :

Bonne foi

18.6 (1) Tout intéressé est tenu d'agir de bonne foi dans le cadre d'une procédure intentée au titre de la présente loi.

Bonne foi — pouvoirs du tribunal

(2) S'il est convaincu que l'intéressé n'agit pas de bonne foi, le tribunal peut, à la demande de tout intéressé, rendre toute ordonnance qu'il estime indiquée.

(Voir aussi *LFI*, art. 4.2; *Loi n° 1 d'exécution du budget de 2019*, L.C. 2019, c. 29, art. 133 et 140.)

[51] La troisième considération, celle de la diligence, requiert qu'on s'y attarde. Conformément au régime de la *LACC* en général, la considération de diligence décourage les parties de rester sur leurs positions et fait en sorte que les créanciers n'usent



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Citation: 1057863 B.C. Ltd. (Re), 2020 BCSC 1359

> Date: 20200914 Docket: S206189 Registry: Vancouver

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

and

In the Matter of the Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57

and

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of 1057863 B.C. Ltd., Northern Resources Nova Scotia Corporation, Northern Pulp Nova Scotia Corporation, Northern Timber Nova Scotia Corporation, 3253527 Nova Scotia Limited, 3243722 Nova Scotia Limited and Northern Pulp NS GP ULC

Petitioners

Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Fitzpatrick

Reasons for Judgment

Counsel for the Petitioners:

S. Collins W.W. MacLeod J. Roberts

Counsel for Province of Nova Scotia:

Counsel for Paper Excellence Canada Holdings Corporation:

Counsel for the Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc.:

R.G. Grant, Q.C. M.P. Chiasson, Q.C.

P.J. Reardon

E. Pillon L. Nicholson

Counsel for Unifor, Local 440:	R.A. Pink, QC
Counsel Pacific Harbor North American Resources Ltd, as the proposed interim lender:	B. Brammall
Counsel for Atlas Holdings LLC and Blue Wolf Capital Management, LLC:	N. MacParland
Counsel for Envirosystems Inc., dba Terrapure Environmental:	H. P. Whiteley
Counsel for Pictou Landing First Nation:	B. Hebert
Counsel for Nova Scotia Superintendent of Pensions:	S. Choo
Place and Date of Hearing:	Vancouver, B.C. July 31 and August 5, 2020
Place and Date of Ruling with Written Reasons to Follow:	Vancouver, B.C. August 6, 2020
Place and Date of Written Reasons:	Vancouver, B.C. September 14, 2020

the CCAA, including confirmation that the debtor is acting with due diligence and in good faith and that the relief sought is appropriate.

[118] The comments of court in *Timminco Limited (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 2515 aptly set out the statutory objectives intended to be achieved by the stay:

[15] The stay of proceedings is one of the main tools available to achieve the purpose of the CCAA. The stay provides the [debtors] with a degree of time in which to attempt to arrange an acceptable restructuring plan or sale of assets in order to maximize recovery for stakeholders. The court's jurisdiction in granting a stay extends to both preserving the *status quo* and facilitating a restructuring. See *Re Stelco Inc.*, (2005) O.J. No. 1171 (C.A.) at para. 36.

[119] Throughout this proceeding, and to this time, the Monitor confirms its view that the Petitioners have been working in good faith and with due diligence. The Monitor recommends the extension of the stay to December 31, 2020.

[120] It will be more than apparent from the discussion above and the orders I have granted, particularly as to the Interim Financing Facility, that I have concluded that an extension of the stay to December 31, 2020 is appropriate in the circumstances. As discussed above, there is somewhat of a "check" on the proceedings arising from the Monitor's report that will be filed before the end of October 2020.

[121] The stay period to December 2020 will allow the Petitioners to advance their objective of securing a restructuring option for the benefit of the stakeholders. I conclude that they should be afforded the opportunity to do so here.

UNIFOR APPLICATION

[122] Unifor seeks an order authorizing it to represent the current and former union members of the local, including pensioners, retirees, deferred vested participants, and their surviving spouses and dependants, employed or formerly employed by the Petitioners, in these proceedings. Unifor does not seek any court ordered funding to secure its participation or that of Pink Larkin, its counsel.

[123] The Petitioners support this relief and no stakeholder objects.



Alberta Court of Queen's Bench Canadian Airlines Corp. (Re) Date: 2000-05-04

G. Morawetz, A.J. McConnell and R.N. Billington, for Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co. of New York and Montreal Trust Co. of Canada.

A.L. Friend, Q.C., and H.M. Kay, Q.C., for Canadian Airlines.

S. Dunphy, for Air Canada and 853350 Alberta Ltd.

R. Anderson, Q.C., for Loyalty Group.

H. Gorman, for ABN AMRO Bank N.V.

P. McCarthy, for Monitor - Price Waterhouse Cooper.

D. Haigh, Q.C., and D. Nishimura, for Unsecured noteholders - Resurgence Asset Management.

C.J. Shaw, for Airline Pilots Association International.

G. Wells, for NavCanada.

D. Hardy, for Royal Bank of Canada.

(Calgary 0001-05071, 0001-05044)

May 4, 2000.

[1] PAPERNY J. [orally]: — Montreal Trust Company of Canada, Collateral Agent for the holders of the Senior Secured Notes, and the Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company of New York, Trustee for the holders of the Senior Secured Notes, apply for the following relief:

1. In the CCAA proceeding (Action No. 0001-05071) an order lifting the stay of proceedings against them contained in the orders of this court dated March 24, 2000 and April 19, 2000 to allow for the court-ordered appointment of Ernst & Young Inc. as receiver and manager over the assets and property charged in favour of the Senior Secured Noteholders; and

2. In Action No. 0001-05044, an order appointing Ernst & Young Inc. as a court officer with the exclusive right to negotiate the sale of the assets or shares of Canadian Regional Airlines (1998) Ltd.

[2] Canadian Airlines Corporation ("CAC") is a Canadian based holding company which, through its majority owned subsidiary Canadian Airlines International Ltd. ("CAIL") provides domestic, U.S.-Canada transborder and international jet air transportation services. CAC also provides regional transportation through its subsidiary Canadian Regional Airlines (1998) Ltd. ("Canadian Regional"). Canadian Regional is not an applicant under the CCAA proceedings.

[3] The Senior Secured Notes were issued under an Indenture dated April 24, 1998 between CAC and the Trustee. The principal face amount is \$175 million U.S. As well, there is interest outstanding. The Senior Secured Notes are directly and indirectly secured [15] In determining whether a stay should be lifted, the court must always have regard to the particular facts. However, in every order in a CCAA proceeding the court is required to balance a number of interests. McFarlane J.A. states in his closing remarks of his reasons in *Re Pacific National Lease Holding Corp.* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]):

In supervising a proceeding under the C.C.A.A. orders are made, and orders are varied as changing circumstances require. Orders depend upon a careful and delicate balancing of a variety of interests and problems.

[16] Also see Blair J.'s decision in *Campeau v. Olympia* & York Developments Ltd. (1992), 14 C.P.C. (3d) 339 (Ont. Gen. Div.), for another example of the balancing approach.

[17] As noted above, the stay power is to be used to preserve the status quo among the creditors of the insolvent company. Huddart J., as she then was, commented on the status quo in *Re Alberta-Pacific Terminals Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 99 (B.C. S.C.). She stated:

The status quo is not always easy to find... Nor is it always easy to define. The preservation of the status quo cannot mean merely the preservation of the relative pre-stay debt status of each creditor. Other interests are served by the CCAA. Those of investors, employees, and landlords among them, and in the case of the Fraser Surrey terminal, the public too, not only of British Columbia, but also of the prairie provinces. The status quo is to be preserved in the sense that manoeuvres by creditors that would impair the financial position of the company while it attempts to reorganize are to be prevented, not in the sense that all creditors are to be treated equally or to be maintained at the same relative level. It is the company and all the interests its demise would affect that must be considered.

[18] Further commentary on the status quo is contained in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 80 C.B.R. (N.S.) 98 (B.C. S.C.). Thackray J. comments that the maintenance of the status quo does not mean that every detail of the status quo must survive. Rather, it means that the debtor will be able to stay in business and will have breathing space to develop a proposal to remain viable.

[19] Finally, in making orders under the CCAA, the court must never lose sight of the objectives of the legislation. These were concisely summarized by the chambers judge and adopted by the British Columbia Court *of* Appeal in *Re Pacific National Lease Holding Corp.* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]):

(1) The purpose of the CCAA is to allow an insolvent company a reasonable period of time to reorganize its affairs and prepare and file a plan for its continued operation subject to the requisite approval of the creditors and court.

(2) The CCAA is intended to serve not only the company's creditors but also a broad constituency which includes the shareholders and employees.

(3) During the stay period, the Act is intended to prevent manoeuvres for positioning amongst the creditors of the company.

(4) The function of the court during the stay period is to play a supervisory role to preserve the status quo and to move the process along to the point where a compromise or arrangement is approved or it is evident that the attempt is doomed to failure.

(5) The status quo does not mean preservation of the relative pre-stay debt status of each creditor. Since the companies under CCAA orders continue to operate and having regard to the broad constituency of interests the Act is intended to serve, the preservation of the status quo is not intended to create a rigid freeze of relative pre-stay positions.

(6) The court has a broad discretion to apply these principles to the facts of th particular case.

[20] At pages 342 and 343 of this text, Canadian Commercial Reorganization: Preventing Bankruptcy (Aurora: Canada Law Book, looseleaf). R.H. McLaren describes situations in which the court will lift a stay:

1. When the plan is likely to fail;

2. The applicant shows hardship (the hardship must be caused by the stay itself and be independent of any pre-existing condition of the applicant creditor);

3. The applicant shows necessity for payment (where the creditors financial problems are created by the order or where the failure to pay the creditor would cause it to close and thus jeopardize the debtor's company's existence);

4. The applicant would be severely prejudiced by refusal to lift the stay and there would be no resulting prejudice to the debtor company or the positions of creditors;

5. It is necessary to permit the applicant to take steps to protect a right which could be lost by the passage of time;

6. After the lapse of a significant time period, the insolvent is no closer to a proposal than at the commencement of the stay period.

[21] I now turn to the particular circumstances of the applications before me.

[22] I would firstly address the matter of the Senior Secured Noteholders' current rejection of the compromise put forward under the Plan. Although they are in a separate class under CAC's Plan and can control the vote as it affects their interest, they are not in a position to vote down the Plan in its entirety. However, the Senior Secured Noteholders submit that where a plan offers two options to a class of creditors and the class has selected which option it wants, there is no purpose to be served in delaying that class from proceeding with its chosen course of action. They rely on the *Nova Metal Products Inc. v.*



CITATION: Canwest Publishing Inc., 2010 ONSC 222 COURT FILE NO.: CV-10-8533-00CL DATE: 20100118

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST PUBLISHING INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC., CANWEST BOOKS INC. AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC.

 COUNSEL: Lyndon Barnes, Alex Cobb and Duncan Ault for the Applicant LP Entities Mario Forte for the Special Committee of the Board of Directors Andrew Kent and Hilary Clarke for the Administrative Agent of the Senior Secured Lenders' Syndicate Peter Griffin for the Management Directors Robin B. Schwill and Natalie Renner for the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders David Byers and Maria Konyukhova for the proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

PEPALL J.

REASONS FOR DECISION

Introduction

[1] Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global") is a leading Canadian media company with interests in (i) newspaper publishing and digital media; and (ii) free-to-air television stations and subscription based specialty television channels. Canwest Global, the entities in its Canadian television business (excluding CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries) and the National Post Company (which prior to October 30, 2009 owned and published the National Post) (collectively, the "CMI Entities"), obtained protection from their creditors in a

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(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

[54] I am satisfied that the issue of notice has been appropriately addressed by the LP Entities. As to whether the amounts are appropriate and whether the charges should extend to the proposed beneficiaries, the section does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in its assessment. It seems to me that factors that might be considered would include:

- (a) the size and complexity of the businesses being restructured;
- (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- (c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;
- (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
- (f) the position of the Monitor.

This is not an exhaustive list and no doubt other relevant factors will be developed in the jurisprudence.

[55] There is no question that the restructuring of the LP Entities is large and highly complex and it is reasonable to expect extensive involvement by professional advisors. Each of the professionals whose fees are to be secured has played a critical role in the LP Entities restructuring activities to date and each will continue to be integral to the solicitation and restructuring process. Furthermore, there is no unwarranted duplication of roles. As to quantum of both proposed charges, I accept the Applicants' submissions that the business of the LP Entities and the tasks associated with their restructuring are of a magnitude and complexity that justify the amounts. I also take some comfort from the fact that the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders has agreed to them. In addition, the Monitor supports the charges requested. The quantum of the administration charge appears to be fair and reasonable. As to the quantum

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A"

REASONS FOR DECISION

Pepall J.

Released: January 18, 2010



Century Services Inc. Appellant

v.

Attorney General of Canada on behalf of Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada Respondent

INDEXED AS: CENTURY SERVICES INC. V. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL)

2010 SCC 60

File No.: 33239.

2010: May 11; 2010: December 16.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA

Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Priorities — Crown applying on eve of bankruptcy of debtor company to have GST monies held in trust paid to Receiver General of Canada — Whether deemed trust in favour of Crown under Excise Tax Act prevails over provisions of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act purporting to nullify deemed trusts in favour of Crown — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 18.3(1) — Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, s. 222(3).

Bankruptcy and insolvency — Procedure — Whether chambers judge had authority to make order partially lifting stay of proceedings to allow debtor company to make assignment in bankruptcy and to stay Crown's right to enforce GST deemed trust — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.

Trusts — Express trusts — GST collected but unremitted to Crown — Judge ordering that GST be held by Monitor in trust account — Whether segregation of Crown's GST claim in Monitor's account created an express trust in favour of Crown. **Century Services Inc.** Appelante

С.

Procureur général du Canada au nom de Sa Majesté la Reine du chef du Canada Intimé

Répertorié : Century Services Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général)

2010 CSC 60

N^o du greffe : 33239.

2010 : 11 mai; 2010 : 16 décembre.

Présents : La juge en chef McLachlin et les juges Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein et Cromwell.

EN APPEL DE LA COUR D'APPEL DE LA COLOMBIE-BRITANNIQUE

Faillite et insolvabilité — Priorités — Demande de la Couronne à la société débitrice, la veille de la faillite, sollicitant le paiement au receveur général du Canada de la somme détenue en fiducie au titre de la TPS — La fiducie réputée établie par la Loi sur la taxe d'accise en faveur de la Couronne l'emporte-t-elle sur les dispositions de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies censées neutraliser ces fiducies? — Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-36, art. 18.3(1) — Loi sur la taxe d'accise, L.R.C. 1985, ch. E-15, art. 222(3).

Faillite et insolvabilité — Procédure — Le juge en cabinet avait-il le pouvoir, d'une part, de lever partiellement la suspension des procédures pour permettre à la compagnie débitrice de faire cession de ses biens en faillite et, d'autre part, de suspendre les mesures prises par la Couronne pour bénéficier de la fiducie réputée se rapportant à la TPS? — Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-36, art. 11.

Fiducies — Fiducies expresses — Somme perçue au titre de la TPS mais non versée à la Couronne — Ordonnance du juge exigeant que la TPS soit détenue par le contrôleur dans son compte en fiducie — Le fait que le montant de TPS réclamé par la Couronne soit détenu séparément dans le compte du contrôleur a-t-il créé une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne? The debtor company commenced proceedings under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"), obtaining a stay of proceedings to allow it time to reorganize its financial affairs. One of the debtor company's outstanding debts at the commencement of the reorganization was an amount of unremitted Goods and Services Tax ("GST") payable to the Crown. Section 222(3) of the *Excise Tax Act* ("*ETA*") created a deemed trust over unremitted GST, which operated despite any other enactment of Canada except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("*BIA*"). However, s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* provided that any statutory deemed trusts in favour of the Crown did not operate under the *CCAA*, subject to certain exceptions, none of which mentioned GST.

Pursuant to an order of the CCAA chambers judge, a payment not exceeding \$5 million was approved to the debtor company's major secured creditor, Century Services. However, the chambers judge also ordered the debtor company to hold back and segregate in the Monitor's trust account an amount equal to the unremitted GST pending the outcome of the reorganization. On concluding that reorganization was not possible, the debtor company sought leave of the court to partially lift the stay of proceedings so it could make an assignment in bankruptcy under the BIA. The Crown moved for immediate payment of unremitted GST to the Receiver General. The chambers judge denied the Crown's motion, and allowed the assignment in bankruptcy. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on two grounds. First, it reasoned that once reorganization efforts had failed, the chambers judge was bound under the priority scheme provided by the ETA to allow payment of unremitted GST to the Crown and had no discretion under s. 11 of the CCAA to continue the stay against the Crown's claim. Second, the Court of Appeal concluded that by ordering the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account, the chambers judge had created an express trust in favour of the Crown.

Held (Abella J. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed.

Per McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.: The apparent conflict between s. 222(3) of the *ETA* and s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* can be resolved through an interpretation that properly recognizes the history of the *CCAA*, its function amidst the body of insolvency legislation enacted by

La compagnie débitrice a déposé une requête sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (« LACC ») et obtenu la suspension des procédures dans le but de réorganiser ses finances. Parmi les dettes de la compagnie débitrice au début de la réorganisation figurait une somme due à la Couronne, mais non versée encore, au titre de la taxe sur les produits et services (« TPS »). Le paragraphe 222(3) de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (« LTA ») crée une fiducie réputée visant les sommes de TPS non versées. Cette fiducie s'applique malgré tout autre texte législatif du Canada sauf la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (« LFI »). Toutefois, le par. 18.3(1) de la LACC prévoyait que, sous réserve de certaines exceptions, dont aucune ne concerne la TPS, les fiducies réputées établies par la loi en faveur de la Couronne ne s'appliquaient pas sous son régime.

Le juge siégeant en son cabinet chargé d'appliquer la LACC a approuvé par ordonnance le paiement à Century Services, le principal créancier garanti du débiteur, d'une somme d'au plus cinq millions de dollars. Toutefois, il a également ordonné à la compagnie débitrice de retenir un montant égal aux sommes de TPS non versées et de le déposer séparément dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur jusqu'à l'issue de la réorganisation. Ayant conclu que la réorganisation n'était pas possible, la compagnie débitrice a demandé au tribunal de lever partiellement la suspension des procédures pour lui permettre de faire cession de ses biens en vertu de la LFI. La Couronne a demandé par requête le paiement immédiat au receveur général des sommes de TPS non versées. Le juge siégeant en son cabinet a rejeté la requête de la Couronne et autorisé la cession des biens. La Cour d'appel a accueilli l'appel pour deux raisons. Premièrement, elle a conclu que, après que la tentative de réorganisation eut échoué, le juge siégeant en son cabinet était tenu, en raison de la priorité établie par la LTA, d'autoriser le paiement à la Couronne des sommes qui lui étaient dues au titre de la TPS, et que l'art. 11 de la LACC ne lui conférait pas le pouvoir discrétionnaire de maintenir la suspension de la demande de la Couronne. Deuxièmement, la Cour d'appel a conclu que, en ordonnant la ségrégation des sommes de TPS dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur, le juge siégeant en son cabinet avait créé une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Arrêt (la juge Abella est dissidente) : Le pourvoi est accueilli.

La juge en chef McLachlin et les juges Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein et Cromwell : Il est possible de résoudre le conflit apparent entre le par. 222(3) de la *LTA* et le par. 18.3(1) de la *LACC* en les interprétant d'une manière qui tienne compte adéquatement de l'historique de la *LACC*, de la fonction de cette loi parmi

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Parliament and the principles for interpreting the CCAA that have been recognized in the jurisprudence. The history of the CCAA distinguishes it from the BIA because although these statutes share the same remedial purpose of avoiding the social and economic costs of liquidating a debtor's assets, the CCAA offers more flexibility and greater judicial discretion than the rules-based mechanism under the BIA, making the former more responsive to complex reorganizations. Because the CCAA is silent on what happens if reorganization fails, the BIA scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily provides the backdrop against which creditors assess their priority in the event of bankruptcy. The contemporary thrust of legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the CCAA and the BIA, and one of its important features has been a cutback in Crown priorities. Accordingly, the CCAA and the BIA both contain provisions nullifying statutory deemed trusts in favour of the Crown, and both contain explicit exceptions exempting source deductions deemed trusts from this general rule. Meanwhile, both Acts are harmonious in treating other Crown claims as unsecured. No such clear and express language exists in those Acts carving out an exception for GST claims.

When faced with the apparent conflict between s. 222(3) of the ETA and s. 18.3(1) of the CCAA, courts have been inclined to follow Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re) and resolve the conflict in favour of the ETA. Ottawa Senators should not be followed. Rather, the CCAA provides the rule. Section 222(3) of the ETA evinces no explicit intention of Parliament to repeal CCAA s. 18.3. Where Parliament has sought to protect certain Crown claims through statutory deemed trusts and intended that these deemed trusts continue in insolvency, it has legislated so expressly and elaborately. Meanwhile, there is no express statutory basis for concluding that GST claims enjoy a preferred treatment under the CCAA or the BIA. The internal logic of the CCAA appears to subject a GST deemed trust to the waiver by Parliament of its priority. A strange asymmetry would result if differing treatments of GST deemed trusts under the CCAA and the BIA were found to exist, as this would encourage statute shopping, undermine the CCAA's remedial purpose and invite the very social ills that the statute was enacted to avert. The later in time enactment of the more general s. 222(3) of the ETA does not require application of the doctrine of implied repeal to the earlier and more specific s. 18.3(1) of the CCAA in the circumstances of this case. In any event,

l'ensemble des textes adoptés par le législateur fédéral en matière d'insolvabilité et des principes d'interprétation de la LACC reconnus dans la jurisprudence. L'historique de la *LACC* permet de distinguer celle-ci de la *LFI* en ce sens que, bien que ces lois aient pour objet d'éviter les coûts sociaux et économiques liés à la liquidation de l'actif d'un débiteur, la LACC offre plus de souplesse et accorde aux tribunaux un plus grand pouvoir discrétionnaire que le mécanisme fondé sur des règles de la LFI, ce qui rend la première mieux adaptée aux réorganisations complexes. Comme la LACC ne précise pas ce qui arrive en cas d'échec de la réorganisation, la LFI fournit la norme de référence permettant aux créanciers de savoir s'ils ont la priorité dans l'éventualité d'une faillite. Le travail de réforme législative contemporain a principalement visé à harmoniser les aspects communs à la LACC et à la LFI, et l'une des caractéristiques importantes de cette réforme est la réduction des priorités dont jouit la Couronne. Par conséquent, la LACC et la LFI contiennent toutes deux des dispositions neutralisant les fiducies réputées établies en vertu d'un texte législatif en faveur de la Couronne, et toutes deux comportent des exceptions expresses à la règle générale qui concernent les fiducies réputées établies à l'égard des retenues à la source. Par ailleurs, ces deux lois considèrent les autres créances de la Couronne comme des créances non garanties. Ces lois ne comportent pas de dispositions claires et expresses établissant une exception pour les créances relatives à la TPS.

Les tribunaux appelés à résoudre le conflit apparent entre le par. 222(3) de la LTA et le par. 18.3(1) de la LACC ont été enclins à appliquer l'arrêt Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re) et à trancher en faveur de la LTA. Il ne convient pas de suivre cet arrêt. C'est plutôt la LACC qui énonce la règle applicable. Le paragraphe 222(3) de la LTA ne révèle aucune intention explicite du législateur d'abroger l'art. 18.3 de la LACC. Quand le législateur a voulu protéger certaines créances de la Couronne au moyen de fiducies réputées et voulu que celles-ci continuent de s'appliquer en situation d'insolvabilité, il l'a indiqué de manière explicite et minutieuse. En revanche, il n'existe aucune disposition législative expresse permettant de conclure que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficient d'un traitement préférentiel sous le régime de la LACC ou de la LFI. Il semble découler de la logique interne de la LACC que la fiducie réputée établie à l'égard de la TPS est visée par la renonciation du législateur à sa priorité. Il y aurait une étrange asymétrie si l'on concluait que la LACC ne traite pas les fiducies réputées à l'égard de la TPS de la même manière que la LFI, car cela encouragerait les créanciers à recourir à la loi la plus favorable, minerait les objectifs réparateurs de la LACC et risquerait de favoriser les maux sociaux que l'édiction de ce texte législatif visait justement à recent amendments to the *CCAA* in 2005 resulted in s. 18.3 of the Act being renumbered and reformulated, making it the later in time provision. This confirms that Parliament's intent with respect to GST deemed trusts is to be found in the *CCAA*. The conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* is more apparent than real.

The exercise of judicial discretion has allowed the CCAA to adapt and evolve to meet contemporary business and social needs. As reorganizations become increasingly complex, CCAA courts have been called upon to innovate. In determining their jurisdiction to sanction measures in a CCAA proceeding, courts should first interpret the provisions of the CCAA before turning to their inherent or equitable jurisdiction. Noteworthy in this regard is the expansive interpretation the language of the CCAA is capable of supporting. The general language of the CCAA should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. The requirements of appropriateness, good faith and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising CCAA authority. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to avoid the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company, which extends to both the purpose of the order and the means it employs. Here, the chambers judge's order staying the Crown's GST claim was in furtherance of the CCAA's objectives because it blunted the impulse of creditors to interfere in an orderly liquidation and fostered a harmonious transition from the CCAA to the BIA, meeting the objective of a single proceeding that is common to both statutes. The transition from the CCAA to the BIA may require the partial lifting of a stay of proceedings under the CCAA to allow commencement of BIA proceedings, but no gap exists between the two statutes because they operate in tandem and creditors in both cases look to the BIA scheme of distribution to foreshadow how they will fare if the reorganization is unsuccessful. The breadth of the court's discretion under the CCAA is sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the BIA. Hence, the chambers judge's order was authorized.

prévenir. Le paragraphe 222(3) de la *LTA*, une disposition plus récente et générale que le par. 18.3(1) de la *LACC*, n'exige pas l'application de la doctrine de l'abrogation implicite dans les circonstances de la présente affaire. En tout état de cause, par suite des modifications apportées récemment à la *LACC* en 2005, l'art. 18.3 a été reformulé et renuméroté, ce qui en fait la disposition postérieure. Cette constatation confirme que c'est dans la *LACC* qu'est exprimée l'intention du législateur en ce qui a trait aux fiducies réputées visant la TPS. Le conflit entre la *LTA* et la *LACC* est plus apparent que réel.

L'exercice par les tribunaux de leurs pouvoirs discrétionnaires a fait en sorte que la LACC a évolué et s'est adaptée aux besoins commerciaux et sociaux contemporains. Comme les réorganisations deviennent très complexes, les tribunaux chargés d'appliquer la LACC ont été appelés à innover. Les tribunaux doivent d'abord interpréter les dispositions de la LACC avant d'invoquer leur compétence inhérente ou leur compétence en equity pour établir leur pouvoir de prendre des mesures dans le cadre d'une procédure fondée sur la LACC. À cet égard, il faut souligner que le texte de la LACC peut être interprété très largement. La possibilité pour le tribunal de rendre des ordonnances plus spécifiques n'a pas pour effet de restreindre la portée des termes généraux utilisés dans la LACC. L'opportunité, la bonne foi et la diligence sont des considérations de base que le tribunal devrait toujours garder à l'esprit lorsqu'il exerce les pouvoirs conférés par la LACC. Il s'agit de savoir si l'ordonnance contribuera utilement à la réalisation de l'objectif d'éviter les pertes sociales et économiques résultant de la liquidation d'une compagnie insolvable. Ce critère s'applique non seulement à l'objectif de l'ordonnance, mais aussi aux moyens utilisés. En l'espèce, l'ordonnance du juge siégeant en son cabinet qui a suspendu l'exécution des mesures de recouvrement de la Couronne à l'égard de la TPS contribuait à la réalisation des objectifs de la LACC, parce qu'elle avait pour effet de dissuader les créanciers d'entraver une liquidation ordonnée et favorisait une transition harmonieuse entre la LACC et la LFI, répondant ainsi à l'objectif commun aux deux lois - qui consiste à avoir une seule procédure. Le passage de la LACC à la LFI peut exiger la levée partielle d'une suspension de procédures ordonnée en vertu de la LACC, de façon à permettre l'engagement des procédures fondées sur la LFI, mais il n'existe aucun hiatus entre ces lois étant donné qu'elles s'appliquent de concert et que, dans les deux cas, les créanciers examinent le régime de distribution prévu par la LFI pour connaître la situation qui serait la leur en cas d'échec de la réorganisation. L'ampleur du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par la LACC suffit pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI. Le juge siégeant en son cabinet pouvait donc rendre l'ordonnance qu'il a prononcée.

No express trust was created by the chambers judge's order in this case because there is no certainty of object inferrable from his order. Creation of an express trust requires certainty of intention, subject matter and object. At the time the chambers judge accepted the proposal to segregate the monies in the Monitor's trust account there was no certainty that the Crown would be the beneficiary, or object, of the trust because exactly who might take the money in the final result was in doubt. In any event, no dispute over the money would even arise under the interpretation of s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* established above, because the Crown's deemed trust priority over GST claims would be lost under the *CCAA* and the Crown would rank as an unsecured creditor for this amount.

Per Fish J.: The GST monies collected by the debtor are not subject to a deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown. In recent years, Parliament has given detailed consideration to the Canadian insolvency scheme but has declined to amend the provisions at issue in this case, a deliberate exercise of legislative discretion. On the other hand, in upholding deemed trusts created by the ETA notwithstanding insolvency proceedings, courts have been unduly protective of Crown interests which Parliament itself has chosen to subordinate to competing prioritized claims. In the context of the Canadian insolvency regime, deemed trusts exist only where there is a statutory provision creating the trust and a CCAA or BIA provision explicitly confirming its effective operation. The Income Tax Act, the Canada Pension Plan and the Employment Insurance Act all contain deemed trust provisions that are strikingly similar to that in s. 222 of the ETA but they are all also confirmed in s. 37 of the CCAA and in s. 67(3) of the BIA in clear and unmistakeable terms. The same is not true of the deemed trust created under the ETA. Although Parliament created a deemed trust in favour of the Crown to hold unremitted GST monies, and although it purports to maintain this trust notwithstanding any contrary federal or provincial legislation, it did not confirm the continued operation of the trust in either the BIA or the CCAA, reflecting Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

L'ordonnance du juge siégeant en son cabinet n'a pas créé de fiducie expresse en l'espèce, car aucune certitude d'objet ne peut être inférée de cette ordonnance. La création d'une fiducie expresse exige la présence de certitudes quant à l'intention, à la matière et à l'objet. Lorsque le juge siégeant en son cabinet a accepté la proposition que les sommes soient détenues séparément dans le compte en fiducie du contrôleur, il n'existait aucune certitude que la Couronne serait le bénéficiaire ou l'objet de la fiducie, car il y avait un doute quant à la question de savoir qui au juste pourrait toucher l'argent en fin de compte. De toute façon, suivant l'interprétation du par. 18.3(1) de la LACC dégagée précédemment, aucun différend ne saurait même exister quant à l'argent, étant donné que la priorité accordée aux réclamations de la Couronne fondées sur la fiducie réputée visant la TPS ne s'applique pas sous le régime de la LACC et que la Couronne est reléguée au rang de créancier non garanti à l'égard des sommes en question.

Le juge Fish : Les sommes perçues par la débitrice au titre de la TPS ne font l'objet d'aucune fiducie réputée ou priorité en faveur de la Couronne. Au cours des dernières années, le législateur fédéral a procédé à un examen approfondi du régime canadien d'insolvabilité, mais il a refusé de modifier les dispositions qui sont en cause dans la présente affaire. Il s'agit d'un exercice délibéré du pouvoir discrétionnaire de légiférer. Par contre, en maintenant, malgré l'existence des procédures d'insolvabilité, la validité de fiducies réputées créées en vertu de la LTA, les tribunaux ont protégé indûment des droits de la Couronne que le Parlement avait lui-même choisi de subordonner à d'autres créances prioritaires. Dans le contexte du régime canadien d'insolvabilité, il existe une fiducie réputée uniquement lorsqu'une disposition législative crée la fiducie et qu'une disposition de la LACC ou de la LFI confirme explicitement l'existence de la fiducie. La Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu, le Régime de pensions du Canada et la Loi sur l'assurance-emploi renferment toutes des dispositions relatives aux fiducies réputées dont le libellé offre une ressemblance frappante avec celui de l'art. 222 de la LTA, mais le maintien en vigueur des fiducies réputées créées en vertu de ces dispositions est confirmé à l'art. 37 de la LACC et au par. 67(3) de la LFI en termes clairs et explicites. La situation est différente dans le cas de la fiducie réputée créée par la LTA. Bien que le législateur crée en faveur de la Couronne une fiducie réputée dans laquelle seront conservées les sommes recueillies au titre de la TPS mais non encore versées, et bien qu'il prétende maintenir cette fiducie en vigueur malgré les dispositions à l'effet contraire de toute loi fédérale ou provinciale, il ne confirme pas l'existence de la fiducie dans la LFI ou la LACC, ce qui témoigne de son intention de laisser la fiducie réputée devenir caduque au moment de l'introduction de la procédure d'insolvabilité.

Per Abella J. (dissenting): Section 222(3) of the *ETA* gives priority during *CCAA* proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. This provision unequivocally defines its boundaries in the clearest possible terms and excludes only the *BIA* from its legislative grasp. The language used reflects a clear legislative intention that s. 222(3) would prevail if in conflict with any other law except the *BIA*. This is borne out by the fact that following the enactment of s. 222(3), amendments to the *CCAA* were introduced, and despite requests from various constituencies, s. 18.3(1) was not amended to make the priorities in the *CCAA* consistent with those in the *BIA*. This indicates a deliberate legislative choice to protect the deemed trust in s. 222(3) from the reach of s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*.

The application of other principles of interpretation reinforces this conclusion. An earlier, specific provision may be overruled by a subsequent general statute if the legislature indicates, through its language, an intention that the general provision prevails. Section 222(3) achieves this through the use of language stating that it prevails despite any law of Canada, of a province, or "any other law" other than the BIA. Section 18.3(1) of the CCAA is thereby rendered inoperative for purposes of s. 222(3). By operation of s. 44(f) of the Interpretation Act, the transformation of s. 18.3(1) into s. 37(1) after the enactment of s. 222(3) of the ETA has no effect on the interpretive queue, and s. 222(3) of the ETA remains the "later in time" provision. This means that the deemed trust provision in s. 222(3) of the ETA takes precedence over s. 18.3(1) during CCAA proceedings. While s. 11 gives a court discretion to make orders notwithstanding the BIA and the Winding-up Act, that discretion is not liberated from the operation of any other federal statute. Any exercise of discretion is therefore circumscribed by whatever limits are imposed by statutes other than the BIA and the Winding-up Act. That includes the ETA. The chambers judge in this case was, therefore, required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the ETA. Neither s. 18.3(1) nor s. 11 of the CCAA gave him the authority to ignore it. He could not, as a result, deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the CCAA proceedings.

La juge Abella (dissidente) : Le paragraphe 222(3) de la LTA donne préséance, dans le cadre d'une procédure relevant de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée qui est établie en faveur de la Couronne à l'égard de la TPS non versée. Cette disposition définit sans équivoque sa portée dans des termes on ne peut plus clairs et n'exclut que la LFI de son champ d'application. Les termes employés révèlent l'intention claire du législateur que le par. 222(3) l'emporte en cas de conflit avec toute autre loi sauf la LFI. Cette opinion est confortée par le fait que des modifications ont été apportées à la LACC après l'édiction du par. 222(3) et que, malgré les demandes répétées de divers groupes, le par. 18.3(1) n'a pas été modifié pour aligner l'ordre de priorité établi par la LACC sur celui de la LFI. Cela indique que le législateur a délibérément choisi de soustraire la fiducie réputée établie au par. 222(3) à l'application du par. 18.3(1) de la LACC.

Cette conclusion est renforcée par l'application d'autres principes d'interprétation. Une disposition spécifique antérieure peut être supplantée par une loi ultérieure de portée générale si le législateur, par les mots qu'il a employés, a exprimé l'intention de faire prévaloir la loi générale. Le paragraphe 222(3) accomplit cela de par son libellé, lequel précise que la disposition l'emporte sur tout autre texte législatif fédéral, tout texte législatif provincial ou « toute autre règle de droit » sauf la LFI. Le paragraphe 18.3(1) de la LACC est par conséquent rendu inopérant aux fins d'application du par. 222(3). Selon l'alinéa 44f) de la Loi d'interpréta*tion*, le fait que le par. 18.3(1) soit devenu le par. 37(1) à la suite de l'édiction du par. 222(3) de la LTA n'a aucune incidence sur l'ordre chronologique du point de vue de l'interprétation, et le par. 222(3) de la LTA demeure la disposition « postérieure ». Il s'ensuit que la disposition créant une fiducie réputée que l'on trouve au par. 222(3) de la LTA l'emporte sur le par. 18.3(1) dans le cadre d'une procédure fondée sur la LACC. Bien que l'art. 11 accorde au tribunal le pouvoir discrétionnaire de rendre des ordonnances malgré les dispositions de la LFI et de la Loi sur les liquidations, ce pouvoir discrétionnaire demeure assujetti à l'application de toute autre loi fédérale. L'exercice de ce pouvoir discrétionnaire est donc circonscrit par les limites imposées par toute loi autre que la LFI et la Loi sur les liquidations, et donc par la LTA. En l'espèce, le juge siégeant en son cabinet était donc tenu de respecter le régime de priorités établi au par. 222(3) de la LTA. Ni le par. 18.3(1), ni l'art. 11 de la LACC ne l'autorisaient à en faire abstraction. Par conséquent, il ne pouvait pas refuser la demande présentée par la Couronne en vue de se faire payer la TPS dans le cadre de la procédure introduite en vertu de la LACC.

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APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (Newbury, Tysoe and Smith JJ.A.), 2009 BCCA 205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, [2009] B.C.J. No. 918 (QL), 2009 CarswellBC 1195, reversing a judgment of Brenner C.J.S.C., 2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2611 (QL), 2008 CarswellBC 2895, dismissing a Crown application for payment of GST monies. Appeal allowed, Abella J. dissenting.

Mary I. A. Buttery, Owen J. James and Matthew J. G. Curtis, for the appellant.

Gordon Bourgard, *David Jacyk* and *Michael J*. *Lema*, for the respondent.

The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. was delivered by

[1] DESCHAMPS J. — For the first time this Court is called upon to directly interpret the provisions of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA"). In that respect, two questions are raised. The first requires reconciliation of provisions of the CCAA and the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("ETA"), which lower courts have held to be in conflict with one another. The second concerns the scope of a court's discretion when supervising reorganization. The relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in the Appendix. On the first question, having considered the evolution of Crown priorities in the context of insolvency and the wording of the various statutes creating Crown priorities, I conclude that it is the CCAA and not the ETA that provides the rule. On the second question, I conclude that the broad discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the supervising judge must be interpreted having regard to the remedial nature of the CCAA and insolvency legislation generally. Consequently, the court had the discretion to partially lift a stay of proceedings to allow the debtor to make an assignment under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency POURVOI contre un arrêt de la Cour d'appel de la Colombie-Britannique (les juges Newbury, Tysoe et Smith), 2009 BCCA 205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, [2009] B.C.J. No. 918 (QL), 2009 CarswellBC 1195, qui a infirmé une décision du juge en chef Brenner, 2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2611 (QL), 2008 CarswellBC 2895, qui a rejeté la demande de la Couronne sollicitant le paiement de la TPS. Pourvoi accueilli, la juge Abella est dissidente.

Mary I. A. Buttery, Owen J. James et Matthew J. G. Curtis, pour l'appelante.

Gordon Bourgard, David Jacyk et Michael J. Lema, pour l'intimé.

Version française du jugement de la juge en chef McLachlin et des juges Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein et Cromwell rendu par

[1] LA JUGE DESCHAMPS — C'est la première fois que la Cour est appelée à interpréter directement les dispositions de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-36 (« LACC »). À cet égard, deux questions sont soulevées. La première requiert la conciliation d'une disposition de la LACC et d'une disposition de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise, L.R.C. 1985, ch. E-15 (« LTA »), qui, selon des juridictions inférieures, sont en conflit l'une avec l'autre. La deuxième concerne la portée du pouvoir discrétionnaire du tribunal qui surveille une réorganisation. Les dispositions législatives pertinentes sont reproduites en annexe. Pour ce qui est de la première question, après avoir examiné l'évolution des priorités de la Couronne en matière d'insolvabilité et le libellé des diverses lois qui établissent ces priorités, j'arrive à la conclusion que c'est la LACC, et non la LTA, qui énonce la règle applicable. Pour ce qui est de la seconde question, je conclus qu'il faut interpréter les larges pouvoirs discrétionnaires conférés au juge en tenant compte de la nature réparatrice de la LACC et de la législation sur l'insolvabilité en général. Par conséquent, le tribunal avait le pouvoir the company or its creditors usually seek to have the debtor's assets liquidated under the applicable provisions of the *BIA* or to place the debtor into receivership. As discussed in greater detail below, the key difference between the reorganization regimes under the *BIA* and the *CCAA* is that the latter offers a more flexible mechanism with greater judicial discretion, making it more responsive to complex reorganizations.

[15] As I will discuss at greater length below, the purpose of the CCAA — Canada's first reorganization statute — is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets. Proposals to creditors under the BIA serve the same remedial purpose, though this is achieved through a rules-based mechanism that offers less flexibility. Where reorganization is impossible, the BIA may be employed to provide an orderly mechanism for the distribution of a debtor's assets to satisfy creditor claims according to predetermined priority rules.

[16] Prior to the enactment of the CCAA in 1933 (S.C. 1932-33, c. 36), practice under existing commercial insolvency legislation tended heavily towards the liquidation of a debtor company (J. Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (2003), at p. 12). The battering visited upon Canadian businesses by the Great Depression and the absence of an effective mechanism for reaching a compromise between debtors and creditors to avoid liquidation required a legislative response. The CCAA was innovative as it allowed the insolvent debtor to attempt reorganization under judicial supervision outside the existing insolvency legislation which, once engaged, almost invariably resulted in liquidation (Reference re Companies' Creditors accepté par ses créanciers et où la compagnie réorganisée poursuit ses activités au terme de la procédure engagée en vertu de la *LACC*. Enfin, dans le dernier scénario, la transaction ou l'arrangement échoue et la compagnie ou ses créanciers cherchent habituellement à obtenir la liquidation des biens en vertu des dispositions applicables de la *LFI* ou la mise sous séquestre du débiteur. Comme nous le verrons, la principale différence entre les régimes de réorganisation prévus par la *LFI* et la *LACC* est que le second établit un mécanisme plus souple, dans lequel les tribunaux disposent d'un plus grand pouvoir discrétionnaire, ce qui rend le mécanisme mieux adapté aux réorganisations complexes.

[15] Comme je vais le préciser davantage plus loin, la LACC — la première loi canadienne régissant la réorganisation — a pour objectif de permettre au débiteur de continuer d'exercer ses activités et, dans les cas où cela est possible, d'éviter les coûts sociaux et économiques liés à la liquidation de son actif. Les propositions faites aux créanciers en vertu de la LFI répondent au même objectif, mais au moyen d'un mécanisme fondé sur des règles et offrant moins de souplesse. Quand la réorganisation s'avère impossible, les dispositions de la LFI peuvent être appliquées pour répartir de manière ordonnée les biens du débiteur entre les créanciers, en fonction des règles de priorité qui y sont établies.

[16] Avant l'adoption de la *LACC* en 1933 (S.C. 1932-33, ch. 36), la liquidation de la compagnie débitrice constituait la pratique la plus courante en vertu de la législation existante en matière d'insolvabilité commerciale (J. Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest : Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (2003), p. 12). Les ravages de la Grande Dépression sur les entreprises canadiennes et l'absence d'un mécanisme efficace susceptible de permettre aux débiteurs et aux créanciers d'arriver à des compromis afin d'éviter la liquidation commandaient une solution législative. La LACC a innové en permettant au débiteur insolvable de tenter une réorganisation sous surveillance judiciaire, hors du cadre de la législation existante en matière d'insolvabilité qui, une fois entrée en jeu,

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3.3 Discretionary Power of a Court Supervising a CCAA Reorganization

[57] Courts frequently observe that "[t]he *CCAA* is skeletal in nature" and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred" (*Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (Re)*, 2008 ONCA 587, 92 O.R. (3d) 513, at para. 44, *per* Blair J.A.). Accordingly, "[t]he history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation" (*Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), at para. 10, *per* Farley J.).

[58] *CCAA* decisions are often based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction. The incremental exercise of judicial discretion in commercial courts under conditions one practitioner aptly describes as "the hothouse of real-time litigation" has been the primary method by which the *CCAA* has been adapted and has evolved to meet contemporary business and social needs (see Jones, at p. 484).

[59] Judicial discretion must of course be exercised in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s purposes. The remedial purpose I referred to in the historical overview of the Act is recognized over and over again in the jurisprudence. To cite one early example:

The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

(*Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282, at para. 57, *per* Doherty J.A., dissenting)

[60] Judicial decision making under the *CCAA* takes many forms. A court must first of all provide the conditions under which the debtor can attempt to reorganize. This can be achieved by

3.3 *Pouvoirs discrétionnaires du tribunal chargé de surveiller une réorganisation fondée sur la LACC*

[57] Les tribunaux font souvent remarquer que [TRADUCTION] « [1]a LACC est par nature schématique » et ne « contient pas un code complet énonçant tout ce qui est permis et tout ce qui est interdit » (Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (Re), 2008 ONCA 587, 92 O.R. (3d) 513, par. 44, le juge Blair). Par conséquent, [TRADUCTION] « [1]'histoire du droit relatif à la LACC correspond à l'évolution de ce droit au fil de son interprétation par les tribunaux » (Dylex Ltd., Re (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (C. Ont. (Div. gén.)), par. 10, le juge Farley).

[58] Les décisions prises en vertu de la *LACC* découlent souvent de l'exercice discrétionnaire de certains pouvoirs. C'est principalement au fil de l'exercice par les juridictions commerciales de leurs pouvoirs discrétionnaires, et ce, dans des conditions décrites avec justesse par un praticien comme constituant [TRADUCTION] « la pépinière du contentieux en temps réel », que la *LACC* a évolué de façon graduelle et s'est adaptée aux besoins commerciaux et sociaux contemporains (voir Jones, p. 484).

[59] L'exercice par les tribunaux de leurs pouvoirs discrétionnaires doit évidemment tendre à la réalisation des objectifs de la *LACC*. Le caractère réparateur dont j'ai fait état dans mon aperçu historique de la Loi a à maintes reprises été reconnu dans la jurisprudence. Voici l'un des premiers exemples :

[TRADUCTION] La loi est réparatrice au sens le plus pur du terme, en ce qu'elle fournit un moyen d'éviter les effets dévastateurs, — tant sur le plan social qu'économique — de la faillite ou de l'arrêt des activités d'une entreprise, à l'initiation des créanciers, pendant que des efforts sont déployés, sous la surveillance du tribunal, en vue de réorganiser la situation financière de la compagnie débitrice.

(*Elan Corp. c. Comiskey* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282, par. 57, le juge Doherty, dissident)

[60] Le processus décisionnel des tribunaux sous le régime de la *LACC* comporte plusieurs aspects. Le tribunal doit d'abord créer les conditions propres à permettre au débiteur de tenter une réorganisation.

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matter, ... subject to this Act, [to] make an order under this section" (CCAA, s. 11(1)). The plain language of the statute was very broad.

[68] In this regard, though not strictly applicable to the case at bar, I note that Parliament has in recent amendments changed the wording contained in s. 11(1), making explicit the discretionary authority of the court under the *CCAA*. Thus, in s. 11 of the *CCAA* as currently enacted, a court may, "subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, . . . make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances" (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 128). Parliament appears to have endorsed the broad reading of *CCAA* authority developed by the jurisprudence.

[69] The CCAA also explicitly provides for certain orders. Both an order made on an initial application and an order on subsequent applications may stay, restrain, or prohibit existing or new proceedings against the debtor. The burden is on the applicant to satisfy the court that the order is appropriate in the circumstances and that the applicant has been acting in good faith and with due diligence (CCAA, ss. 11(3), (4) and (6)).

[70] The general language of the CCAA should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. However, the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising CCAA authority. Appropriateness under the CCAA is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the CCAA. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the CCAA — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all d'un intéressé, [...] sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi [...] rendre l'ordonnance prévue au présent article » (*LACC*, par. 11(1)). Cette formulation claire était très générale.

[68] Bien que ces dispositions ne soient pas strictement applicables en l'espèce, je signale à ce propos que le législateur a, dans des modifications récentes, apporté au texte du par. 11(1) un changement qui rend plus explicite le pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par la *LACC*. Ainsi, aux termes de l'art. 11 actuel de la *LACC*, le tribunal peut « rendre [. . .] sous réserve des restrictions prévues par la présente loi [. . .] toute ordonnance qu'il estime indiquée » (L.C. 2005, ch. 47, art. 128). Le législateur semble ainsi avoir jugé opportun de sanctionner l'interprétation large du pouvoir conféré par la *LACC* qui a été élaborée par la jurisprudence.

[69] De plus, la *LACC* prévoit explicitement certaines ordonnances. Tant à la suite d'une demande initiale que d'une demande subséquente, le tribunal peut, par ordonnance, suspendre ou interdire toute procédure contre le débiteur, ou surseoir à sa continuation. Il incombe à la personne qui demande une telle ordonnance de convaincre le tribunal qu'elle est indiquée et qu'il a agi et continue d'agir de bonne foi et avec la diligence voulue (*LACC*, par. 11(3), (4) et (6)).

[70] La possibilité pour le tribunal de rendre des ordonnances plus spécifiques n'a pas pour effet de restreindre la portée des termes généraux utilisés dans la LACC. Toutefois, l'opportunité, la bonne foi et la diligence sont des considérations de base que le tribunal devrait toujours garder à l'esprit lorsqu'il exerce les pouvoirs conférés par la LACC. Sous le régime de la LACC, le tribunal évalue l'opportunité de l'ordonnance demandée en déterminant si elle favorisera la réalisation des objectifs de politique générale qui sous-tendent la Loi. Il s'agit donc de savoir si cette ordonnance contribuera utilement à la réalisation de l'objectif réparateur de la LACC à savoir éviter les pertes sociales et économiques résultant de la liquidation d'une compagnie insolvable. J'ajouterais que le critère de l'opportunité s'applique non seulement à l'objectif de l'ordonnance, mais aussi aux moyens utilisés. Les tribunaux

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stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

[71] It is well established that efforts to reorganize under the *CCAA* can be terminated and the stay of proceedings against the debtor lifted if the reorganization is "doomed to failure" (see *Chef Ready*, at p. 88; *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 6-7). However, when an order is sought that does realistically advance the *CCAA*'s purposes, the ability to make it is within the discretion of a *CCAA* court.

[72] The preceding discussion assists in determining whether the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of proceedings against the Crown once it was apparent that reorganization would fail and bankruptcy was the inevitable next step.

[73] In the Court of Appeal, Tysoe J.A. held that no authority existed under the CCAA to continue staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust once efforts at reorganization had come to an end. The appellant submits that in so holding, Tysoe J.A. failed to consider the underlying purpose of the CCAA and give the statute an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation under which the order was permissible. The Crown submits that Tysoe J.A. correctly held that the mandatory language of the ETA gave the court no option but to permit enforcement of the GST deemed trust when lifting the CCAA stay to permit the debtor to make an assignment under the BIA. Whether the ETA has a mandatory effect in the context of a CCAA proceeding has already been discussed. I will now address the question of whether the order was authorized by the CCAA.

doivent se rappeler que les chances de succès d'une réorganisation sont meilleures lorsque les participants arrivent à s'entendre et que tous les intéressés sont traités de la façon la plus avantageuse et juste possible dans les circonstances.

[71] Il est bien établi qu'il est possible de mettre fin aux efforts déployés pour procéder à une réorganisation fondée sur la *LACC* et de lever la suspension des procédures contre le débiteur si la réorganisation est [TRADUCTION] « vouée à l'échec » (voir *Chef Ready*, p. 88; *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd.*, *Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (C.A.C.-B.), par. 6-7). Cependant, quand l'ordonnance demandée contribue vraiment à la réalisation des objectifs de la *LACC*, le pouvoir discrétionnaire dont dispose le tribunal en vertu de cette loi l'habilite à rendre à cette ordonnance.

[72] L'analyse qui précède est utile pour répondre à la question de savoir si le tribunal avait, en vertu de la *LACC*, le pouvoir de maintenir la suspension des procédures à l'encontre de la Couronne, une fois qu'il est devenu évident que la réorganisation échouerait et que la faillite était inévitable.

[73] En Cour d'appel, le juge Tysoe a conclu que la LACC n'habilitait pas le tribunal à maintenir la suspension des mesures d'exécution de la Couronne à l'égard de la fiducie réputée visant la TPS après l'arrêt des efforts de réorganisation. Selon l'appelante, en tirant cette conclusion, le juge Tysoe a omis de tenir compte de l'objectif fondamental de la LACC et n'a pas donné à ce texte l'interprétation téléologique et large qu'il convient de lui donner et qui autorise le prononcé d'une telle ordonnance. La Couronne soutient que le juge Tysoe a conclu à bon droit que les termes impératifs de la LTA ne laissaient au tribunal d'autre choix que d'autoriser les mesures d'exécution à l'endroit de la fiducie réputée visant la TPS lorsqu'il a levé la suspension de procédures qui avait été ordonnée en application de la LACC afin de permettre au débiteur de faire cession de ses biens en vertu de la LFI. J'ai déjà traité de la question de savoir si la LTA a un effet contraignant dans une procédure fondée sur la LACC. Je vais maintenant traiter de la question de savoir si l'ordonnance était autorisée par la LACC.





Court File No.: CV-23-00703350-00CL

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE COMMERCIAL LIST

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THE HONOURABLE

FRIDAY, THE 4TH

JUSTICE PENNY

DAY OF AUGUST, 2023

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ALEAFIA HEALTH INC., EMBLEM CORP., EMBLEM CANNABIS CORPORATION, EMBLEM REALTY LTD., GROWWISE HEALTH LIMITED., CANABO MEDICAL CORPORATION, ALEAFIA INC., ALEAFIA FARMS INC., ALEAFIA BRANDS INC., ALEAFIA RETAIL INC., 2672533 ONTARIO INC., and 2676063 ONTARIO INC.

(collectively, the "Applicants")

AMENDED AND RESTATED INITIAL ORDER

(amending Initial Order dated July 25, 2023)

THIS MOTION, made by the Applicants, for an order amending and restating the initial order of Justice Conway issued on July 25, 2023 pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA"), was heard this day by judicial videoconference.

ON READING the affidavit of Patricia Symmes-Rizakos sworn July 24, 2023 and the Exhibits thereto (the "**Initial Symmes Affidavit**"), the affidavit of Patricia Symmes-Rizakos sworn July 26, 2023 and the Exhibits thereto, the pre-filing report of KSV Restructuring Inc. ("**KSV**"), in its capacity as proposed monitor of the Applicants dated July 24, 2023, and the First Report of KSV, in its capacity as monitor (in such capacity, the "**Monitor**"), to be filed (the "**First Report**"), on being advised that the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the charges created herein were given notice, and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants,

counsel for the Monitor, counsel to Red White & Bloom Brands Inc. (the "**DIP Lender**"), and such other parties listed on the Counsel Slip, no one appearing for any other party although duly served as appears from the Affidavits of Service of S. Hans, as filed,

SERVICE

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record is hereby abridged and validated so that this Application is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

APPLICATION

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that each of the Applicants is a company to which the CCAA applies.

PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicants shall have the authority to file and may, subject to further order of this Court, file with this Court a plan of compromise or arrangement (hereinafter referred to as the "**Plan**").

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND OPERATIONS

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall remain in possession and control of their respective current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof (the "**Property**"). Subject to further Order of this Court, the Applicants shall continue to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of their business (the "**Business**") and Property. The Applicants are authorized and empowered to continue to retain and employ the employees, consultants, agents, experts, accountants, counsel and such other persons (collectively "**Assistants**") currently retained or employed by them, with liberty to retain such further Assistants as they deem reasonably necessary or desirable in the ordinary course of business or for the carrying out of the terms of this Order.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall be entitled to continue to utilize the central cash management system currently in place as described in the Symmes Affidavit or, with

- (a) neither the creation of the Charges nor the execution, delivery, perfection, registration or performance of the Definitive Documents shall create or be deemed to constitute a breach by the Applicants of any Agreement to which they are a party;
- (b) none of the Chargees shall have any liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of any breach of any Agreement caused by or resulting from the Applicants entering into of the Definitive Documents, the creation of the Charges, or the execution, delivery or performance of the Definitive Documents; and
- (c) the payments made by the Applicants pursuant to this Order or the Definitive Documents, and the granting of the Charges, do not and will not constitute preferences, fraudulent conveyances, transfers at undervalue, oppressive conduct, or other challengeable or voidable transactions under any applicable law.

43. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Charge created by this Order over leases of real property in Canada shall only be a Charge in the applicable Applicant's interest in such real property leases.

CORPORATE MATTERS

44. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Aleafia Health Inc. be and is hereby relieved of any obligation to call and hold an annual meeting of its shareholders until further Order of this Court.

RELIEF FROM REPORTING AND FILING OBLIGATIONS

45. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the decision by the Applicant to incur no further expenses for the duration of the Stay Period in relation to any filings (including financial statements), disclosures, core or non-core documents, and press releases (collectively, the "**Securities Filings**") that may be required by any federal, provincial or other law respecting securities or capital markets in Canada, or by the rules and regulations of a stock exchange, including, without limitation, the *Securities Act* (Ontario), R.S.O, c. S.5 and comparable statutes enacted by other provinces of Canada, and the rules, regulations and policies of the Toronto Stock Exchange and OTCQB® (collectively, the "**Securities Legislation**"), is hereby authorized, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit any securities regulator or stock exchange from taking any action or exercising any discretion that it may have of a nature described in Section 11.1(2) of the CCAA

as a consequence of the Applicant failing to make any Securities Filings required by the Securities Provisions.

46. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that none of the directors, officers, employees, and other representatives of the Applicants, nor the Monitor shall have any personal liability for any failure by the Applicant to make any Securities Filings required by the Securities Legislation during the Stay Period, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit any securities regulator or stock exchange from taking any action or exercising any discretion that it may have against the directors, officers, employees and other representatives of the Applicant of a nature described in section 11.1(2) of the CCAA as a consequence of such failure by the Applicant. For greater certainty, nothing in this Order is intended to or shall encroach on the jurisdiction of any securities regulatory authorities (the "**Regulators**") in the matter of regulating the conduct of market participants and to issue or maintain cease trader orders if and when required pursuant to applicable securities law. Further, nothing in this Order shall constitute or be construed as an admission by the Regulators that the Court has jurisdiction over matters that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regulators under the Securities Legislation.

SERVICE AND NOTICE

47. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall (i) without delay, publish in *The Globe and Mail* National Edition a notice containing the information prescribed under the CCAA, and (ii) within five (5) days after the date of this Order, (A) make this Order publicly available in the manner prescribed under the CCAA, (B) send, or cause to be sent, in the prescribed manner, a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against any of the Applicants of more than \$1,000, and (C) prepare a list showing the names and addresses of those creditors and the estimated amounts of those claims, and make it publicly available in the prescribed manner, all in accordance with Section 23(1)(a) of the CCAA and the regulations made thereunder; provided that the Monitor shall not be required to make the claims, names and addresses of individuals who are creditors publicly available unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

48. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the E-Service Protocol of the Commercial List (the "**Protocol**") is approved and adopted by reference herein and, in this proceeding, the service of documents made in accordance with the Protocol (which can be found on the Commercial List website at http://www.directions/toronto/www.directions/toronto/www.direct

Australia, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicants, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicants and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Applicants and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

54. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicants and the Monitor be at liberty and is hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order, and that the Monitor is authorized and empowered to act as a representative in respect of the within proceedings for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in a jurisdiction outside Canada.

55. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any interested party (including the Applicants and the Monitor) may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order on not less than seven (7) days notice to any other party or parties likely to be affected by the order sought or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order; provided, however, that the Chargees shall be entitled to rely on this Order as issued and entered and on the Charges and priorities set forth in paragraphs 38 and 40 hereof with respect to any fees, expenses and disbursements incurred, or advances made under the DIP loan, as applicable, until the date this Order may be amended, varied or stayed.

56. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Initial Order is hereby amended and restated pursuant to this Order, and this Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard/Daylight Time on the date of this Order.

Very 3.





Court File No. CV-23-00711935-00CL

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL LIST)

))

THE HONOURABLE

MONDAY, THE 29TH

JUSTICE OSBORNE

DAY OF JANUARY, 2024

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TREES CORPORATION, ONTARIO CANNABIS HOLDINGS CORP., MIRACULO INC., 2707461 ONTARIO LTD., OCH ONTARIO CONSULTING CORP., AND 11819496 CANADA INC. (collectively, the "Applicants")

SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED INITIAL ORDER

THIS MOTION, made by the Applicants, pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA") for an order amending and restating the Amended and Restated Initial Order granted January 2, 2024 (as amended and restated, the "Initial Order") was heard this day by way of judicial video conference in Toronto, Ontario by Zoom videoconference.

ON READING the affidavit of Jeffrey Holmgren sworn December 21, 2023, and the Exhibits thereto (the "Initial Holmgren Affidavit"), the affidavit of Jeffrey Holmgren sworn December 29, 2023 (the "Second Holmgren Affidavit"), the affidavit of Jeffrey Holmgren sworn January 23, 2024 (together with the Initial Holmgren Affidavit and the Second Holmgren Affidavit, the "Holmgren Affidavits"), the Pre-Filing Report of Ernst & Young Inc. dated December 21, 2023 (the "Pre-Filing Report"), the First Report of Ernst & Young Inc. dated December 29, 2023, and the First Report of FTI Consulting Canada Inc., filed, and on being

advised that the secured creditors who are likely affected by the charges created herein were given notice, and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants, counsel for FTI Consulting Canada Inc. and those other parties listed on the Participant Information Form, no one else appearing although duly served as appears from the Affidavits of Service, and on reading the consent of FTI Consulting Canada Inc. to act as the monitor (the "**Monitor**");

SERVICE AND DEFINITIONS

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record of the Applicants dated December 29, 2023, is hereby abridged and validated so that this Application is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that capitalized terms used herein that are not otherwise defined shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Holmgren Affidavits.

APPLICATION

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicants is a company to which the CCAA applies.

PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall have the authority to file and may, subject to further order of this Court, file with this Court a plan of compromise or arrangement (hereinafter referred to as the "**Plan**").

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND OPERATIONS

5. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicants shall remain in possession and control of their current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof (the "**Property**"). Subject to further Order of the Court, the Applicants shall continue to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of their business (the "**Business**") and Property. The Applicants are authorized and empowered to continue to retain and employ their employees, consultants, agents, experts, accountants, counsel and such other persons (collectively "Assistants") currently retained or

RELIEF FROM REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

52. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the decision by the Applicants to incur no further expenses for the duration of the Stay Period in relation to any filings (including financial statements), disclosures, core or non-core documents, and press releases (collectively, the **"Securities Filings"**) that may be required by any federal, provincial or other law respecting securities or capital markets in Canada, or by the rules and regulations of a stock exchange, including, without limitation, the *Securities Act* (Alberta), RSA 2000, c S-4 and comparable statutes enacted by other provinces of Canada, and the rules, regulations and policies of Cboe Canada (collectively, the **"Securities Legislation"**), is hereby authorized, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit any securities regulator or stock exchange from taking any action or exercising any discretion that it may have of a nature described in section 11.1(2) of the CCAA as a consequence of the Applicants failing to make any Securities Filings required by the Securities Legislation.

53. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that none of the directors, officers, employees, and other representatives of the Applicants nor the Monitor shall have any personal liability for any failure by the Applicants to make any Securities Filings required by the Securities Legislation during the Stay Period, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit any securities regulator or stock exchange from taking any action or exercising any discretion that it may have of a nature described in section 11.1(2) of the CCAA as a consequence of such failure by the Applicants. For greater certainty, nothing in this Order is intended to or shall encroach on the jurisdiction of any securities regulatory authorities (the "**Regulators**") in the matter of regulating the conduct of market participants and to issue cease trade orders if and when required pursuant to applicable securities law. Further, nothing in this Order shall constitute or be construed as an admission by the Regulators that the court has jurisdiction over matters that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regulators under the Securities Legislation.

SHAREHOLDERS' MEETING

54. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the requirement for any future annual general meeting of the shareholders of Trees Corporation be postponed during these proceedings, and the time limit to call and hold such annual general meeting of shareholders is extended until after the conclusion of these proceedings, subject to further Order of this Court.

GENERAL

55. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants or the Monitor may from time to time apply to this Court for advice and directions in the discharge of its powers and duties hereunder.

56. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in this Order shall prevent the Monitor from acting as an interim receiver, a receiver, a receiver and manager, or a trustee in bankruptcy of the Applicants, the Business or the Property.

57. THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicants, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicants and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Applicants and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

58. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicants and the Monitor be at liberty and is hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order, and that the Monitor is authorized and empowered to act as a representative in respect of the within proceedings for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in a jurisdiction outside Canada.


59. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any interested party (including the Applicants and the Monitor) may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order on not less than seven (7) days notice to any other party or parties likely to be affected by the order sought or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order.

60. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that this Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard/Daylight Time on the date of this Order.





Clerk's Stamp:



COURT FILE NUMBER

JUDICIAL CENTRE OF

DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT:

COURT OF KING'S BENCH OF ALBERTA

CALGARY

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF WOLVERINE ENERGY AND INFRASTRUCTURE INC., **WOLVERINE** EQUIPMENT INC., **WOLVERINE** CONSTRUCTION INC., HD ENERGY RENTALS LTD., IN-LINE PRODUCTION TESTING LTD., BHW EMPLOYMENT SERVICES INC., FLO-BACK EQUIPMENT INC., LIBERTY ENERGY SERVICES LTD., and WESTERN CANADIAN MULCHING LTD.

CCAA INITIAL ORDER

BENNETT JONES LLP

Barristers and Solicitors 4500, 855 – 2nd Street S.W. Calgary, Alberta T2P 4K7

Attention: Michael Selnes/Keely Cameron Telephone No.: 403-298-3311/3324 Fax No.: 403-265-7219 Client File No.: 089248.00006

DATE ON WHICH ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED:

ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND

CONTACT INFORMATION OF

PARTY FILING THIS

NAME OF JUDGE WHO MADE THIS ORDER:

November 30, 2023

The Honourable Justice Whitling

LOCATION OF HEARING:

Calgary Courts Centre 601 – 5th Street SW, Calgary, AB T2P 5P7

UPON the application of Wolverine Energy and Infrastructure Inc., Wolverine Equipment Inc., Wolverine Construction Inc., HD Energy Rentals Ltd., BHW Employment Services Inc., Flo-Back Equipment Inc., Liberty Energy Services Ltd., and Western Canadian Mulching Ltd. (collectively, the "Applicants" or "Wolverine Group"); AND UPON having read the Originating Application, the Affidavit of Shannon Ostapovich sworn on November 29, 2023 (the "Ostapovich Affidavit") and the Pre-filing Report of the Proposed Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc.; AND UPON reading the consent of Ernst & Young Inc. to act as Monitor; AND UPON hearing counsel for the Applicants; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECLARED THAT:

SERVICE

1. The time for service of the notice of application for this order (the "**Order**") is hereby abridged and deemed good and sufficient and this application is properly returnable today.

CAPITALIZED TERMS

2. Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined in this Order shall have the meaning given to such terms in the Ostapovich Affidavit.

APPLICATION

The Applicants are companies to which the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c C-36 (the "CCAA") applies.

PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT

4. The Applicants shall have the authority to file and may, subject to further order of this Court, file with this Court a plan of compromise or arrangement (the "**Plan**").

- (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes; or
- (e) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances, contained in any existing loan documents, lease, sublease, offer to lease or other agreement (collectively, an "Agreement") that binds the Applicants, and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Agreement:
 - (i) neither the creation of the Charges nor the execution, delivery, perfection, registration or performance of any documents in respect thereof, shall create or be deemed to constitute a new breach by the Applicants of any Agreement to which it is a party;
 - (ii) none of the Chargees shall have any liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of any breach of any Agreement caused by or resulting from the creation of the Charges; and
 - (iii) the payments made by the Applicants pursuant to this Order and the granting of the Charges do not and will not constitute preferences, fraudulent conveyances, transfers at undervalue, oppressive conduct or other challengeable or voidable transactions under any applicable law.

RELIEF FROM REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

39. THIS COURT ORDERS that the decision by the Applicants to incur no further expenses in relation to any filings, disclosures, core or non-core documents, restatements, amendments to existing filings, press releases or any other actions (collectively, the "Securities Filings") that maybe required by any federal, provincial or other law respecting securities or capital markets in Canada or the United States, or by the rules and regulations of a stock exchange, including without limitation, the *Securities Act (Alberta)* and comparable statutes enacted by other provinces of Canada, the *Securities Act of 1933* (United States) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (United States) and comparable statutes enacted by individual states of the United States, the TSX Company Manual, the TSX Venture Exchange Corporate Finance Policies and other rules, regulations and policies of the Toronto Stock Exchange and the TSX Venture Exchange (collectively, the "Securities Provisions"), is hereby

authorized, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit any securities regulator or stock exchange from taking any action or exercising any discretion that it may have of a nature described in section 11.1(2) of the CCAA as a consequence of the Applicants failing to make any Securities Filings required by the Securities Provisions.

40. THIS COURT ORDERS that none of the directors, officers, employees and other representatives of the Applicants, the Monitor (and its directors, officers, employees and representatives, shall have any personal liability for any failure by the Applicants to make any Securities Filings required by the Securities Provisions.

ALLOCATION

41. Any interested Person may apply to this Court on notice to any other party likely to be affected for an order to allocate the Charges amongst the various assets comprising the Property.

SERVICE AND NOTICE

- 42. The Monitor shall (i) without delay, publish in the *Daily Oil Bulletin* a notice containing the information prescribed under the CCAA; (ii) within five (5) days after the date of this Order (A) make this Order publicly available in the manner prescribed under the CCAA, (B) send, in the prescribed manner, a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against either of the Applicants of more than \$1,000 and (C) prepare a list showing the names and addresses of those creditors and the estimated amounts of those claims, and make it publicly available in the prescribed manner, all in accordance with section 23(1)(a) of the CCAA and the regulations made thereunder.
- 43. The Monitor shall establish a case website in respect of the within proceedings at www.ey.com/ca/WolverineEnergy (the "Monitor's Website").
- 44. The Applicants and the Monitor are at liberty to serve this Order, any other materials and orders in these proceedings, any notices or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery or electronic transmission to the Applicants' creditors or other interested parties at their respective

55. This Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Mountain Daylight Time on the date of this Order.

Justice of the Court of King's Bench of Alberta





HALIFAX, N.S.

2023

THE MATTER OF:

e Honourable

Hfx No. 523334

SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA

Application by IMV Inc. and Immunovaccine Technologies Inc. and IMV USA Inc. (the "Applicants"), for relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*

Amended and Restated Initial Order

Justice John P. Bodurtha

in chambers:

SARMA The Applicants propose to make a compromise or arrangement under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended (the "**CCAA**") and they applied Sgd. for an initial order and, now or in the future, other relief under the CCAA as may be sought on JPB, J. notice of motion.

The following parties received notice of this application: see attached at Schedule "A".

The following parties, represented by the following counsel, made submissions:

Party	Counsel
Applicants	McCarthy Tétrault LLP Alain N. Tardif François Alexandre Toupin
	Stewart McKelvey Lawyers Sara L. Scott
Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.	Stikeman Elliott LLP Maria Konyukhova
Horizon Technology Finance Corporation, as agent	Aird & Berlis LLP Miranda Spence Kyle Plunkett

On motion of the Applicants, the following is ordered and declared:

Service

1. The service of the Notice of Motion, the associated pleadings, and the supporting documents, as set out in the affidavit of service is hereby abridged and validated so that this Motion is properly returnable today and further service thereof is hereby dispensed with.

Application

2. The Applicants are affiliated debtor companies within the meaning of the CCAA and are companies to which the CCAA applies.

business which the Applicants are not lawfully entitled to carry on; (ii) affect such investigations, actions, suits or proceedings by a regulatory body as are permitted by section 11.1 of the CCAA; (iii) exempt the Applicants from compliance with statutory or regulatory provisions relating to health, safety, or the environment; (iv) prevent the filing of any registration to preserve or perfect a security interest; or (v) prevent the registration of a claim for lien and the related filing of an action to preserve the right of a lien holder, provided that the Applicants shall not be required to file a defence during the stay period.

No Interference with Rights

19. During the Stay Period, no Person shall discontinue, fail to renew per the same terms and conditions, fail to honour, alter, interfere with, repudiate, terminate, or cease to perform any right, renewal right, contract, agreement, licence, or permit in favour of or held by the Applicants, including but not limited to renewal rights in respect of existing insurance policies on the same terms, except with the written consent of the Applicants and the Monitor, or leave of this Court.

Reporting Obligations

- 20. The decision by the Applicants to incur no further expenses for the duration of the Stay Period in relation to any filings (including, without limitation, financial statements, disclosures, core or non-core documents and press releases) (collectively, the "**Securities Filings**") and not to maintain an audit committee that may be required by any federal, provincial or other law respecting securities or capital markets in Canada, or by the rules and regulations of a stock exchange, including, without limitation, the *Securities Act* (Nova Scotia), RSNS 1989, c 418, as amended and comparable statutes enacted by other provinces and territories of Canada, and the rules, regulations and policies of the Toronto Stock Exchange (collectively, the "**Securities Provisions**"), is hereby authorized, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit any securities regulator or stock exchange from taking any action or exercising any discretion that it may have of a nature described in section 11.1(2) of the CCAA as a consequence of the Applicants failing to make any Securities Filings required by the Securities Provisions.
- 21. None of the Directors and Officers, employees, and other representatives of the Applicants, nor the Monitor and its directors, officers, employees and representatives, shall have any personal liability for any failure by the Applicants to make any Securities Filings or comply with any obligation to maintain an audit committee required by the Securities Provisions during the Stay Period, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit any securities regulator or stock exchange from taking any action or exercising any discretion that it may have of a nature described in section 11.1(2) of the CCAA as a consequence of such failure by the Applicants.

Shareholders' Meeting

22. The time limit to call and hold the Applicants' annual shareholders' meeting is extended until after the conclusion of the CCAA Proceedings, subject to further order of this Court.

Continuation of Services

23. During the Stay Period, all Persons having oral or written agreements with the Applicants or statutory or regulatory mandates for the supply of goods or services, including without limitation all computer software, communication and other data services, centralized banking services, payroll services, insurance, transportation

- 63. Each of the Applicants and the Monitor may apply to any court, tribunal, or regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order, and the Monitor may act as a representative in respect of the within proceedings for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in a jurisdiction outside Canada.
- 64. The schedules to the Key Employee Bonus Agreement (Schedule B to this Order) and Appendix B to the First Report of the Monitor dated May 4, 2023, shall be and remain sealed and kept confidential until further Order of this Court.
- 65. Any interested party, including the Applicant and the Monitor, may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order on such notice required under the *Civil Procedure Rules* or as this Court may order.

Issued

may 5th , 2023

-Prothonotary

LAUREL PAUL

Deputy Prothonotary

	IN THE SUPREME COURT	
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	identified by the seal of the court, is a true	
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Court of King's Bench of Alberta

Citation: Mantle Materials Group, Ltd (Re), 2024 ABKB 19

Date: 20240110 Docket: B201 965622; 2301 16114 Registry: Calgary

In the Matter of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985 c B-3, as Amended

-and-

In the Matter of the Bankruptcy of Mantle Materials Group Ltd

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36, as Amended

-and-

In the Matter of the Compromise or Arrangement of Mantle Materials Group, Ltd and RLF Canada Holdings Ltd

> Reasons for Decision of the Associate Chief Justice D.B. Nixon

I. Introduction

[1] This is an application by Mantle Materials Group, Ltd. ("**Mantle**") to convert their action under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3 (the "*BIA*") to a proceeding under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c C-36 (the "*CCAA*"). The conversion

itself is not opposed, however, Travelers Capital Corp. ("**Travelers**") has made applications both to compel responses to certain undertakings and questions as well as an application to enhance the powers of the proposed monitor FTI Consulting Canada Inc ("**FTI**").

[2] In the following reasons I will first address the conversion application by Mantle before turning to the applications brought by Travelers.

II. Background

[3] Mantle is a wholly owned subsidiary of RLF Canada Holdings Limited ("**RLF Canada**"). RLF Canada itself is a wholly owned subsidiary of Resource Land Fund V, LP ("**RLF V**"), a Delaware limited partnership. RLF V is private equity fund managed by RLH LLP.

[4] Mantle was incorporated in British Columbia on July 17, 2020, and was continued in Alberta under the *Business Corporations Act*, RSA 2000, c B-9, as amended on April 30, 2021. It was amalgamated on May 1, 2021, with JMB Crushing Systems Inc ("**JMB**") and its wholly owned subsidiary 2161889 Alberta Ltd ("**216Co**").

[5] RLF Canada is a Colorado corporation incorporated on July 8, 2020, under Title 7, Corporations and Associations of the *2022 Colorado Code*. The sole activity of RLF Canada is to hold all the shares in the capital of Mantle.

[6] Mantle's business involves the extraction, processing and selling of gravel and other aggregates ("**Aggregate**") from pits in Alberta ("**Aggregate Pits**"). It supplied Aggregate to service companies in the oil and gas sector, construction firms and municipalities. Mantle operates 14 Aggregate Pits on public land pursuant to surface material leases issued by Alberta Environment and Protected Areas ("**AEPA**").

[7] Following the acquisition of its business and property from the *CCAA* proceedings involving JMB and 216Co, Mantle was responsible for the environment protection orders ("**EPOs**") issued by the AEPA on the Aggregate Pits. These EPOs addressed the end-of-life reclamation steps to be taken.

[8] Mantle experienced operational problems and was burdened with excessive debt inherited from the JMB *CCAA* proceedings and incurred in the period following the acquisition of the gravel-producing properties. Mantle's difficulties were compounded by the significant reclamation obligations it was required to complete to satisfy the EPOs. On July 14, 2023, Mantle filed a notice of intention ("**NOI**") to make a proposal under s 50.4(1) of the *BIA* naming FTI as the proposal trustee.

[9] Mantle now seeks to convert the proposal proceedings under the *BIA* into a *CCAA* proceeding because the statutory time periods provided for under the *BIA* are not flexible enough to address its reclamation liabilities.

III. Issues

[10] In the present application I must decide the following:

A. Should Mantle's application to convert from the *BIA* to the *CCAA* be approved?

i. Is Mantle a company under the definition of the CCAA?

b. Is the proposed continuation consistent with the purposes of the *CCAA* (the "Second Factor")?

[23] An issue in the present case is whether the *CCAA* is an appropriate vehicle for Mantle. As acknowledged by its counsel, the goal in this instance is not restructuring. Rather, the underlying goal in this case is a liquidation of Mantle's business with a focus on the reclamation of its liabilities.

[24] The notion of liquidation being permissible under the *CCAA* was considered by the Supreme Court in *9354-9186 Québec inc v Callidus Capital Corp*, 2020 SCC 10 ["*Callidus*"]. The discussion by the Court in *Callidus* is a helpful guide to determining whether the continuation is consistent with the purposes of the *CCAA*. The Court highlights the following (footnotes excluded):

[43] Liquidating CCAAs take diverse forms and may involve, among other things: the sale of the debtor company as a going concern; an "en bloc" sale of assets that are capable of being operationalized by a buyer; a partial liquidation or downsizing of business operations; or a piecemeal sale of assets (B. Kaplan, "Liquidating CCAAs: Discretion Gone Awry?", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law* (2008), 79, at pp. 87-89). The ultimate commercial outcomes facilitated by liquidating CCAAs are similarly diverse. Some may result in the continued operation of the business of the debtor under a different going concern entity (e.g., the liquidations in *Indalex* and *Re Canadian Red Cross Society* (1998), 1998 CanLII 14907 (ON SC), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. C.J. (Gen. Div.)), while others may result in a sale of assets and inventory with no such entity emerging (e.g., the proceedings in *Re Target Canada Co.*, 2015 ONSC 303, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323, at paras. 7 and 31). Others still, like the case at bar, may involve a going concern sale of most of the assets of the debtor, leaving residual assets to be dealt with by the debtor and its stakeholders.

[44] *CCAA* courts first began approving these forms of liquidation pursuant to the broad discretion conferred by the Act. The emergence of this practice was not without criticism, largely on the basis that it appeared to be inconsistent with the *CCAA* being a "restructuring statute" (see, e.g., *UTI Energy Corp. v. Fracmaster Ltd.*, 1999 ABCA 178, 244 A.R. 93, at paras. 15-16, aff'g 1999 ABQB 379, 11 C.B.R. (4th) 204, at paras. 40-43; A. Nocilla, "The History of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Future of Re-Structuring Law in Canada" (2014), 56 *Can. Bus. L.J.* 73, at pp. 88-92).

[45] However, since s. 36 of the *CCAA* came into force in 2009, courts have been using it to effect liquidating CCAAs. Section 36 empowers courts to authorize the sale or disposition of a debtor company's assets outside the ordinary course of business. Significantly, when the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce recommended the adoption of s. 36, it observed that liquidation is not necessarily inconsistent with the remedial objectives of the *CCAA*, and that it may be a means to "raise capital [to facilitate a restructuring], eliminate further loss for creditors or focus on the solvent operations of the business" (p. 147). Other commentators have observed that liquidation can be a "vehicle to restructure a business" by allowing the business to survive, albeit under a different corporate form or ownership (Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, at p. 169; see also K. P. McElcheran, *Commercial Insolvency in Canada* (4th ed. 2019), at p. 311). Indeed, in *Indalex*, the company sold its assets under the *CCAA* in order to preserve the jobs of its employees, despite being unable to survive as their employer (see para. 51).

[46] Ultimately, the relative weight that the different objectives of the CCAA take on in a particular case may vary based on the factual circumstances, the stage of the proceedings, or the proposed solutions that are presented to the court for approval. Here, a parallel may be drawn with the BIA context. In Orphan Well Association v. Grant Thornton Ltd., 2019 SCC 5, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 150, at para. 67, this Court explained that, as a general matter, the BIA serves two purposes: (1) the bankrupt's financial rehabilitation and (2) the equitable distribution of the bankrupt's assets among creditors. However, in circumstances where a debtor corporation will never emerge from bankruptcy, only the latter purpose is relevant (see para. 67). Similarly, under the CCAA, when a reorganization of the pre-filing debtor company is not a possibility, a liquidation that preserves going-concern value and the ongoing business operations of the pre-filing company may become the predominant remedial focus. Moreover, where a reorganization or liquidation is complete and the court is dealing with residual assets, the objective of maximizing creditor recovery from those assets may take centre stage. As we will explain, the architecture of the CCAA leaves the case-specific assessment and balancing of these remedial objectives to the supervising judge.

[25] The above discussion is helpful particularly in relation to the reclamation obligations as set out in *Orphan Well Association v Grant Thornton Ltd*, 2019 SCC 5 ["*Redwater*"]. These reclamation obligations are the remedial objectives of Mantle. Mantle has described its intentions if continued under the *CCAA* as follows:

(a) complete the remaining Major Reclamation Work;

(b) perform the Assessment Period Reclamation Work;

(c) complete the collection of Mantle's accounts receivable;

(d) complete the sale, if possible, of the Active Aggregate Pits to purchasers who assume the Reclamation Liabilities associated therewith, and if such sales are not possible, provide for such Reclamation Liabilities to be addressed;

(e) complete the sale of the remaining assets of Mantle; and

(f) once reasonable reserves are provided for, make distributions to Mantle's creditors.

[26] It bears repeating here that the continuation under the *CCAA* is not contested by any of the parties. Further, no other options for what to do with Mantle and its assets have been proposed.

[27] As noted by the proposed monitor (being FTI), proceeding under the *CCAA* would be the only available means by which the reclamation obligations and the sale of the active pits could be completed. I also note that FTI supports the continuation of the *BIA* proceedings under the *CCAA*.

[28] As noted above, one of the motivations underlying the conversion of the Mantle proceedings from the *BIA* to the *CCAA* concerns the inflexible timing issues legislated in the *BIA*. Under the current timelines stipulated in the *BIA*, Mantle would be adjudged bankrupt by the expiration of the period within which it may file a proposal, the ultimate deadline being January 13, 2024. As discussed in *Callidus*, the appropriateness of the *CCAA* for liquidation depends on the facts of each individual case, and these factors are particularly pertinent.

[29] Based on the evidence and my analysis of the law, I find that Mantle has satisfied the Second Factor. I make this determination because liquidation is not necessarily inconsistent with the remedial objectives of the *CCAA*: *Callidus* at para 45. This is particularly the case in these circumstances because the ultimate remedial objective of Mantle is to address its reclamation obligations.

c. Has Mantle filed evidence which serves as a reasonable surrogate for the information which section 10(2) of the *CCAA* requires accompany any initial application under the Act (the "Third Factor")?

[30] Finally, under section 10(2) of the CCAA, Mantle must provide:

(a) a statement indicating, on a weekly basis, the projected cash flow of the debtor company;

(b) a report containing the prescribed representations of the debtor company regarding the preparation of the cash-flow statement; and

(c) copies of all financial statements, audited or unaudited, prepared during the year before the application or, if no such statements were prepared in that year, a copy of the most recent such statement.

[31] This material was provided as exhibits attached to the affidavit of Byron Levkulich, dated November 27, 2023. Mr. Levkulich is a director of Mantle. There are also cash-flow statements attached to the fourth report of the proposed monitor FTI.

[32] Based on the evidence and my analysis of the law, I find that Mantle has satisfied the Third Factor.

[33] Based on my review of the evidence and my analysis of the law, I find Mantle has satisfied the three factors forming the test in *Modern*. As a result, it is appropriate to continue this matter from the *BIA* to the *CCAA*.

B. Should the proposed extension to the stay of proceedings be granted?

[34] Under section 11.02(2) of the *CCAA*, on application from a debtor company other than during an initial application, a court may stay for any period considered necessary all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph 1(a) of section 11.02.

[35] On such an application, under section 11.02(3) of the *CCAA*, the burden of proof is on the applicant to satisfy the court that circumstances exist to make the order appropriate, and the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

[36] Based on my review of the evidence and my analysis of the law, I find it appropriate to grant the proposed extension to the stay of proceedings against Mantle until January 20, 2024. I make this determination because I find that this is the best method by which Mantle can

accomplish the liquidation while continuing its reclamation work and attempting to sell the Aggregate Pits.

[37] In making this determination, I also find that Mantle has been acting in good faith and with due diligence. This finding is supported by the evidence that the proposed monitor is also of the view that Mantle has been acting in good faith and with due diligence. Further, the proposed monitor supports this extension.

C. Should the charges be approved?

[38] Mantle seeks to take up and continue the restructuring charges including an administration charge, the interim financing charge, and the directors & officers ("**D&O**") charge that were granted on August 15 and August 28 from this Court by Justice Feasby (collectively, the "**Restructuring Charges**"): see *Re Mantle Materials Group, Ltd*, 2023 ABKB 488 ["*Mantle ABKB #1*"]. That decision was upheld by the Alberta Court of Appeal in *Mantle Materials Group, Ltd v Travelers Capital Corp*, 2023 ABCA 302 ["*Mantle ABCA #1*"] and *Mantle Materials Group, Ltd v Travelers Capital Corp*, 2023 ABCA 339 ["*Mantle ABCA #2*"].

[39] Section 11.52 of the *CCAA* provides the Court with jurisdiction to make an order as follows:

11.52 (1) On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

[40] A non exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining the appropriateness of such charges is set out at paragraph 54 of *Canwest Publishing Inc (Re)*, 2010 ONSC 222:

- (a) the size and complexity of the businesses being restructured;
- (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- (c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;

(d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

- (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
- (f) the position of the Monitor.

[41] I reiterate that the Restructuring Charges were initially approved by Justice Feasby under the *BIA*. Mantle has asserted that these charges should be taken up and continued under the



92 O.R. (3d) 513

Court of Appeal for Ontario, Laskin, Cronk and Blair JJ.A. August 18, 2008

Debtor and creditor -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act permitting inclusion of third-party releases in plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by court where those releases are reasonably connected to proposed restructuring -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

In response to a liquidity crisis which threatened the Canadian market in Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP"), a creditor-initiated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement was crafted. The Plan called for the release of third parties from any liability associated with ABCP, including, with certain narrow exceptions, liability for claims relating to fraud. The "double majority" required by s. 6 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") approved the Plan. The respondents sought court approval of the Plan under s. 6 of the CCAA. The application judge made the following findings: (a) the parties to be released were necessary and essential to the restructuring; (b) the claims to be released were rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it; (c) the Plan could not succeed without the releases; (d) the parties who were to have claims against them released were contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan; and (e) the Plan would benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor noteholders generally. The application judge sanctioned the Plan. The appellants were holders of ABCP notes who opposed the Plan. On appeal, they argued that the CCAA does not permit a release of claims against third parties and that the releases constitute an unconstitutional confiscation of private property that is within the exclusive domain of the provinces under s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Held, the appeal should be dismissed.

On a proper interpretation, the CCAA permits the inclusion of third-party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by the court where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring. That conclusion is supported by (a) the open-ended, flexible character of the CCAA itself; (b) the broad nature of the term "compromise or arrangement" as used in the CCAA; and (c) the express statutory effect of the "double majority" vote and court sanction which render the plan binding on all creditors, including those unwilling to accept certain portions of it. The first of these signals a flexible approach to the application of the CCAA in new and evolving situations, an active judicial role in its application and interpretation, and a liberal approach to interpretation. The second provides the entre to negotiations between the parties [page514] affected in the restructuring and furnishes them with the ability to apply the broad scope of their ingenuity to fashioning the proposal. The latter afford necessary protection to unwilling creditors who may be deprived of certain of their civil and property rights as a result of the process.

While the principle that legislation must not be construed so as to interfere with or prejudice established contractual or proprietary rights -- including the right to bring an action -in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intention to that effect is an important one, Parliament's intention to clothe the court with authority to consider and sanction a plan that contains third-party releases is expressed with sufficient clarity in the "compromise or arrangement" language of the CCAA coupled with the statutory voting and sanctioning mechanism making the provisions of the plan binding on all creditors. This is not a situation of impermissible "gap-filling" in the case of legislation severely affecting property rights; it is a question of finding meaning in the language of the Act itself. Interpreting the CCAA as permitting the inclusion of thirdparty releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement is not unconstitutional under the division-of-powers doctrine and does not contravene the rules of public order pursuant to the Civil Code of Quebec. The CCAA is valid federal legislation under the federal insolvency power, and the power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party releases is embedded in the wording of the CCAA. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant's right to pursue a civil action or trump Quebec rules of public order is constitutionally immaterial. To the extent that the provisions of the CCAA are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is paramount.

The application judge's findings of fact were supported by the evidence. His conclusion that the benefits of the Plan to the creditors as a whole and to the debtor companies outweighed the negative aspects of compelling the unwilling appellants to execute the releases was reasonable.

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Canadian Airlines Corp. (Re), [2000] A.J. No. 771, 2000 ABQB 442, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 265 A.R. 201, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 98 A.C.W.S. (3d) 334 (Q.B.); NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc. (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 514, [1999] O.J. No. 4749, 181 D.L.R. (4th) 37, 127 O.A.C. 338, 1 B.L.R. (3d) 1, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 67, 47 C.C.L.T. (2d) 213, 93 A.C.W.S. (3d) 391 (C.A.); Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580, 2001 BCSC 1721, 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286, 110 A.C.W.S. (3d) 259 (S.C.); Stelco Inc. (Re) (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241, [2005] O.J. No. 4883, 261 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 204 O.A.C. 205, 11 B.L.R. (4th) 185, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 307, 144 A.C.W.S. (3d) 15 (C.A.); Stelco Inc. (Re), [2005] O.J. No. 4814, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297, 143 A.C.W.S. (3d) 623 (S.C.J.); Stelco Inc. (Re), [2006] O.J. No. 1996, 210 O.A.C. 129, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 157, 148 A.C.W.S. (3d) 193 (C.A.); consd

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APPEAL from the sanction order of C.L. Campbell J., [2008] O.J. No. 2265, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269 (S.C.J.) under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

See Schedule "C" -- Counsel for list of counsel.

The judgment of the court was delivered by

BLAIR J.A.: --A. Introduction

[1] In August 2007, a liquidity crisis suddenly threatened the Canadian market in Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP"). The crisis was triggered by a loss of confidence amongst investors stemming from the news of widespread defaults on U.S. sub-prime mortgages. The loss of confidence placed the Canadian financial market at risk generally and was reflective of an economic volatility worldwide.

[2] By agreement amongst the major Canadian participants, the \$32 billion Canadian market in third-party ABCP was frozen on August 13, 2007, pending an attempt to resolve the crisis

(a) the open-ended, flexible character of the CCAA itself, (b) the broad nature of the term "compromise or arrangement" as used in the Act, and (c) the express statutory effect of the "double-majority" vote and court sanction which render the plan binding on all creditors, including [page525] those unwilling to accept certain portions of it. The first of these signals a flexible approach to the application of the Act in new and evolving situations, an active judicial role in its application and interpretation, and a liberal approach to that interpretation. The second provides the entre to negotiations between the parties affected in the restructuring and furnishes them with the ability to apply the broad scope of their ingenuity in fashioning the proposal. The latter afford necessary protection to unwilling creditors who may be deprived of certain of their civil and property rights as a result of the process.

[44] The CCAA is skeletal in nature. It does not contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred. Judges must therefore play a role in fleshing out the details of the statutory scheme. The scope of the Act and the powers of the court under it are not limitless. It is beyond controversy, however, that the CCAA is remedial legislation to be liberally construed in accordance with the modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation. It is designed to be a flexible instrument and it is that very flexibility which gives the Act its efficacy: Canadian Red Cross Society (Re), [1998] O.J. No. 3306, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Gen. Div.). As Farley J. noted in Dylex Ltd. (Re), [1995] O.J. No. 595, 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Gen. Div.), at p. 111 C.B.R., "[t]he history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation".

[45] Much has been said, however, about the "evolution of judicial interpretation" and there is some controversy over both the source and scope of that authority. Is the source of the court's authority statutory, discerned solely through application of the principles of statutory interpretation, for example? Or does it rest in the court's ability to "fill in the gaps" in legislation? Or in the court's inherent jurisdiction?

[46] These issues have recently been canvassed by the



CITATION: Jaguar Mining Inc. (Re), 2014 ONSC 494 COURT FILE NO.: CV-13-10383-00CL DATE: 20140116

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO (COMMERCIAL LIST)

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND:

IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF JAGUAR MINING INC., Applicant

- **BEFORE:** MORAWETZ R.S.J.
- COUNSEL: Tony Reyes and Evan Cobb, for the Applicant, Jaguar Mining Inc.

Robert J. Chadwick and Caroline Descours, for the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders

Joseph Bellissimo, for Global Resource Fund, Secured Lender

Jeremy Dacks, for FTI Consulting Canada Inc., Proposed Monitor

Robin B. Schwill, for the Special Committee of the Board of Directors

HEARD & ENDORSED: DECEMBER 23, 2013

REASONS: JANUARY 16, 2014

ENDORSEMENT

[1] On December 23, 2013, I heard the CCAA application of Jaguar Mining Inc. ("Jaguar") and made the following three endorsements:

1. CCAA protection granted. Initial Order signed. Reasons will follow. It is expected that parties will utilize the e-Service Protocol which can be

[41] The authority to grant the court-ordered Administration Charge and Director's Charge is contained in ss. 11.51 and 11.52 of the CCAA.

[42] In granting the Administration Charge, I am satisfied that:

- (i) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge;
- (ii) the amount is appropriate; and
- (iii) the charges should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

[43] In considering both the amount of the Administration Charge and who should be entitled to its benefit, the following factors can also be considered:

- (a) the size and complexity of the business being restructured; and
- (b) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles.

See Canwest Publishing Inc. (Re), 2010 ONSC 222, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115.

[44] In this case, the proposed restructuring involves the proposed beneficiaries of the charge. I accept that many have played a significant role in the negotiation of the Recapitalization to date and will continue to play a role in the implementation of the Recapitalization. I am satisfied that there is no unwarranted duplication of roles among those who benefit from the proposed Administration Charge.

- [45] With respect to the Director's Charge, the court must be satisfied that:
 - (i) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge;
 - (ii) the amount is appropriate;
 - (iii) the applicant could not obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost; and
 - (iv) the charge does not apply in respect of any obligation incurred by a director or officer as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

[46] A review of the evidence satisfies me that it is appropriate to grant the Director's Charge as requested.

[47] Jaguar requested that the Initial Order authorize it to perform certain pre-filing obligations in respect of professional service providers and third parties who provide services in respect of Jaguar's public listing agreement. In the circumstances, I find it to be reasonable that Jaguar be authorized to perform these pre-filing obligations.



1993 CarswellOnt 183 Ontario Court of Justice (General Division – Commercial List)

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43; Re plan of compromise in respect of LEHNDORFF GENERAL PARTNER LTD. (in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA), LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) and LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) II) and in respect of certain of their nominees LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA) LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS II LTD., BAYTEMP PROPERTIES LIMITED and 102 BLOOR STREET WEST LIMITED and in respect of THG LEHNDORFF VERMÖGENSVERWALTUNG GmbH (in its capacity as limited partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA))

Farley J.

Heard: December 24, 1992 Judgment: January 6, 1993 Docket: Doc. B366/92

Counsel: Alfred Apps, Robert Harrison and Melissa J. Kennedy, for applicants. L. Crozier, for Royal Bank of Canada. R.C. Heintzman, for Bank of Montreal. J. Hodgson, Susan Lundy and James Hilton, for Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation. Jay Schwartz, for Citibank Canada. Stephen Golick, for Peat Marwick Thorne^{*} Inc., proposed monitor. John Teolis, for Fuji Bank Canada. Robert Thorton, for certain of the advisory boards.

Farley J.:

1 These are my written reasons relating to the relief granted the applicants on December 24, 1992 pursuant to their application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") and the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ("CJA"). The relief sought was as follows:

(a) short service of the notice of application;

(b) a declaration that the applicants were companies to which the CCAA applies;

(c) authorization for the applicants to file a consolidated plan of compromise;

(d) authorization for the applicants to call meetings of their secured and unsecured creditors to approve the consolidated plan of compromise;

(i) Rationalization of the existing debt and security structure in the continuing entities in the Group.

Formal meetings of the beneficial limited partners of the Limited Partnerships are scheduled for January 20 and 21, 1993 in Germany and an information circular has been prepared and at the time of hearing was being translated into German. This application was brought on for hearing at this time for two general reasons: (a) it had now ripened to the stage of proceeding with what had been distilled out of the strategic and consultative meetings; and (b) there were creditors other than senior secured lenders who were in a position to enforce their rights against assets of some of the applicants (and Limited Partnerships) which if such enforcement did take place would result in an undermining of the overall plan. Notice of this hearing was given to various creditors: Barclays Bank of Canada, Barclays Bank PLC, Bank of Montreal, Citibank Canada, Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Tokyo Canada, Funtauna Investments Limited, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Fuji Bank Canada and First City Trust Company. In this respect the applicants have recognized that although the initial application under the CCAA may be made on an ex parte basis (s. 11 of the CCAA; *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.); *Re Keppoch Development Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.). The court will be concerned when major creditors have not been alerted even in the most minimal fashion (*Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 310). The application was either supported or not opposed.

4 "Instant" debentures are now well recognized and respected by the courts: see *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.), at pp. 55-56, varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170 (N.B. Q.B.), reversed on different grounds (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161 (N.B. C.A.), at pp. 165-166; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 250-251; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.) per Doherty J.A., dissenting on another point, at pp. 306-310 (O.R.); *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) at p. 327. The applicants would appear to me to have met the technical hurdle of s. 3 and as defined s. 2) of the CCAA in that they are debtor companies since they are insolvent, they have outstanding an issue of debentures under a trust deed and the compromise or arrangement that is proposed includes that compromise between the applicants and the holders of those trust deed debentures. I am also satisfied that because of the significant intertwining of the applicants it would be appropriate to have a consolidated plan. I would also understand that this court (Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)) is the appropriate court to hear this application since all the applicants except GmbH have their head office or their chief place of business in Ontario and GmbH, although it does not have a place of business within Canada, does have assets located within Ontario.

The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative 5 to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the CCAA; *Reference re* Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, [1934] S.C.R. 659 at p. 661, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75; Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 219-220; Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.), at pp. 12-13 (C.B.R.); Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 310-311, affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.C.) .; Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of), supra, at p. 307 (O.R.); Fine's Flowers v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of) (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.), at p. 199 and "Reorganizations Under The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at p. 592.

6 The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating or to otherwise deal with its assets but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA. see *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey* (*Trustee of*), supra at pp. 297 and 316; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 251-252 and *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of*), supra, at p. 328 and p. 330. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed: see *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, supra, at p. 220 (W.W.R.). The possibility that one or more creditors may be prejudiced should not affect the court's exercise of its authority to grant a stay of proceedings under the CCAA because this affect is offset by the benefit to all creditors and to the company of facilitating a reorganization. The court's primary concerns under the CCAA must be for the debtor and *all* of the creditors: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 108-110; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.), at pp. 315-318 (C.B.R.) and *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 251-252.

7 One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors. Unlike the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, before the amendments effective November 30, 1992 to transform it into the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"), it is possible under the CCAA to bind secured creditors it has been generally speculated that the CCAA will be resorted to by companies that are generally larger and have a more complicated capital structure and that those companies which make an application under the BIA will be generally smaller and have a less complicated structure. Reorganization may include partial liquidation where it is intended as part of the process of a return to long term viability and profitability. See *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 318 and *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* (1987), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 245, reversed on other grounds at (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 71 (Alta. C.A.). It appears to me that the purpose of the CCAA is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.*, supra, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Fish Co.*, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) at pp. 187-188 (C.B.R.).

8 It strikes me that each of the applicants in this case has a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating, although each is currently unable to meet all of its expenses albeit on a reduced scale. This is precisely the sort of circumstance in which all of the creditors are likely to benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it is appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings so as to allow the applicant to finalize preparation of and file a plan of compromise and arrangement.

9 Let me now review the aspect of the stay of proceedings. Section 11 of the CCAA provides as follows:

11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,

(*a*) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;

(b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

10 The power to grant a stay of proceeding should be construed broadly in order to permit the CCAA to accomplish its legislative purpose and in particular to enable continuance of the company seeking CCAA protection. The power to grant a stay therefore extends to a stay which affected the position not only of the company's secured and unsecured creditors, but also all non-creditors and other parties who could potentially jeopardize the success of the plan and thereby the continuance of the





SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

CITATION: Sherman Estate *v*. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25

APPEAL HEARD: October 6, 2020 JUDGMENT RENDERED: June 11, 2021 DOCKET: 38695

BETWEEN:

Estate of Bernard Sherman and Trustees of the Estate and Estate of Honey Sherman and Trustees of the Estate Appellants

and

Kevin Donovan and Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. Respondents

- and -

Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of British Columbia, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Income Security Advocacy Centre, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Postmedia Network Inc., CTV, a Division of Bell Media Inc., Global News, a division of Corus Television Limited Partnership, The Globe and Mail Inc., Citytv, a division of Rogers Media Inc., British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, HIV Legal Network and Mental Health Legal Committee Interveners **CORAM:** Wagner C.J. and Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe, Martin and Kasirer JJ.

NOTE: This document is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in the *Canada Supreme Court Reports*.

Estate of Bernard Sherman and Trustees of the Estate andEstate of Honey Sherman and Trustees of the EstateAppellants

v.

Kevin Donovan and Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd.

Respondents

and

Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of British Columbia, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Income Security Advocacy Centre, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Postmedia Network Inc., CTV, a Division of Bell Media Inc., Global News, a division of Corus Television Limited Partnership, The Globe and Mail Inc., Citytv, a division of Rogers Media Inc., British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, HIV Legal Network and Mental Health Legal Committee

Indexed as: Sherman Estate v. Donovan

2021 SCC 25

File No.: 38695.

2020: October 6; 2021: June 11.

Present: Wagner C.J. and Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe, Martin and Kasirer JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

Courts — Open court principle — Sealing orders — Discretionary limits on court openness — Important public interest — Privacy — Dignity — Physical safety — Unexplained deaths of prominent couple generating intense public scrutiny and prompting trustees of estates to apply for sealing of probate files — Whether privacy and physical safety concerns advanced by estate trustees amount to important public interests at such serious risk to justify issuance of sealing orders.

A prominent couple was found dead in their home. Their deaths had no apparent explanation and generated intense public interest. To this day, the identity and motive of those responsible remain unknown, and the deaths are being investigated as homicides. The estate trustees sought to stem the intense press scrutiny prompted by the events by seeking sealing orders of the probate files. Initially granted, the sealing orders were challenged by a journalist who had reported on the couple's deaths, and by the newspaper for which he wrote. The application judge sealed the probate files, concluding that the harmful effects of the sealing orders were substantially outweighed by the salutary effects on privacy and physical safety interests. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and lifted the sealing orders. It concluded that the privacy interest advanced lacked a public interest quality, and that there was no evidence of a real risk to anyone's physical safety. *Held*: The appeal should be dismissed.

The estate trustees have failed to establish a serious risk to an important public interest under the test for discretionary limits on court openness. As such, the sealing orders should not have been issued. Open courts can be a source of inconvenience and embarrassment, but this discomfort is not, as a general matter, enough to overturn the strong presumption of openness. That said, personal information disseminated in open court can be more than a source of discomfort and may result in an affront to a person's dignity. Insofar as privacy serves to protect individuals from this affront, it is an important public interest and a court can make an exception to the open court principle if it is at serious risk. In this case, the risks to privacy and physical safety cannot be said to be sufficiently serious.

Court proceedings are presumptively open to the public. Court openness is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression and is essential to the proper functioning of Canadian democracy. Reporting on court proceedings by a free press is often said to be inseparable from the principle of open justice. The open court principle is engaged by all judicial proceedings, whatever their nature. Matters in a probate file are not quintessentially private or fundamentally administrative. Obtaining a certificate of appointment of estate trustee in Ontario is a court proceeding engaging the fundamental rationale for openness — discouraging mischief and ensuring confidence in the administration of justice through transparency — such that the strong presumption of openness applies. The test for discretionary limits on court openness is directed at maintaining the presumption while offering sufficient flexibility for courts to protect other public interests where they arise. In order to succeed, the person asking a court to exercise discretion in a way that limits the open court presumption must establish that (1) court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest; (2) the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and (3) as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

The recognized scope of what interests might justify a discretionary exception to open courts has broadened over time and now extends generally to important public interests. The breadth of this category transcends the interests of the parties to the dispute and provides significant flexibility to address harm to fundamental values in our society that unqualified openness could cause. While there is no closed list of important public interests, courts must be cautious and alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule when they are identifying them. Determining what is an important public interest can be done in the abstract at the level of general principles that extend beyond the parties to the particular dispute. By contrast, whether that interest is at serious risk is a fact-based finding that is necessarily made in context. The identification of an important interest and the seriousness of the risk to that interest are thus theoretically separate and qualitatively distinct operations. Privacy has been championed as a fundamental consideration in a free society, and its public importance has been recognized in various settings. Though an individual's privacy will be pre-eminently important to that individual, the protection of privacy is also in the interest of society as a whole. Privacy therefore cannot be rejected as a mere personal concern: some personal concerns relating to privacy overlap with public interests.

However, cast too broadly, the recognition of a public interest in privacy could threaten the strong presumption of openness. The privacy of individuals will be at risk in many court proceedings. Furthermore, privacy is a complex and contextual concept, making it difficult for courts to measure. Recognizing an important interest in privacy generally would accordingly be unworkable.

Instead, the public character of the privacy interest involves protecting individuals from the threat to their dignity. Dignity in this sense involves the right to present core aspects of oneself to others in a considered and controlled manner; it is an expression of an individual's unique personality or personhood. This interest is consistent with the Court's emphasis on the importance of privacy, but is tailored to preserve the strong presumption of openness.

Privacy as predicated on dignity will be at serious risk in limited circumstances. Neither the sensibilities of individuals nor the fact that openness is disadvantageous, embarrassing or distressing to certain individuals will generally on their own warrant interference with court openness. Dignity will be at serious risk only where the information that would be disseminated as a result of court openness is sufficiently sensitive or private such that openness can be shown to meaningfully strike at the individual's biographical core in a manner that threatens their integrity. The question is whether the information reveals something intimate and personal about the individual, their lifestyle or their experiences.

In cases where the information is sufficiently sensitive to strike at an individual's biographical core, a court must then ask whether a serious risk to the interest is made out in the full factual context of the case. The seriousness of the risk may be affected by the extent to which information is disseminated and already in the public domain, and the probability of the dissemination actually occurring. The burden is on the applicant to show that privacy, understood in reference to dignity, is at serious risk; this erects a fact-specific threshold consistent with the presumption of openness.

There is also an important public interest in protecting individuals from physical harm, but a discretionary order limiting court openness can only be made where there is a serious risk to this important public interest. Direct evidence is not necessarily required to establish a serious risk to an important public interest, as objectively discernable harm may be identified on the basis of logical inferences. But this process of inferential reasoning is not a licence to engage in impermissible speculation. It is not just the probability of the feared harm, but also the gravity of the harm itself that is relevant to the assessment of serious risk. Where the feared harm is particularly serious, the probability that this harm materialize need not be shown to be likely, but must still be more than negligible, fanciful or speculative. Mere assertions of grave physical harm are therefore insufficient.

In addition to a serious risk to an important interest, it must be shown that the particular order sought is necessary to address the risk and that the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects as a matter of proportionality. This contextual balancing, informed by the importance of the open court principle, presents a final barrier to those seeking a discretionary limit on court openness for the purposes of privacy protection.

In the present case, the risk to the important public interest in privacy, defined in reference to dignity, is not serious. The information contained in the probate files does not reveal anything particularly private or highly sensitive. It has not been shown that it would strike at the biographical core of the affected individuals in a way that would undermine their control over the expression of their identities. Furthermore, the record does not show a serious risk of physical harm. The estate trustees asked the application judge to infer not only the fact that harm would befall the affected individuals, but also that a person or persons exist who wish to harm them. To infer all this on the basis of the deaths and the association of the affected individuals with the deceased is not a reasonable inference but is speculation.

Even if the estate trustees had succeeded in showing a serious risk to privacy, a publication ban — less constraining on openness than the sealing orders would have likely been sufficient as a reasonable alternative to prevent this risk. As a final barrier, the estate trustees would have had to show that the benefits of any order necessary to protect from a serious risk to the important public interest outweighed the harmful effects of the order.

Cases Cited

By Kasirer J.

Applied: Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522; referred to: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480; Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332; Khuja v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2017] UKSC 49, [2019] A.C. 161; Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326; Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442; Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002 SCC 53, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773; Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403; R. v. Henry, 2009 BCCA 86, 270 B.C.A.C. 5; Attorney General of Nova Scotia v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175; A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567; Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, 2005 SCC 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188; Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.1) (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 11; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; Otis v. Otis (2004), 7 E.T.R. (3d) 221; H. (M.E.) v. Williams, 2012 ONCA 35, 108 O.R. (3d) 321; F.N. (Re), 2000 SCC 35, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880; R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial

physical harm to the affected individuals by lifting the sealing orders. Accordingly, this is not an appropriate case in which to make sealing orders, or any order limiting access to these court files. In the circumstances, the admissibility of the Toronto Star's new evidence is moot. I propose to dismiss the appeal.

A. The Test for Discretionary Limits on Court Openness

[37] Court proceedings are presumptively open to the public (*MacIntyre*, at p. 189; *A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc.*, 2012 SCC 46, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 11).

[38] The test for discretionary limits on presumptive court openness has been expressed as a two-step inquiry involving the necessity and proportionality of the proposed order (*Sierra Club*, at para. 53). Upon examination, however, this test rests upon three core prerequisites that a person seeking such a limit must show. Recasting the test around these three prerequisites, without altering its essence, helps to clarify the burden on an applicant seeking an exception to the open court principle. In order to succeed, the person asking a court to exercise discretion in a way that limits the open court presumption must establish that:

(1) court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;

(2) the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and,

(3) as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

Only where all three of these prerequisites have been met can a discretionary limit on openness — for example, a sealing order, a publication ban, an order excluding the public from a hearing, or a redaction order — properly be ordered. This test applies to all discretionary limits on court openness, subject only to valid legislative enactments (*Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario*, 2005 SCC 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188, at paras. 7 and 22).

[39] The discretion is structured and controlled in this way to protect the open court principle, which is understood to be constitutionalized under the right to freedom of expression at s. 2(b) of the Charter (*New Brunswick*, at para. 23). Sustained by freedom of expression, the open court principle is one of the foundations of a free press given that access to courts is fundamental to newsgathering. This Court has often highlighted the importance of open judicial proceedings to maintaining the independence and impartiality of the courts, public confidence and understanding of their work and ultimately the legitimacy of the process (see, e.g., *Vancouver Sun*, at paras. 23-26). In *New Brunswick*, La Forest J. explained the presumption in favour of court openness had become "one of the hallmarks of a democratic society" (citing *Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.1)* (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 113 (C.A.), at p. 119), that "acts as a guarantee that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner, according to the rule of law . . . thereby fostering public confidence in the integrity of the court system and

understanding of the administration of justice" (para. 22). The centrality of this principle to the court system underlies the strong presumption — albeit one that is rebuttable — in favour of court openness (para. 40; *Mentuck*, at para. 39).

[40] The test ensures that discretionary orders are subject to no lower standard than a legislative enactment limiting court openness would be (*Mentuck*, at para. 27; *Sierra Club*, at para. 45). To that end, this Court developed a scheme of analysis by analogy to the *Oakes* test, which courts use to understand whether a legislative limit on a right guaranteed under the *Charter* is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society (*Sierra Club*, at para. 40, citing *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; see also *Dagenais*, at p. 878; *Vancouver Sun*, at para. 30).

[41] The recognized scope of what interests might justify a discretionary exception to open courts has broadened over time. In *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. spoke of a requisite risk to the "fairness of the trial" (p. 878). In *Mentuck*, Iacobucci J. extended this to a risk affecting the "proper administration of justice" (para. 32). Finally, in *Sierra Club*, Iacobucci J., again writing for a unanimous Court, restated the test to capture any serious risk to an "important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation" (para. 53). He simultaneously clarified that the important interest must be expressed as a public interest. For example, on the facts of that case, a harm to a particular business interest would not have been sufficient, but the "general commercial interest of preserving confidential information" was an important interest because of its public character (para. 55). This is consistent with the fact that this test

was developed in reference to the *Oakes* jurisprudence that focuses on the "pressing and substantial" objective of legislation of general application (*Oakes*, at pp. 138-39; see also *Mentuck*, at para. 31). The term "important interest" therefore captures a broad array of public objectives.

[42] While there is no closed list of important public interests for the purposes of this test, I share Iacobucci J.'s sense, explained in *Sierra Club*, that courts must be "cautious" and "alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule" even at the earliest stage when they are identifying important public interests (para. 56). Determining what is an important public interest can be done in the abstract at the level of general principles that extend beyond the parties to the particular dispute (para. 55). By contrast, whether that interest is at "serious risk" is a fact-based finding that, for the judge considering the appropriateness of an order, is necessarily made in context. In this sense, the identification of, on the one hand, an important interest and, on the other, the seriousness of the risk to that interest are, theoretically at least, separate and qualitatively distinct operations. An order may therefore be refused simply because a valid important public interest is not at serious risk on the facts of a given case or, conversely, that the identified interests, regardless of whether they are at serious risk, do not have the requisite important public character as a matter of general principle.

[43] The test laid out in *Sierra Club* continues to be an appropriate guide for judicial discretion in cases like this one. The breadth of the category of "important interest" transcends the interests of the parties to the dispute and provides significant

flexibility to address harm to fundamental values in our society that unqualified openness could cause (see, e.g., P. M. Perell and J. W. Morden, *The Law of Civil Procedure in Ontario* (4th ed. 2020), at para. 3.185; J. Bailey and J. Burkell, "Revisiting the Open Court Principle in an Era of Online Publication: Questioning Presumptive Public Access to Parties' and Witnesses' Personal Information" (2016), 48 *Ottawa L. Rev.* 143, at pp. 154-55). At the same time, however, the requirement that a serious risk to an important interest be demonstrated imposes a meaningful threshold necessary to maintain the presumption of openness. Were it merely a matter of weighing the benefits of the limit on court openness against its negative effects, decision-makers confronted with concrete impacts on the individuals appearing before them may struggle to put adequate weight on the less immediate negative effects on the open court principle. Such balancing could be evasive of effective appellate review. To my mind, the structure provided by *Dagenais, Mentuck*, and *Sierra Club* remains appropriate and should be affirmed.

[44] Finally, I recall that the open court principle is engaged by all judicial proceedings, whatever their nature (*MacIntyre* at pp. 185-86; *Vancouver Sun*, at para. 31). To the extent the Trustees suggested, in their arguments about the negative effects of the sealing orders, that probate in Ontario does not engage the open court principle or that the openness of these proceedings has no public value, I disagree. The certificates the Trustees sought from the court are issued under the seal of that court, thereby bearing the imprimatur of the court's authority. The court's decision, even if rendered in a non-contentious setting, will have an impact on third parties, for example



Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Appellant

v.

Sierra Club of Canada Respondent

and

The Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada Respondents

INDEXED AS: SIERRA CLUB OF CANADA *v*. CANADA (MINISTER OF FINANCE)

Neutral citation: 2002 SCC 41.

File No.: 28020.

2001: November 6; 2002: April 26.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

Practice — Federal Court of Canada — Filing of confidential material — Environmental organization seeking judicial review of federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Crown corporation for construction and sale of nuclear reactors — Crown corporation requesting confidentiality order in respect of certain documents — Proper analytical approach to be applied to exercise of judicial discretion where litigant seeks confidentiality order — Whether confidentiality order should be granted — Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, r. 151.

Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. ("AECL"), a Crown corporation, for the construction and sale to China of two CANDU reactors. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where AECL is the main contractor and project manager. Sierra Club maintains that the authorization of financial assistance Énergie atomique du Canada Limitée Appelante

С.

Sierra Club du Canada Intimé

et

Le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada Intimés

Répertorié : Sierra Club du Canada c. Canada (Ministre des Finances)

Référence neutre : 2002 CSC 41.

Nº du greffe : 28020.

2001 : 6 novembre; 2002 : 26 avril.

Présents : Le juge en chef McLachlin et les juges Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour et LeBel.

EN APPEL DE LA COUR D'APPEL FÉDÉRALE

Pratique — Cour fédérale du Canada — Production de documents confidentiels — Contrôle judiciaire demandé par un organisme environnemental de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de donner une aide financière à une société d'État pour la construction et la vente de réacteurs nucléaires — Ordonnance de confidentialité demandée par la société d'État pour certains documents — Analyse applicable à l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire judiciaire sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité — Faut-il accorder l'ordonnance? — Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998), DORS/98-106, règle 151.

Un organisme environnemental, Sierra Club, demande le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de fournir une aide financière à Énergie atomique du Canada Ltée (« ÉACL »), une société de la Couronne, pour la construction et la vente à la Chine de deux réacteurs CANDU. Les réacteurs sont actuellement en construction en Chine, où ÉACL est l'entrepreneur principal et le gestionnaire de projet. Sierra Club soutient que by the government triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act ("CEAA"), requiring an environmental assessment as a condition of the financial assistance, and that the failure to comply compels a cancellation of the financial arrangements. AECL filed an affidavit in the proceedings which summarized confidential documents containing thousands of pages of technical information concerning the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities. AECL resisted Sierra Club's application for production of the confidential documents on the ground, inter alia, that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have the authority to disclose them. The Chinese authorities authorized disclosure of the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, under which they would only be made available to the parties and the court, but with no restriction on public access to the judicial proceedings. AECL's application for a confidentiality order was rejected by the Federal Court, Trial Division. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

Held: The appeal should be allowed and the confidentiality order granted on the terms requested by AECL.

In light of the established link between open courts and freedom of expression, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a confidentiality order is whether the right to freedom of expression should be compromised in the circumstances. The court must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with Charter principles because a confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression. A confidentiality order should only be granted when (1) such an order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (2) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings. Three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of the test. First, the risk must be real and substantial, well grounded in evidence, posing a serious threat to the commercial interest in question. Second, the important commercial interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality, where there is a general principle at stake. Finally, the judge is required to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available to such an order but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

l'autorisation d'aide financière du gouvernement déclenche l'application de l'al. 5(1)b) de la Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale (« LCÉE ») exigeant une évaluation environnementale comme condition de l'aide financière, et que le défaut d'évaluation entraîne l'annulation des ententes financières. ÉACL dépose un affidavit qui résume des documents confidentiels contenant des milliers de pages d'information technique concernant l'évaluation environnementale du site de construction qui est faite par les autorités chinoises. ÉACL s'oppose à la communication des documents demandée par Sierra Club pour la raison notamment qu'ils sont la propriété des autorités chinoises et qu'elle n'est pas autorisée à les divulguer. Les autorités chinoises donnent l'autorisation de les communiquer à la condition qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité n'y donnant accès qu'aux parties et à la cour, mais n'imposant aucune restriction à l'accès du public aux débats. La demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité est rejetée par la Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale. La Cour d'appel fédérale confirme cette décision.

Arrêt : L'appel est accueilli et l'ordonnance demandée par ÉACL est accordée.

Vu le lien existant entre la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression, la question fondamentale pour la cour saisie d'une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité est de savoir si, dans les circonstances, il y a lieu de restreindre le droit à la liberté d'expression. La cour doit s'assurer que l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de l'accorder est conforme aux principes de la Charte parce qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité a des effets préjudiciables sur la liberté d'expression garantie à l'al. 2b). On ne doit l'accorder que (1) lorsqu'elle est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres options raisonnables pour écarter ce risque, et (2) lorsque ses effets bénéfiques, y compris ses effets sur le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur la liberté d'expression qui, dans ce contexte, comprend l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires. Trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous le premier volet de l'analyse. Premièrement, le risque en cause doit être réel et important, être bien étayé par la preuve et menacer gravement l'intérêt commercial en question. Deuxièmement, l'intérêt doit pouvoir se définir en termes d'intérêt public à la confidentialité, mettant en jeu un principe général. Enfin le juge doit non seulement déterminer s'il existe d'autres options raisonnables, il doit aussi restreindre l'ordonnance autant qu'il est raisonnablement possible de le faire tout en préservant l'intérêt commercial en question.

Applying the test to the present circumstances, the commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality, which is sufficiently important to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met. The information must have been treated as confidential at all relevant times; on a balance of probabilities, proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by disclosure of the information; and the information must have been accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential. These requirements have been met in this case. Disclosure of the confidential documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of AECL, and there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

Under the second branch of the test, the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial. Disclosure of the confidential documents would cause AECL to breach its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. If a confidentiality order is denied, AECL will be forced to withhold the documents in order to protect its commercial interests, and since that information is relevant to defences available under the CEAA, the inability to present this information hinders AECL's capacity to make full answer and defence. Although in the context of a civil proceeding, this does not engage a Charter right, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental principle of justice. Further, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the confidential documents, and permit cross-examination based on their contents, assisting in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression. Finally, given the technical nature of the information, there may be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

The deleterious effects of granting a confidentiality order include a negative effect on the open court principle, and therefore on the right to freedom of expression. The more detrimental the confidentiality order would be to the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons, the harder it will be to justify the confidentiality order. In the hands of the parties and their experts, the confidential documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the highly technical nature of the documents, the important value of the search for the truth which underlies En l'espèce, l'intérêt commercial en jeu, la préservation d'obligations contractuelles de confidentialité, est suffisamment important pour satisfaire au premier volet de l'analyse, pourvu que certaines conditions soient remplies : les renseignements ont toujours été traités comme des renseignements confidentiels; il est raisonnable de penser que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, leur divulgation compromettrait des droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques; et les renseignements ont été recueillis dans l'expectative raisonnable qu'ils resteraient confidentiels. Ces conditions sont réunies en l'espèce. La divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de ÉACL et il n'existe pas d'options raisonnables autres que l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

À la deuxième étape de l'analyse, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de ÉACL à un procès équitable. Si ÉACL divulguait les documents confidentiels, elle manquerait à ses obligations contractuelles et s'exposerait à une détérioration de sa position concurrentielle. Le refus de l'ordonnance obligerait ÉACL à retenir les documents pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux et comme ils sont pertinents pour l'exercice des moyens de défense prévus par la LCÉE, l'impossibilité de les produire empêcherait ÉACL de présenter une défense pleine et entière. Même si en matière civile cela n'engage pas de droit protégé par la Charte, le droit à un procès équitable est un principe de justice fondamentale. L'ordonnance permettrait aux parties et au tribunal d'avoir accès aux documents confidentiels, et permettrait la tenue d'un contre-interrogatoire fondé sur leur contenu, favorisant ainsi la recherche de la vérité, une valeur fondamentale sous-tendant la liberté d'expression. Il peut enfin y avoir un important intérêt de sécurité publique à préserver la confidentialité de ce type de renseignements techniques.

Une ordonnance de confidentialité aurait un effet préjudiciable sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et donc sur la liberté d'expression. Plus l'ordonnance porte atteinte aux valeurs fondamentales que sont (1) la recherche de la vérité et du bien commun, (2) l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement des pensées et des idées et (3) la participation de tous au processus politique, plus il est difficile de justifier l'ordonnance. Dans les mains des parties et de leurs experts, les documents peuvent être très utiles pour apprécier la conformité du processus d'évaluation environnementale chinois, et donc pour aider la cour à parvenir à des conclusions de fait exactes. Compte tenu de leur nature hautement technique, la production des documents confidentiels en vertu de l'ordonnance demandée favoriserait mieux l'importante valeur de la recherche de la vérité, qui

both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the confidential documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order.

Under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions relate to the public distribution of the documents, which is a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule. Although the confidentiality order would restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, the second core value of promoting individual self-fulfilment would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order. The third core value figures prominently in this appeal as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. By their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection, so that the public interest is engaged here more than if this were an action between private parties involving private interests. However, the narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the confidential documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts. The core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. The salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects and the order should be granted. A balancing of the various rights and obligations engaged indicates that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial and freedom of expression, while the deleterious effects on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal.

Cases Cited

Applied: Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480; Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76; M. (A.) v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; **referred to:** AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and sous-tend à la fois la liberté d'expression et la publicité des débats judiciaires, que ne le ferait le refus de l'ordonnance.

Aux termes de l'ordonnance demandée, les seules restrictions ont trait à la distribution publique des documents, une atteinte relativement minime à la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Même si l'ordonnance de confidentialité devait restreindre l'accès individuel à certains renseignements susceptibles d'intéresser quelqu'un, la deuxième valeur fondamentale, l'épanouissement personnel, ne serait pas touchée de manière significative. La troisième valeur joue un rôle primordial dans le pourvoi puisque la publicité des débats judiciaires est un aspect fondamental de la société démocratique. Par leur nature même, les questions environnementales ont une portée publique considérable, et la transparence des débats judiciaires sur les questions environnementales mérite généralement un degré élevé de protection, de sorte que l'intérêt public est en l'espèce plus engagé que s'il s'agissait d'un litige entre personnes privées à l'égard d'intérêts purement privés. Toutefois la portée étroite de l'ordonnance associée à la nature hautement technique des documents confidentiels tempère considérablement les effets préjudiciables que l'ordonnance de confidentialité pourrait avoir sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires. Les valeurs centrales de la liberté d'expression que sont la recherche de la vérité et la promotion d'un processus politique ouvert sont très étroitement liées au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, et sont les plus touchées par une ordonnance limitant cette publicité. Toutefois, en l'espèce, l'ordonnance de confidentialité n'entraverait que légèrement la poursuite de ces valeurs, et pourrait même les favoriser à certains égards. Ses effets bénéfiques l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, et il y a lieu de l'accorder. Selon la pondération des divers droits et intérêts en jeu, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques importants sur le droit de ÉACL à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression, et ses effets préjudiciables sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression seraient minimes.

Jurisprudence

Arrêts appliqués : Edmonton Journal c. Alberta (Procureur général), [1989] 2 R.C.S. 1326; Société Radio-Canada c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Procureur général), [1996] 3 R.C.S. 480; Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835; R. c. Mentuck, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 442, 2001 CSC 76; M. (A.) c. Ryan, [1997] 1 R.C.S. 157; Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général), [1989] 1 R.C.S. 927; R. c. Keegstra, [1990] 3 R.C.S. 697; arrêts mentionnés : AB Hassle c. *Welfare*), [2000] 3 F.C. 360, aff'g (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428; *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; *R. v. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478, 2001 SCC 77; *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35; *Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(*b*). *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37, ss. 5(1)(*b*), 8, 54, 54(2)(*b*).

Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, rr. 151, 312.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (QL), affirming a decision of the Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (QL). Appeal allowed.

J. Brett Ledger and Peter Chapin, for the appellant.

Timothy J. Howard and *Franklin S. Gertler*, for the respondent Sierra Club of Canada.

Graham Garton, Q.C., and J. Sanderson Graham, for the respondents the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

Іасовиссі J. —

I. Introduction

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In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important *Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social)*, [2000] 3 C.F. 360, conf. [1998] A.C.F. nº 1850 (QL); *Ethyl Canada Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; *R. c. Oakes*, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103; *R. c. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 478, 2001 CSC 77; *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 880, 2000 CSC 35; *Eli Lilly and Co. c. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

Lois et règlements cités

Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, art. 1, 2b).

Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, ch. 37, art. 5(1)*b*), 8, 54, 54(2) [abr. & rempl. 1993, ch. 34, art. 37].

Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998), DORS/98-106, règles 151, 312.

POURVOI contre un arrêt de la Cour d'appel fédérale, [2000] 4 C.F. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] A.C.F. n° 732 (QL), qui a confirmé une décision de la Section de première instance, [2000] 2 C.F. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] A.C.F. n° 1633 (QL). Pourvoi accueilli.

J. Brett Ledger et Peter Chapin, pour l'appelante.

Timothy J. Howard et *Franklin S. Gertler*, pour l'intimé Sierra Club du Canada.

Graham Garton, c.r., et J. Sanderson Graham, pour les intimés le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada.

Version française du jugement de la Cour rendu par

LE JUGE IACOBUCCI —

I. Introduction

Dans notre pays, les tribunaux sont les institutions généralement choisies pour résoudre au mieux les différends juridiques par l'application de principes juridiques aux faits de chaque espèce. Un des principes sous-jacents au processus judiciaire est la transparence, tant dans la procédure suivie que dans les éléments pertinents à la solution du litige. Certains de ces éléments peuvent toutefois faire l'objet d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Le

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demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(*b*) of the *Charter: New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is <u>seen</u> to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as "the very soul of justice", guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: *New Brunswick*, at para. 22.

(3) <u>Adapting the *Dagenais* Test to the Rights</u> and Interests of the Parties

Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of *Dagenais* and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

A confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and général est que tout litige porté devant les tribunaux doit être tranché selon la norme du procès équitable. La légitimité du processus judiciaire n'exige pas moins. De même, les tribunaux ont intérêt à ce que toutes les preuves pertinentes leur soient présentées pour veiller à ce que justice soit faite.

Ainsi, les intérêts que favoriserait l'ordonnance de confidentialité seraient le maintien de relations commerciales et contractuelles, de même que le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable. Est lié à ce dernier droit l'intérêt du public et du judiciaire dans la recherche de la vérité et la solution juste des litiges civils.

Milite contre l'ordonnance de confidentialité le principe fondamental de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Ce principe est inextricablement lié à la liberté d'expression constitutionnalisée à l'al. 2b) de la Charte : Nouveau-Brunswick, précité, par. 23. L'importance de l'accès du public et des médias aux tribunaux ne peut être sous-estimée puisque l'accès est le moyen grâce auquel le processus judiciaire est soumis à l'examen et à la critique. Comme il est essentiel à l'administration de la justice que justice soit faite et soit perçue comme l'étant, cet examen public est fondamental. Le principe de la publicité des procédures judiciaires a été décrit comme le « souffle même de la justice », la garantie de l'absence d'arbitraire dans l'administration de la justice : Nouveau-Brunswick, par. 22.

(3) <u>Adaptation de l'analyse de *Dagenais* aux</u> droits et intérêts des parties

Pour appliquer aux droits et intérêts en jeu en l'espèce l'analyse de *Dagenais* et des arrêts subséquents précités, il convient d'énoncer de la façon suivante les conditions applicables à une ordonnance de confidentialité dans un cas comme l'espèce :

Une ordonnance de confidentialité en vertu de la règle 151 ne doit être rendue que si :

 a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres options raisonnables pour écarter ce risque;

- (b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.
- As in *Mentuck*, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well grounded in the evidence, and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.
- In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest", the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in F.N. (Re), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35, at para. 10, the open court rule only yields "where the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness" (emphasis added).
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In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an "important commercial interest". It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second b) ses effets bénéfiques, y compris ses effets sur le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur la liberté d'expression qui, dans ce contexte, comprend l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires.

Comme dans *Mentuck*, j'ajouterais que trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous le premier volet de l'analyse. En premier lieu, le risque en cause doit être réel et important, en ce qu'il est bien étayé par la preuve et menace gravement l'intérêt commercial en question.

De plus, l'expression « intérêt commercial important » exige une clarification. Pour être qualifié d'« intérêt commercial important », l'intérêt en question ne doit pas se rapporter uniquement et spécifiquement à la partie qui demande l'ordonnance de confidentialité; il doit s'agir d'un intérêt qui peut se définir en termes d'intérêt public à la confidentialité. Par exemple, une entreprise privée ne pourrait simplement prétendre que l'existence d'un contrat donné ne devrait pas être divulguée parce que cela lui ferait perdre des occasions d'affaires, et que cela nuirait à ses intérêts commerciaux. Si toutefois, comme en l'espèce, la divulgation de renseignements doit entraîner un manquement à une entente de non-divulgation, on peut alors parler plus largement de l'intérêt commercial général dans la protection des renseignements confidentiels. Simplement, si aucun principe général n'entre en jeu, il ne peut y avoir d'« intérêt commercial important » pour les besoins de l'analyse. Ou, pour citer le juge Binnie dans F.N. (Re), [2000] 1 R.C.S. 880, 2000 CSC 35, par. 10, la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires ne cède le pas que « dans les cas où le droit du public à la confidentialité l'emporte sur le droit du public à l'accessibilité » (je souligne).

Outre l'exigence susmentionnée, les tribunaux doivent déterminer avec prudence ce qui constitue un « intérêt commercial important ». Il faut rappeler qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité implique une atteinte à la liberté d'expression. Même si la pondération de l'intérêt commercial et de la liberté d'expression intervient à la deuxième étape

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In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended and in the Matter of a Proposed Plan of Compromise or Arrangement with respect to Stelco Inc., and other Applicants listed in Schedule "A" Application under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended

[Indexed as: Stelco Inc. (Re)]

[* Editor's note: Schedule "A" was not attached to the copy received from the Court and therefore is not included in the judgment.]

> 75 O.R. (3d) 5 [2005] O.J. No. 1171 Docket: M32289

Court of Appeal for Ontario, Goudge, Feldman and Blair JJ.A. March 31, 2005

Corporations -- Directors -- Removal of directors --Jurisdiction of court to remove directors -- Restructuring supervised by court under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Supervising judge erring in removing directors based on apprehension that directors would not act in best interests of corporation -- In context of restructuring, court not having inherent jurisdiction to remove directors -- Removal of directors governed by normal principles of corporate law and not by court's authority under s. 11 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to supervise restructuring -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.

Debtor and creditor -- Arrangements -- Removal of directors -- Jurisdiction of court to remove directors -- Restructuring supervised by court under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Supervising judge erring in removing directors based on apprehension that directors would not act in best interests of corporation - In context of restructuring, court not having inherent jurisdiction to remove directors -- Removal of directors governed by normal principles of corporate law and not by court's authority under s. 11 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to supervise restructuring -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.

On January 29, 2004, Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") obtained protection from creditors under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA"). Subsequently, while a restructuring under the CCAA was under way, Clearwater Capital Management Inc. ("Clearwater") and Equilibrium Capital Management Inc. ("Equilibrium") acquired a 20 per cent holding in the outstanding publicly traded common shares of Stelco. Michael Woollcombe and Roland Keiper, who were associated with Clearwater and Equilibrium, asked to be appointed to the Stelco board of directors, which had been depleted as a result of resignations. Their request was supported by other shareholders who, together with Clearwater and Equilibrium, represented about 40 per cent of the common shareholders. On February 18, 2005, the Board acceded to the request and Woollcombe and Keiper were appointed to the Board. On the same day as their appointments, the board of directors began consideration of competing bids that had been received as a result of a courtapproved capital raising process that had become the focus of the CCAA restructuring.

The appointment of Woollcombe and Keiper to the Board incensed the employees of Stelco. They applied to the court to have the appointments set aside. The employees argued that there was a reasonable apprehension that Woollcombe [page6] and Keiper would not be able to act in the best interests of Stelco as opposed to their own best interests as shareholders. Purporting to rely on the court's inherent jurisdiction and the discretion provided by the CCAA, on February 25, 2005, Farley J. ordered Woollcombe and Keiper removed from the Board.

Woollcombe and Keiper applied for leave to appeal the order of Farley J. and if leave be granted, that the order be set aside on the grounds that (a) Farley J. did not have the jurisdiction to make the order under the provisions of the CCAA, (b) even if he did have jurisdiction, the reasonable apprehension of bias test had no application to the removal of directors, (c) he had erred in interfering with the exercise by the Board of its business judgment in filling the vacancies on the Board, and (d) in any event, the facts did not meet any test that would justify the removal of directors by a court.

Held, leave to appeal should be granted, and the appeal should be allowed.

The appeal involved the scope of a judge's discretion under s. 11 of the CCAA, in the context of corporate governance decisions made during the course of the plan negotiating and approval process of the CCAA. In particular, it involved the court's power, if any, to make an order removing directors under s. 11 of the CCAA. The order to remove directors could not be founded on inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction is a power derived from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law, and it permits the court to maintain its authority and to prevent its process from being obstructed and abused. However, inherent jurisdiction does not operate where Parliament or the legislature has acted and, in the CCAA context, the discretion given by s. 11 to stay proceedings against the debtor corporation and the discretion given by s. 6 to approve a plan which appears to be reasonable and fair supplanted the need to resort to inherent jurisdiction. A judge is general ly exercising the court's statutory discretion under s. 11 of the Act when supervising a CCAA proceeding. The order in this case could not be founded on inherent jurisdiction because it was designed to supervise the company's process, not the court's process.

The issue then was the nature of the court's power under s. 11 of the CCAA. The s. 11 discretion is not open-ended and unfettered. Its exercise was guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. What the court does under s. 11 is establish the boundaries of the playing field and act as a referee in the process. The company's role in the restructuring, and that of

its stakeholders, is to work out a plan or compromise that a sufficient percentage of creditors will accept and the court will approve and sanction. In the course of acting as referee, the court has authority to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. The court is not entitled to usurp the role of the directors and management in conducting what are in substance the company's restructurin g efforts. The corporate activities that take place in the course of the workout are governed by the legislation and legal principles that normally apply to such activities. The court is not catapulted into the shoes of the board of directors or into the seat of the chair of the board when acting in its supervisory role in the restructuring.

The matters relating to the removal of directors did not fall within the court's discretion under s. 11. The fact that s. 11 did not itself provide the authority for a CCAA judge to order the removal of directors, however, did not mean that the supervising judge was powerless to make such an order. Section 20 of the CCAA offered a gateway to the oppression remedy and other provisions of the Canada [page7] Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 ("CBCA") and similar provincial statutes. The powers of a judge under s. 11 of the CCAA may be applied together with the provisions of the CBCA, including the oppression remedy provisions of that statute.

Court removal of directors is an exceptional remedy and one that is rarely exercised in corporate law. In determining whether directors have fallen foul of their obligations, more than some risk of anticipated misconduct is required before the court can impose the extraordinary remedy of removing a director from his or her duly elected or appointed office. The evidence in this case was far from reaching the standard for removal, and the record would not support a finding of oppression, even if one had been sought. The record did not support a finding that there was a sufficient risk of misconduct to warrant a conclusion of oppression. Further, Farley J.'s borrowing the administrative law notion of apprehension of bias was foreign to the principles that govern the election, appointment and removal of directors and to corporate governance considerations in general. There was nothing in the CBCA or other corporate legislation that envisaged the screening of directors in advance for their ability to a ct neutrally, in the best interests of the corporation, as a prerequisite for appointment. The issue to be determined was not whether there was a connection between a director and other shareholders or stakeholders, but rather whether there was some conduct on the part of the director that would justify the imposition of a corrective sanction. An apprehension of bias approach did not fit this sort of analysis.

For these reasons, Farley J. erred in declaring the appointment of Woollcombe and Keiper as directors of Stelco of no force and effect, and the appeal should be allowed. Cases referred to

Alberta Pacific Terminals Ltd. (Re), [1991] B.C.J. No. 1065, 8 C.B.R. (3d) 99 (S.C.); Algoma Steel Inc. (Re), [2001] O.J. No. 1943, 147 O.A.C. 291, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (C.A.); Algoma Steel Inc. v. Union Gas Ltd. (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 78, [2003] O.J. No. 71, 39 C.B.R. (4th) 5 (C.A.), revg in part [2001] O.J. No. 5046, 30 C.B.R. (4th) 163 (S.C.J.); Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd. (Re) [2000] O.J. No. 786, 18 C.B.R. (4th) 157, 5 B.L.R. (3d) 75 (S.C.J.); Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 475, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 5 N.R. 515, [1976] 1 W.W.R. 1, 20 C.B.R. (N.S.) 240; Blair v. Consolidated Enfield Corp., [1995] 4 S.C.R. 5, [1995] S.C.J. No. 29, 25 O.R. (3d) 480n, 128 D.L.R. (4th) 73, 187 N.R. 241, 24 B.L.R. (2d) 161; Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc. (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 289, [1991] O.J. No. 683, 45 O.A.C. 320, 80 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 1 B.L.R. (2d) 225 (C.A.); Catalyst Fund General Partne r I Inc. v. Hollinger Inc., [2004] O.J. No. 4722, 1 B.L.R. (4th) 186 (S.C.J.); Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (C.A.); Clear Creek Contracting Ltd. v. Skeena Cellulose Inc. [2003] B.C.J. No. 1335, 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (C.A.); Country Style Foods Services Inc.

(Re), [2002] O.J. No. 1377, 158 O.A.C. 30 (C.A.); Dylex Ltd. (Re), [1995] O.J. No. 595, 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Gen. Div.); Ivaco Inc. (Re), [2004] O.J. No. 2483, 3 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (S.C.J.); Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. (Re), [1993] O.J. No. 14, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Gen. Div.); London Finance Corp. Ltd. v. Banking Service Corp. Ltd., [1922] O.J. No. 378, 23 O.W.N. 138 (H.C.); Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Re) (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500, [1993] O.J. No. 545, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Gen. Div.) (sub nom. Olympia & York Dev. v. Royal Trust Co.); Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, [2004] S.C.J. No. 64, 244 D.L.R. (4th) 564, 2004 SCC 68, 49 B.L.R. (3d) 165, 4 C.B.R. (5th) 215; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, [2001] [page8] S.C.J. No. 3, 88 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, 194 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [2001] 6 W.W.R. 1, 86 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 150 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 39 C.R. (5th) 72, [2001] SCC 2; Richtree Inc. (Re) (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 174, [2005] O.J. No. 251, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 294 (S.C.J.); Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, 36 O.R. (3d) 418n, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 221 N.R. 241, 50 C.B.R. (3d) 163, 33 C.C.E.L. (2d) 173, 98 CLLC 210-006 (sub nom. Ontario Ministry of Labour v. Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Adrien v. Ontario Ministry of Labour); Royal Oak Mines Inc. (Re), [1999] O.J. No. 864, 7 C.B.R. (4th) 293, 96 O.T.C. 279 (Gen. Div.); Sammi Atlas Inc. (Re), [1998] O.J. No. 1089, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Gen. Div.); Stephenson v. Vokes (1896), 27 O.R. 691, [1896] O.J. No. 191 (H.C.J.); Westar Mining Ltd. (Re), [1992] B.C.J. No. 1360, 14 C.B.R. (3d) 88, 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) 6, [1992] 6 W.W.R. 331 (S.C.)

Statutes referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, ss. 2 [as am.], 102 [as am.], 106(3) [as am], 109(1) [as am.], 111 [as am.], 122(1) [as am.], 145 [as am.], 241 [as am.]

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ss. 11 [as am.], 20 [as am.]

Authorities referred to

Driedger, E.A., The Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983)

Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. (London: LexisNexis UK, 1973 --),

Jacob, I.H., "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 27-28

Peterson, D.H., Shareholder Remedies in Canada, looseleaf (Markham: LexisNexis--Butterworths, 1989)

Sullivan, R., Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002)

APPLICATION for leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, an appeal from the order of Farley J., reported at [2005] O.J. No. 729, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (S.C.J.), removing two directors from the board of directors of Stelco Inc.

Jeffrey S. Leon and Richard B. Swan, for appellants Michael Woollcombe and Roland Keiper.

Kenneth T. Rosenberg and Robert A. Centa, for respondent United Steelworkers of America.

Murray Gold and Andrew J. Hatnay, for respondent Retired Salaried Beneficiaries of Stelco Inc., CHT Steel Company Inc., Stelpipe Ltd., Stelwire Ltd. And Welland Pipe Ltd.

Michael C.P. McCreary and Carrie L. Clynick, for USWA Locals 5328 and 8782.

John R. Varley, for Active Salaried Employee Representative.

Michael Barrack, for Stelco Inc.

Peter Griffin, for Board of Directors of Stelco Inc.

K. Mahar, for Monitor.

David R. Byers, for CIT Business Credit, Agent for DIP Lender. [page9]

The judgment of the court was delivered by

BLAIR J.A.: --

Part I -- Introduction

[1] Stelco Inc. and four of its wholly-owned subsidiaries obtained protection from their creditors under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA") [See Note 1 at the end of the document] on January 29, 2004. Since that time, the Stelco Group has been engaged in a high profile, and sometimes controversial, process of economic restructuring. Since October 2004, the restructuring has revolved around a court-approved capital raising process which, by February 2005, had generated a number of competitive bids for the Stelco Group.

[2] Farley J., an experienced judge of the Superior Court Commercial List in Toronto, has been supervising the CCAA process from the outset.

[3] The appellants, Michael Woollcombe and Roland Keiper, are associated with two companies -- Clearwater Capital Management Inc. and Equilibrium Capital Management Inc. -- which, respectively, hold approximately 20 per cent of the outstanding publicly traded common shares of Stelco. Most of these shares have been acquired while the CCAA process has been ongoing, and Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper have made it clear publicly that they believe there is good shareholder value in Stelco in spite of the restructuring. The reason they are able to take this position is that there has been a solid turn around in worldwide steel markets, as a result of which Stelco, although remaining in insolvency protection, is earning annual operating profits.

[4] The Stelco board of directors (the "Board") has been depleted as a result of resignations, and in January of this year Messrs. Woollcombe and Keiper expressed an interest in [36] In the CCAA context, Parliament has provided a statutory framework to extend protection to a company while it holds its creditors at bay and attempts to negotiate a compromised plan of arrangement that will enable it to emerge and continue as a viable economic entity, thus benefiting society and the company in the long run, along with the company's creditors, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders. The s. 11 discretion is the engine that drives this broad and flexible statutory scheme, and that for the most part supplants the need to resort to inherent jurisdiction. In that regard, I agree with the comment of Newbury J.A. in Clear Creek Contracting Ltd. v. Skeena Cellulose Inc., [2003] B.C.J. No. 1335, 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187 (C.A.), at para. 46, that:

... the court is not exercising a power that arises from its nature as a superior court of law, but is exercising the discretion given to it by the CCAA. ... This is the discretion, given by s. 11, to stay proceedings against the debtor corporation and the discretion, given by s. 6, to approve a plan which appears to be reasonable and fair, to be in accord with the requirements and objects of the statute, and to make possible the continuation of the corporation as a viable entity. It is these considerations the courts have been concerned with in the cases discussed above [See Note 2 at the end of the docuemnt], rather than the integrity of their own process.

[37] As Jacob observes, in his article "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court", supra, at p. 25:

The inherent jurisdiction of the court is a concept which must be distinguished from the exercise of judicial discretion. These two concepts resemble each other, particularly in their operation, and they often appear to overlap, and are therefore sometimes confused the one with the other. There is nevertheless a vital juridical distinction between jurisdiction and discretion, which must always be observed.

[38] I do not mean to suggest that inherent jurisdiction can never apply in a CCAA context. The court retains the ability to



CITATION: Timminco Limited (Re), 2012 ONSC 506 COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-9539-00CL DATE: 20120202

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

(COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36, AS AMENDED

RE: IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TIMMINCO LIMITED AND BÉCANCOUR SILICON INC., Applicants

BEFORE: MORAWETZ J.

COUNSEL: A. J. Taylor, M. Konyukhova and K. Esaw, for the Applicants

D.W. Ellickson, for Communications, Energy and Paperworkers' Union of Canada

C. Sinclair, for United Steelworkers' Union

K. Peters, for AMG Advance Metallurgical Group NV

M. Bailey, for Superintendent of Financial Services (Ontario)

S. Weisz, for FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

A. Kauffman, for Investissement Quebec

HEARD:January 12, 2012RELEASED:January 16, 2012REASONS:February 2, 2012

ENDORSEMENT

[1] This motion was heard on January 12, 2012. On January 16, 2012, the following endorsement was released:

[42] It seems apparent that the position of the unions' is in direct conflict with the Applicants' positions.

[43] The position being put forth by counsel to the CEP and USW is clearly stated and is quite understandable. However, in my view, the position of the CEP and the USW has to be considered in the context of the practical circumstances facing the Timminco Entities. The Timminco Entities are clearly insolvent and do not have sufficient reserves to address the funding requirements of the pension plans.

[44] Counsel to the Applicants submits that without the relief requested, the Timminco Entities will be deprived of the services being provided by the beneficiaries of the charges, to the company's detriment. I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that it is unlikely that the advisors will participate in the CCAA proceedings unless the Administration Charge is granted to secure their fees and disbursements. I also accept the evidence of Mr. Kalins that the role of the advisors is critical to the efforts of the Timminco Entities to restructure. To expect that the advisors will take the business risk of participating in these proceedings without the security of the charge is neither reasonable nor realistic.

[45] Likewise, I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants to the effect that the directors and officers will not continue their service without the D&O Charge. Again, in circumstances such as those facing the Timminco Entities, it is neither reasonable nor realistic to expect directors and officers to continue without the requested form of protection.

[46] It logically follows, in my view, that without the assistance of the advisors, and in the anticipated void caused by the lack of a governance structure, the Timmico Entities will be directionless and unable to effectively proceed with any type or form of restructuring under the CCAA.

[47] The Applicants argue that the CCAA overrides any conflicting requirements of the QSPPA and the BPA.

[48] Counsel submits that the general paramountcy of the CCAA over provincial legislation was confirmed in *ATB Financial v. Metcalf & Mansfield Alternative Investment II Corp.*, (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 104. In addition, in *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, the Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of paramountcy applies either where a provincial and a federal statutory position are in conflict and cannot both be complied with, or where complying with the provincial law will have the effect of frustrating the purpose of the federal law and therefore the intent of Parliament. See *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 23 (Ont. C.A.).

[49] It has long been stated that the purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors, with the purpose of allowing the business to continue. As the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated in *Stelco Inc.*, (*Re*) (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5, at para. 36:

In the CCAA context, Parliament has provided a statutory framework to extend protection to a company while it holds its creditors at bay and attempts to negotiate a compromised plan of arrangement that will enable it to emerge and continue as a viable economic entity, thus benefiting society and the company in the long run, along with the company's creditors, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders. The s. 11 discretion is the engine that drives this broad and flexible statutory scheme...

[50] Further, as I indicated in *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J.), this purpose continues to exist regardless of whether a company is actually restructuring or is continuing operations during a sales process in order to maintain maximum value and achieve the highest price for the benefit of all stakeholders. Based on this reasoning, the fact that Timminco has not provided any plan for restructuring at this time does not change the analysis.

[51] The Court of Appeal in *Indalex Ltd. (Re)* (2011), 75 C.B.R. (5th) 19 (Ont. C.A.) confirmed the CCAA court's ability to override conflicting provisions of provincial statutes where the application of the provincial legislation would frustrate the company's ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy. The Court stated, *inter alia*, as follows (beginning at paragraph 176):

The CCAA court has the authority to grant a super-priority charge to DIP lenders in CCAA proceedings. I fully accept that the CCAA judge can make an order granting a super-priority charge that has the effect of overriding provincial legislation, including the PBA. ...

•••

What of the contention that recognition of the deemed trust will cause DIP lenders to be unwilling to advance funds in CCAA proceedings? It is important to recognize that the conclusion I have reached does not mean that a finding of paramountcy will never be made. That determination must be made on a case by case basis. There may well be situations in which paramountcy is invoked and the record satisfies the CCAA judge that application of the provincial legislation would frustrate the company's ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy.

[52] The Timminco Entities seek approval to suspend Special Payments in order to maintain sufficient liquidity to continue operations for the benefit of all stakeholders, including employees and pensioners. It is clear that based on the January 2 forecast, as modified by the Second Report, the Timminco Entities have insufficient liquidity to make the Special Payments at this time.

[53] Counsel to the Timminco Entities submits that where it is necessary to achieve the objective of the CCAA, the court has the jurisdiction to make an order under the CCAA granting, in the present case, super priority over the Encumbrances for the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge, even if such an order conflicts with, or overrides, the QSPPA or the PBA.



In the Court of Appeal of Alberta

Citation: Wiebe v Weinrich Contracting Ltd, 2020 ABCA 396

Date: 20201109 Docket: 1903-0139-AC Registry: Edmonton

Between:

Roy Wiebe and Parkland Aerospace Corp

Appellants (Defendants)

- and -

Weinrich Contracting Ltd

Respondent (Plaintiff)

- and -

Parkland Airport Development Corporation, Deloitte Restructuring Inc, and 2155734 Alberta Ltd

Not Parties to the Appeal

The Court:

The Honourable Mr. Justice Peter Martin The Honourable Madam Justice Ritu Khullar The Honourable Madam Justice Dawn Pentelechuk

Memorandum of Judgment

Appeal from the Order by The Honourable Mr. Justice S.D. Hillier Dated the 17th day of April, 2019 Filed the 14th day of June, 2019 (Docket: 1603-20319; 1603-12839)

Page: 6

[*Century Services*]. Farley J in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd, Re*, 17 CBR (3d) 24, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 at para 5 (Ont Gen Div [Commercial List]), expressed a similar view:

It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors.

[27] In furtherance of these remedial objectives, the *CCAA* provides "broad and flexible authority" permitting a court to make a wide range of orders necessary to support a company's reorganization. All insolvency proceedings in Canada are based on the single proceeding model, described by Professor Wood in *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law*, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009):

They all provide a collective proceeding that supersedes the usual civil process available to creditors to enforce their claims. The creditors' remedies are collectivized in order to prevent the free-for-all that would otherwise prevail if creditors were permitted to exercise their remedies. In the absence of a collective process, each creditor is armed with the knowledge that if they do not strike hard and swift to seize the debtor's assets, they will be beat out by other creditors. [pp. 2-3]

[28] To achieve this, the *CCAA* expressly provided, as at the relevant time, that a court may issue and extend a stay of proceedings against the debtor company while a compromise is sought:

11.02(1) A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 30 days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

[29] Stays of proceedings against the debtor company are common and are included in the initial commercial template order in *CCAA* proceedings in Alberta.¹

[30] The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature"; that is, legislation not "contain[ing] a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred": *Metcalfe & Mansfield* Alternative Investments II Corp (Re), 2008 ONCA 587, 92 OR (3d) 513, at para 44, per Blair JA). Thus, decisions of the court are frequently based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction grounded in the broad language of s 11 of the CCAA:

Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if <u>an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company</u>, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person <u>or without notice</u> as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances [emphasis added].

[31] This broad and flexible authority means a high degree of deference is afforded to a supervising judge making a discretionary decision in the *CCAA* context. An appellate court may intervene if there was an error in principle or the discretion was exercised unreasonably: **9354**-**9186** *Québec inc v Callidus Capital Corp*, 2020 SCC 10 at para 53 [*Callidus*]. It may also intervene if there was a breach of procedural fairness, if the breach had a negative impact on affected parties' rights: *Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v United Steelworkers*, 2013 SCC 6, [2013] 1 SCR 271 at paras 73-74 (*per* Deschamps J) and paras 275-276 (*per* LeBel J, dissenting, but not on whether the duty of procedural fairness applies to *CCAA* proceedings).

[32] While the *CCAA* provides no express authority to grant a stay of proceedings against third parties other than the debtor company, such orders are quite common. Orders have also been granted *releasing* claims against third parties as part of approving a plan of arrangement. In short, "[c]ases support the view that third-party rights may be affected by a stay order": *Luscar Ltd v Smoky River Coal Limited*, 1999 ABCA 179, 237 AR 326 at para 60. If it is just and convenient

¹ Available here: https://albertacourts.ca/qb/areas-of-law/commercial/templates-and-forms. See appellants' factum at paras 62, 65.